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Abstract 
Some philosophers have suggested that we can deduce the temporal metaphysics of our 
universe from our theories of physics. The special and general theories of relativity in 
particular have been taken to imply that past and future moments of time have the same 
status as the present moment of time. Philosophers who propose this view of reality, 
which can be described as the static block universe view, frequently take their 
opponents to be claiming that only the present moment of time exists and that past and 
future moments of time do not exist, the so-called presentisi view. 
Presentism however is only one type of objectively distinguished present theory 
of time. It is possible to argue for an objectively distinguished present theory in which 
past moments as well as the present moment are conceived of as existing. This is the 
growing block universe view. It is also possible to argue for a physically distinguished 
present theory in which moments of time are distinguished not in terms of their state of 
existence but in terms of their state of determinacy. This is the growing determinacy 
view. On such a view, all moments are conceived of as existing, but past moments are 
regarded as deten-ninate, the present moment as becoming determinate, and future 
moments as indeterminate. 
The arguments for the static block universe view on the basis of special and 
general relativity are examined initially. It is demonstrated that it is not possible to 
describe in objectively distinguished present terms some universes which are modelled 
on the basis of relativity alone. However, it is further demonstrated that if a universe 
confon-ns to thermodynamical and quantum mechanical laws as well as to relativity, 
then that universe can be described in objectively distinguished present terms as well as 
in static block universe terms. 
These results are interpreted as evidence that our current theories of physics, 
taken together, do not conclusively indicate the temporal metaphysics of our universe. 
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Heraclitus, who urges us to investigate this, positing "necessary changes" from opposite to opposite, and 
saying "way up and down" and "changing, it is at rest", and "weariness to toil at and be subjected to the 
same things", has left us guessingl- since he has neglected to make clear to us what he is saying, perhaps we 
ought to seek by ourselves, as he himself sought and found. 




I Locations In Space, Locations In Time 
imagine an archer firing an arrow from a bow towards a target thirty metres away. The 
arrow leaves the bow at a speed of thirty metres per second, and thus the length of time 
taken for the arrow to travel from the bow to the target, assuming that deceleration due 
to air resistance is negligible, is one second. Consider a plot of the distance of the arrow 
from the bow at intervals of one tenth of a second. 
Fig. 1.1 Distance Travelled In One Second 
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At each moment of the arrow's flight, the arrow has a determinate location in space. 
After zero seconds, it is zero metres from the bow in the direction of flight, after one 
tenth of a second, it is three metres from the bow in the direction of flight, and so on. 
We think of each of these locations in space as existing, and can represent these 
locations on the x-axis of a graph as shown. 
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Now consider the y-axis of the graph. The y-axis represents locations not in 
space but in time. I Should I conceive of locations in time as existing in the same way as 
locations in space? My experience of time is different to my experience of space. I can 
perceive all the parts of a relatively short distance, such as the distance travelled by the 
arrow, in a single moment of time, but I never experience more than one moment of 
time directly. The moment of time which I experience directly I term the present 
moment, and I distinguish this present moment from moments which I have experienced 
previously, which I term past moments, and moments which I have yet to experience, 
which I term future moments. 
If I walk along the path traversed by the arrow, I can stop fifteen metres from the 
target and say "I am here". Whilst my spatial location is fifteen metres from the target, a 
location six metres from the target does not seem to be any less real than my current 
location. It does not seem that the location fifteen metres from the target is real simply 
because that is where I am located, nor that the location six metres from the target is not 
real because I am not located at that point in space or because, perhaps, I am not 
observing that point in space. I can summarize by saying that a location in space is 
objective, that is, it is real independent of whether or not I am located at that point in 
space and independent of whether or not I am observing that location in space. 2 
To say that something is objective is to say that it does not belong to the 
consciousness or the perceiving or thinking subject, but to what is presented to the 
subject. An objective thing is therefore a thing which is external to the mind. 3 I am 
going to assume a realist position in relation to locations in space and assume that they 
are objective in this sense. 4 
Suppose that I am standing at the position fifteen metres from the target at a 
moment of time one hundred and eighty seconds after the arrow reached the target, and 
I say "I am here now". My temporal location is the moment one hundred and eighty 
seconds after the arrow reached the target. Just as I can envisage a location in space, so 
I In the case of simple distance against time graphs, distance is often represented on the y-axis with time 
represented on the x-axis. In the following chapters, however, I will be referring to the type of space-time 
diagrams which are standardly employed in accounts of special and general relativity. The convention in 
these type of space-time diagrams is to represent time on the y-axis and distance on the x-axis. This 
convention has therefore been adopted from the outset. 
2 it is possible to conceive of metaphysical systems in which the reality of locations in space does depend 
upon their being observed. An idealist in the mould of Bishop Berkeley might hold, for example, that 
spatial locations only exist because they are observed by God. However, I am assuming for the sake of 
argument a straightforward realist view in which a spatial location is assumed to be real, regardless of 
whether or not anyone is located at that point in space and regardless of whether or not that point in space 
is being observed by an observer. 
3 This definition is derived ftom the entry for "objective" in the Oxford English Dictionary. 
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I can envisage a location in time, and just as I can envisage that a location in space is 
objective, so I can envisage that a location in time is objective. I will therefore assume, 
again adopting a straightforward realist view, that there is an objective correlate to what 
I experience as the present moment of time, and that this objective correlate is a 
location in time. I will use the term moment to refer to the objective correlate of my 
experience. I am therefore taking a moment to be an objective temporal location, and 
assuming that my experience of the present moment is an experience of a particular 
temporal location. 
A question arises as a consequence of the realist assumption made above. Is the 
moment at which the arrow reached the target as real as the moment which I call 
"now"? From my point of view, the moment at which the arrow reached the target is a 
past moment, a moment which I cannot perceive directly, though I may be able to 
remember it. Does that, however, mean that I should consider it to be less real than the 
moment which I am experiencing as the present moment? 
In relation to a particular spatial location, the fact that I am at that spatial 
location does not appear to confer any special status upon that location which 
distinguishes it from other locations in space. According to the straightforward realist 
view I am assuming, all spatial locations have the same physical status and they also all 
have the same existential status. 
By "existential status" I mean the "state of existence" of a spatial location (and, 
as I will go on to illustrate, the "state of existence" of a temporal location as well). In 
order to indicate the distinction I am drawing here between physical status and 
existential status, consider an unrelated example. When Descartes considered a piece of 
wax, 5 he noticed that its physical status could vary. It could exist, in the scenario he 
describes, as a solid or a liquid. The wax in these two different states could be said to 
have a different physical status. If the wax actually went out of existence, however, if it 
boiled away into its constituent components for example, then I would describe this by 
saying that it had a different existential status before and after boiling. Before boiling it 
existed as wax, after boiling it no longer existed as wax. In this case, it is apparent that 
if the wax has a different existential status, then it necessarily has a different physical 
status, suggesting that a change in existential status is a subset of the possible changes 
in physical status. Indeed, change in existential status could be viewed as a limiting case 
of change in physical status. Whilst this example clarifies in essence the distinction 
4 Nagel 1986 explores the philosophical complexities attendant on the term "objective" in detail. 
5 Descartes 1641,2d Meditation. 
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which I am drawing between physical status and existential status, I will attempt to 
clarify the distinction further specifically as it applies to spatial and temporal locations. 
The claim that a spatial location exists whether or not a subject is located at that 
location is a relatively unproblematic one, unless one is an idealist. (By a subject here is 
meant an entity capable of experiencing the location at which It is located. ) Should I 
therefore assume, however, that a temporal location exists, whether or not a subject is 
located at that location? Given that the only temporal location of which I have direct 
experience is the present moment, it is not clear what I am entitled to assume about the 
state of existence of other temporal locations, that is, past and future moments. I 
employ the term "existential status" at this stage, therefore, to avoid embodying in the 
terminology any assumptions which have not yet been justified. 
In relation to a particular spatial location, my being at that spatial location did 
not carry any particular significance for either the existential status nor more generally 
the physical status of that location, on the assumption that all spatial locations are 
objective. In relation to a particular temporal location, however, it is not yet obvious 
what the significance is of my being at that temporal location. 
Should I conceive of a temporal location in the same way as a spatial location, 
and conclude that the fact that I am "at" that temporal location, that is, that I experience 
that temporal location as the present moment, does not imply any special existential 
status nor, more generally, any special physical status for that temporal location which 
distinguishes it from other locations in time? Or should I note that my experience of 
time is different to my experience of space, and conclude that the fact that I experience 
a particular moment as the present moment is indicative of an objective difference 
between that moment and other moments of time? If the latter, should I conclude that 
the difference is an existential difference, or some other physical difference between 
that moment and other moments of time? 
In the case of a piece of wax, it was clear that a change in existential status 
amounted to a change in physical status, of a more extreme variety than other possible 
changes in physical status such as when the wax changes from a solid to a liquid. I am 
going to assume that, similarly, if two moments of time had a different existential 
status, then this would imply that they had a different physical status. It seems apparent, 
however, that two moments of time could have a different physical status without their 
having a different existential status, just as solid wax has a different physical status to 
liquid wax, although it shares the same existential status. 
On what basis, however, am I entitled to draw any conclusions as to the physical 
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status or more specifically the existential status of a moment of time? 
2 Static Block Universe And Objectively Distinguished Present Theories Of 
Temporal Metaphysics 
In the following chapters, I am going to investigate broadly two different ways of 
conceiving of locations in time. In particular I am going to assess whether our current 
theories of physics imply that we should conceive of locations in time in one of these 
ways in preference to the other way. In this section, therefore, I will map out what I take 
the two ways of conceiving of locations in time to be. One way of conceiving of 
locations in time is found in what I will term static block universe theories, the other 
way of conceiving of locations in time is found in what I will term objectively 
distinguished present theories. I am going to focus on three types of objectively 
distinguished present theory, although in fact more than three types of objectively 
distinguished present theory can be identified. 6 In the following subsections I will 
explain the terminology which I have adopted, and also relate it to other terminology 
widely employed in relation to temporal metaphysics. 
(a) Static Block Universe Theories 
What I am calling static block universe theories are frequently referred to simply as 
block universe theories. 7 I have qualified the term block universe by addition of the 
adjective static in order to distinguish these theories from growing block universe 
theories, which I describe below as a subset of objectively distinguished present 
theories. The description of block universes as specifically static block universes is also 
suggested by the title of chapter 3 of Dainton 2001, the chapter entitled "Static Time". 
The claim which characterizes a theory of temporal metaphysics as a static block 
universe theory is the claim that all locations in time share the same existential status. 
That is to say, in a static block universe, moments of time which some arbitrary 
observer calls past moments exist in the same way as moments of time which the same 
arbitrary observer calls future moments, and both these types of moment exist in the 
same way as that moment of time which the same arbitrary observer calls the present 
moment. This type of view is expressed by Dainton as follows. 
6 Confer Lucas 1989. 
7 Confer Sider 200 1, p. 11. 
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"Many contemporary philosophers are convinced that McTaggart was essentially 
correct: our world is a static four-dimensional ensemble, lacking a moving 
present, wherein all times and events are equally real. " (Dainton 2001, p. 27) 
I take Dainton to mean by times here what I am referring to as moments of time 
or locations in time. In a static block universe, as portrayed here by Dainton, the 
temporal dimension is composed of a series of moments, all of them equally real, just as 
the three spatial dimensions are composed of a series of locations in space, all of them 
equally real. 
An interesting question arises in relation to static block universe theories, in 
light of the distinction which I have drawn between the physical status of a location in 
time and the existential status of a location in time. Is an advocate of a static block 
universe theory committed to the claim that all locations in time share the same physical 
status89 Apparently not. It is possible to imagine that all locations in time share the 
same existential status, a view to which I take it any advocate of a static block universe 
theory is committed, without necessarily concluding that they all share the same 
physical status. (Recall the example of the wax. The liquid wax has a different physical 
status to the solid wax, but both samples of wax have the same existential status. ) 
Why might an advocate of static block universe theory wish to maintain that 
locations in time do not all have the same physical status? An advocate of a static block 
universe theory claims that my experience of the passage of time, the passing of the 
present moment into past moments and of future moments into the present moment, is a 
consequence of the way in which I experience the physical world, and does not reflect 
any objective difference in the existential status of locations in time. However, an 
advocate of a static block universe theory need not claim that my experience of the 
passage of time does not relate to any objective features of the physical world at all. 
On a static block universe view, I am composed of a sequence of temporal parts, 
arranged along the temporal dimension. Each of these temporal parts has the experience 
of the temporal location at which It Is located as the present moment. All of these 
temporal locations have the same existential status, but it is conceivable that each 
temporal location has a different physical status to every other temporal location, and 
8 Some philosophers might prefer to use the term "metaphysical status" rather than the term "physical 
status" in relation to locations in time. However, I am assuming that those philosophers who turn to 
theories of physics as a source of temporal metaphysics, the type of philosophers with whom I will be most 
concerned in this thesis, are conceiving of the difference or similarity between locations in time as 
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that this is why each of the temporal parts of which I am composed experiences the 
temporal location at which it is located as a different moment to any other moment. 
The proposed model is one in which all locations in time exist. A subject who 
experiences the passage of time is composed of a sequence of temporal parts arranged 
along a sequence of locations in time. Each temporal part of the subject experiences the 
location in time at which it is located as the present moment, but the physical status of 
each location in time is different to the physical status of every other location in time. 
As a consequence, no two locations in time are experienced as the same moment, and 
the subject expresses this difference between locations in time by speaking of the 
passage of time. Objectively, however, the physical status of each location in time does 
not change: there is no "moving present". 
What is not clear in the model as described is in what respect the physical status 
of one temporal location might be different to the physical status of another temporal 
location. The important point to note at this stage, however, is that allowing that the 
physical status of one temporal location can be different to the physical status of another 
temporal location may provide a basis for explaining the experience of the passage of 
time in a static block universe, without undermining the claim, central to any static 
block universe theory, that there is no difference in the existential status of temporal 
locations. 
Static block universe theories are sometimes referred to as B-series theories, 
since the temporal dimension in a static block universe corresponds to a temporal series 
famously referred to by the early twentieth century philosopher J. M. E. McTaggart as 
the B-series. 9 McTaggart describes two temporal "series" of events, the A-series and the 
B-series. 10 In the A-series, each event has the property of being past, present, or future. 
An event which is future (that is, which has the property of being future), becomes 
present, then becomes past. The temporal properties of events in the A-series therefore 
change. 
In the B-series, an event has the properties of being before or after other events. 
ultimately a physical difference or similarity. Hence I shall speak in terms of the physical status of locations 
in time. 
9 Confer McTaggart 1927. 
10 The term "event" is potentially a problematic term, particularly in the context of temporal metaphysics. 
(Confer Davidson 1980, essays 9 and 10. ) 1 take an event to be a change or changes undergone by one or 
more physical entities over a sequence of moments of time. It would I think be preferable to talk about a 
state of affairs, the arrangement of a collection of physical entities at a particular moment of time, having 
the property of being past, present or future, since some stages in an event could be past and future whilst 
one stage of the same event was present. I retain the term "event" here however since this is the term used 
by McTaggart. 
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If one event is after another event, then this remains the case relative to all other events 
in the B-series. The temporal properties of events in the B-series therefore do not 
change. 
McTaggart also alludes to a C-series which gives rise to our experience of events 
as temporally ordered, and hence to the apparent existence of the A-series and B-series. 
The C-series itself however is beyond our experience, somewhat like Kant's Ding an 
Sich, and therefore, although McTaggart implies that it is ordered, it is misleading to 
describe this ordering as temporal. 
Static block universe theories embody the claim that the properties of being 
past, present or future associated with events in the A-series are a consequence of our 
experience of what is essentially a B-series, and thus that A-series properties are not 
actually possessed by real events. 
With reference to the possibility that the physical status of one location in time 
may be different to the physical status of another location in time in a static block 
universe, it can be observed that some account needs to be given of what makes one 
location in time earlier than another location in time where those locations in time lie in 
a B-series. It may in fact be that any such account would need to be given in terms of 
the physical status of locations in time. Therefore, it may not simply be that an advocate 
of a static block universe theory can allow that the physical status of one location in 
time can be different to the physical status of another location in time, but is actually 
required to allow this, in order to explain the B-series ordering of these locations in 
time. 
Before concluding this description of static block universe theories, I will 
indicate some of the other terms which are used to describe such theories. 
The terms four diniensionalism and efernalism are both employed to refer to 
static block universe theories. II The term four dimensionalism arises out of the implied 
equivalence between the temporal dimension and the three spatial dimensions in a static 
block universe. 
The term eternalism arises out of the observation that each location in time (and 
the temporal parts of the objects associated with that location in time) has properties 
which never change but are eternally fixed in a static block universe. 
Static block universe theories are also referred to as lenseless theories. 12 In order 
to understand what is meant by a tenseless theory of time, consider first the following 
11 Confer Sider 200 1. 
12 Confer Le Poidevin 199 1, Hawley 200 1. 
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depiction of a tensed theory, the opposite of a tenseless theory 
"[Tensed theories] assume that time flows, i. e. that times [that is, locations in 
time or moments of time], and objects located at them, successively possess the 
transient monadic properties of being future, present and past, properties which I 
shall follow the custom of calling 'tenses'. (These properties must not of course 
be confused with the variations in the spelling of verbs in English and some 
other languages that grammarians also call 'tenses'. )"13 (Mellor 1998, pp. 45-6) 
A tenseless theory, then, is any theory which denies that locations in time 
successively possess the transient monadic properties of being future, present and past. 
This is equivalent to denying the existence of McTaggart's A-series. 
Since, in a static block universe, locations in time do not possess tenses in the 
philosophical sense of that term described by Mellor, an alternative name for a static 
block universe theory is a tenseless theory. 
To conclude this section, I provide the following summary of the beliefs 
embodied in a static block universe theory. I have added points (vii) to (x) to indicate 
how physical objects are conceived of in a static block universe theory. This is not 
intended as an account of every belief which an advocate of a static block universe 
theory might hold, but rather a summary of what I take to be the main beliefs. 
Summary Of The Beliqfv Embodied In A Static Block Universe Theory 
(1) All locations in time share the same existential status, that is, all locations in 
time exist. 
(10 Locations in time may not all have the same physical status. 
(III) Whatever the physical status of a location in time, it has this status eternally. 
(IV) Given two different locations in time, one location must be earlier than the other 
location. 
(V) The property "earlier than" may be explicable in terms of the different physical 
status of locations in time. 
13 Confer Mellor 1998 Mellor is actually ascribing the assumption that time flows to Kant when he is 
arguing in the First Antinomy that time "can neither lack nor have a first moment". Confer Kant [1929], 
pp. 396-7. However, Mellor's description of what the assumption embodies is a good description of a 
tensed theory of time. The quotation is useful because it clarifies the distinction between the philosophical 
and grammatical uses of the term tens'e. 
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(V0 The experience of the passage of time by an inhabitant of a static block universe 
may be explicable in terms of the different physical status of locations in time. 
(Vil) An object is composed of temporal parts. 14 
(Vill) One temporal part of an object exists at one location in time. 
(ix) Any object composed of a single temporal part is a three-dimensional entity. 
(X) Any object composed of two or more temporal parts is a four-dimensional entity. 
Whenever I use the term static block universe theory in the following pages, I 
will mean the collection of beliefs stated above, unless specifically stated otherwise. 
(b) Objectively Distinguished Present Theories 
The claim which characterizes a theory of temporal metaphysics as an objectively 
distinguished present theoryI5 is the claim that there are objective differences between 
locations in time, and that, in particular, that location in time which I experience as the 
present moment is objectively distinguished from all other moments of time. 
An advocate of an objectively distinguished present theory claims that the 
distinction which we make between past, present and future moments of time on the 
basis of our experience reflects an objective difference between locations in time, a 
difference which actually obtains in the universe which we inhabit. 
Since the distinction which we draw between past, present and future moments 
of time arises out of our experience of the passage of time, objectively distinguished 
present theorists also claim that our experience of the passage of time is correlated to 
objective conditions in the universe which we inhabit, objective conditions which are in 
some way related to the objective distinction between locations in time. 
According to advocates of an objectively distinguished present theory, it can be 
deduced from the fact that we experience the passage of time, that is, from the fact that 
we experience an ever changing present, that each location in time which we experience 
as the present moment does not constitute a present moment eternally, but only 
14 1 have included a belief in temporal parts (belief (vii)) and some further beliefs connected to this belief 
(beliefs (viii), (ix) and (x)) as characteristic of Static Block Universe Theories. However, some theorists 
who reject Objectively Distinguished Present Theories, and who might therefore reasonably be described 
as Static Block Universe Theorists, also reject temporal parts for objects- Confer for example Mellor 198 1, 
Mellor 1998. This suggests that there are at least two types of Static Block Universe Theory, those 
embodying belief in temporal parts and those not embodying belief in temporal parts. I have not sought to 
distinguish between these two types of Static Block Universe Theory for the purposes of this thesis, but it 
is important to note that the distinction exists. 
15 The term ohjectjie4y disfingujAed pre. wnl is my own. I use it to refer to all theories of temporal 
metaphysics which are not static block universe theories. 
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transiently. In a static block universe, if a location in time has a set of properties, it has 
those properties eternally (hence, as illustrated above, an alternative name for static 
block universe theories is eternalism). In contrast, in a universe where one location in 
time is objectively distinguished as the present moment, that particular location in time 
is not objectively distinguished as the present moment eternally, but only transiently. 
There is thus a "moving present" in objectively distinguished present theories. 
Advocates of an objectively distinguished present theory are claiming at the very 
least that there can be a difference in the physical status of locations in time. As we saw, 
static block universe theorists can also claim that there can be a difference in the 
physical status of locations In time. The difference between the two types of theory is as 
follows. In a static block universe, if there is a difference in the physical status of two 
locations in time, that difference is eternal. Furthermore, all locations in time are 
conceived of as having the same existential status in a static block universe. 
In a universe in which an objectively distinguished present exists, however, the 
difference in the physical status of locations in time need not be eternal. A location in 
time has a different physical status when it is in the future or the past of some arbitrary 
observer to when it becomes the present moment of that observer. It may or may not 
have a different physical status when it is in the future of the arbitrary observer to when 
it is in the past of the arbitrary observer. 
Frequently, the difference in the physical status of locations in time in 
objectively distinguished present theories is interpreted as a difference in the existential 
status of locations in time. The first two types of objectively distinguished present 
theory which I consider below both envisage the objective difference between that 
location in time which I experience as the present moment and other locations in time in 
terms of the state of existence of those locations in time. However, it is possible to 
conceive of the objective difference between locations in time in terms of a difference 
in the physical status of those locations in time, whilst maintaining that all locations in 
time have the same existential status. This becomes apparent in the third type of 
obj . ectively distinguished present theory which I consider. 
Hawley summarizes the distinction between the objectively distinguished 
present type of theory and the static block universe type of theory in terms which echo 
McTaggart's formulation. 
"Tenseless [static block universe] theorists believe that events are related by 
being earlier, later than or simultaneous with one another-, tensed [objectively 
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distinguished present] theorists believe that an important further feature of an 
event is whether it is past, present or future. " (Hawley 2001, p. 33) 
Since objectively distinguished present theories embody the claim that the 
properties of being past, present or future associated with events in McTaggart's A- 
series are real ones, an alternative name for objectively distinguished present theories in 
general are A-series theories. 16 
Since objectively distinguished present theories embody the equivalent claim 
that locations in time successively possess the transient monadic properties of being 
future, present and past, customarily called tenses, another alternative name for 
objectively distinguished present theories in general are tensed theories. 17 
1 will now consider three types of objectively distinguished present theories, 
beginning with the type against which advocates of static block universe theories 
frequently direct their arguments. 
(i) Presentist Theories 
All advocates of objectively distinguished present theories assert that there is a physical 
distinction between locations in time, some assert that this physical distinction is an 
existential distinction. That is, some advocates of objectively distinguished present 
theories claim that some locations in time have a different existential status to other 
locations in time. 
Theories of an objectively distinguished present which assert that only one 
location in time exists, namely that location in time which I experience as the present 
moment, are frequently referred to as presentist theories. 18 According to such theories, 
the moment which I experience as the present moment is the only existing moment. 
in terms of the existential status of objects in the Sider depicts a presentist theory II 
following quotation. Note that he equates existing with being real here. I will argue in 
the next chapter that this equation needs to be analyzed, on the grounds that asserting 
that something is real may not unequivocally imply that it exists. Does the claim that the 
past is real, for example, equate to the claim that the past exists? I will return to this 
issue in the next chapter. 
16 Confer McTaggart 1927 and section (a) above. 
17 Confer Mellor 19988 and section (a) above. 
18 Bigelow 1996, Zimmerman 1996, and Sider 2001 all refer to presentist theories. 
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"Only currently existing objects are real ... the past 
is no more, while the future 
is yet to be. " (Sider 2001, p. 11) 
Whilst Sider captures the essence of the presentist position, I have attempted in the 
following description to provide a definition of presentism (that Is, of the presentist 
position), based on Sider's description but couched in terms of locations in time, and 
without reference to objects being real. 
"The only objects which exist are those objects which exist at the location in 
time which are experienced as the present moment. Locations in time which 
have previously been experienced as the present moment no longer exist, whilst 
locations in time which have not yet been experienced as the present moment do 
not yet exist. " 
Sider goes on to question whether it is possible to coherently formulate the presentist 
claim that objects wholly exist in the present moment. He cites Dau's description of 
presentism, which Dau refers to as "the three-dimensional conception". 
"On the three-dimensional conception, the entire object is to be found at each 
instant that it exists. " (Dau 1986, p. 464, quoted in Sider 2001, p. 63) 
Sider objects to this type of formulation as follows. 
"What, then, is three-dimensionalism? It cannot be the denial of the possibility 
of temporal parts, for many three-dimensionalists will admit the possibility of 
instantaneous objects, objects which appear only for an instant and then 
disappear. Such objects would be temporal parts of themselves, given the present 
definition of 'temporal parts'. " (Sider 2001, p. 64) 
Whilst it is well to be aware of this potential problem for presentism, it may be 
that Sider is employing a definition of a temporal part which not all presentists would 
be prepared to accept when he claims that instantaneous objects would be temporal 
parts of themselves. 
It seems that a presentist could assert that if an object exists at a location in time, 
then it exists wholly at that moment, as described by Dau. This is simply to deny that 
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objects have temporal parts. Whether the claim that an object exists wholly at a single 
location in time is a coherent one remains problematic, however. 
Setting aside this problem at this stage, the following beliefs can be identified as 
lying at the heart of any presentist theory of temporal metaphysics. I derive these beliefs 
from the definition of presentism given above, which was in turn derived from Sider's 
description of presentism. Notice however that points (Iv), (v) and (vi) are implied by, 
rather than derived directly from, the earlier definition of presentism. Points (Iv) and (v) 
are required to express the presentist belief in a moving present. Point (vi) indicates that 
a B-series is definable in a presentist theory. This summary of beliefs is not intended as 
a complete account of every belief to which an advocate of a presentist theory might be 
committed. 
Summary Qf The Beliefs E mbodied In A Presentist Theory 
(i) Only one location in time exists, that location in time which is experienced as 
the present moment. 
Locations in time which have previously been experienced as the present 
moment, that is, past moments, no longer exist. 
Locations in time which have not yet been experienced as the present moment, 
that is, future moments, do not yet exist. 
(iv) The location in time which I experience as the present moment does not exist 
eternally, but transiently, 
(V) As that location in time which J have just experienced as the present moment 
passes out of existence, so a new location in time passes into existence. 
Although one location in time can be referred to as earlier than another location 
in time, at most one of the two locations referred to actually exists. 
(Vii) An object exists wholly at that location in time which is experienced as the 
present moment. 
(vill) All objects are three-dimensional. 
Whenever I use the terms presentisl theory or presentism in the following pages, 
I will mean the collection of beliefs stated above, unless specifically stated otherwise. 
Theories Of Temporal Metaphysics 26 
(ii) Growing Block Universe Theories 
As we have just seen, presentists claim that only that location in time which is 
experienced as the present moment exists. This is not the only theoretical position open 
Oto advocates of objectively distinguished present theories, however. An alternative 
approach is to conceive of the location in time constituting the present moment as the 
boundary between existing moments, the past, and non-existing moments, the future, 19 
This type of theory is sometimes termed a growing block universe theory. 20 
The present moment is again envisaged to be objectively distinguished from 
other moments of time, but rather than claiming that the present moment is the only 
existing moment, a growing block universe theorist claims that the present moment is 
the moment which is just coming into existence, in addition to all past moments which 
exist. The total number of existing moments is therefore constantly increasing. 
Sider expresses the growing block universe view as follows. 
"Inten-nediate between the polar opposites presentism and etemalism is the view, 
defended by C. D. Broad (1923, ch. 11) and more recently by Michael Tooley 
(1997), that the past is real but the future is not. On this view reality consists of a 
growing four-dimensional manifold, the 'growing block universe'. " (Sider 2001, 
p. 12) 
This can be reformulated as follows in terms of locations in time, and in terms 
of existence rather than reality. 
"A growing block universe is one in which locations in time which have 
previously been experienced as the present moment, that is, past moments, exist, 
but locations in time which have not been experienced as the present moment, 
that is, future moments, do not exist. On this view, the number of locations in 
time which exist is increasing. " 
19 There is a potential problem around linguistic tense in any attempt to express the status of moments of 
time. Classifying a moment as "existing" or "non-existing", where that moment is not the present moment, 
entails using a part of speech which might be interpreted as implying existence in the present. This can be 
avoided by interpreting terms such as "existing" or "non-existing" tenselessly when they are applied to 
moments of time other than the present moment. Compare the present tense sense of "is" in the 
proposition "She is here now" with the tenseless sense of "is" in the proposition "thirteen is a prime 
number". The problem does not arise for presentists, since they assert that only the present moment exists. 
20 Dainton 2001 and Sider 2001 both refer to growing block universes. 
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A number of philosophers have questioned the coherence of growing block 
universe theories. A frequent complaint against such theories Is that it is not clear how 
that location in time which is experienced as the present moment is to be distinguished 
from locations in time which constitute past moments. Braddon-Mitchell frames this 
problem in terms of agents, that is, subjects capable of acting. Since past locations in 
time exist, agents located at those past moments also exist. He therefore questions on 
what basis an agent is entitled to conclude that the location in time which he or she is 
experiencing as the present moment actually is the present moment. Might it not be that 
the agent actually exists at some moment which is past relative to some other agent who 
is located at the actual present moment? The implication is that growing block universe 
theories must collapse into incoherence. 
"Like presentism [a growing block universe] has an objective now, but unlike 
presentism the existence of past agents undermines any reason those who are 
present might have for believing they are present. " (Braddon-Mitchell, p. 202-3) 
A possible way of avoiding this problem is to assert that we experience as the 
present moment only a location in time which is coming into existence, not a location in 
time which fully exists. On this view, an agent existing at a past moment in a growing 
block universe, a moment whichfully exists, would have no experience of that location 
in time as a present moment. Only an agent existing at the actual present moment, that 
moment which is coming into existence, would experience a present moment. 
Whilst acknowledging this problem for a growing block universe theory, my 
main purpose here is to describe the essential components of such a theory. The 
following, therefore, is a summary of the main beliefs embodied in a growing block 
universe theory. 
Summary Of The Beliefs EmbodiedIn A Growing Block Universe Theory 
That location in time which is experienced as the present moment is the location 
in time which is coming into existence. 
Locations in time which have previously been experienced as the present 
moment, that is, past moments, remain in existence. 
Locations in time which have not yet been experienced as the present moment, 
that is, future moments, do not yet exist. 
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(IV) The location in time which I experience as the present moment is not coming 
into existence eternally, but transiently. 
(v) As that location in time which I have just experienced as the present moment 
becomes a past moment, so a new location in time comes into existence. 
(vi) The total number of locations in time existing in the universe is increasing. 
(vii) One location in time can be referred to as earlier than another location in time. 
(viii) An object is composed of temporal parts. 
(Ix) One temporal part of an object exists at one location in time. 
(X) Any object composed of a single temporal part is a three-dimensional entity. 
(xi) Any object composed of two or more temporal parts is a four-dimensional entity. 
(Xii) The total number of temporal parts constituting an object increases by one if a 
new temporal part of the object comes into existence at the location in time 
which is coming into existence, that is, the present moment. 
Whenever 1 use the term growing block universe theory in the following pages, I 
will mean the collection of beliefs stated above, unless specifically stated otherwise. 21 
(iii) Growing Determinacy Theories 
Presentist theories and growing block universe theories both conceive of the difference 
between the present moment and past and future moments of time consisting in a 
difference in the existential status of those locations in time. However, it is possible to 
conceive of the difference between locations in time consisting in a difference in their 
physical status, whilst maintaining that all locations in time have the same existential 
status, that is, that all locations in time exist. One aspect of the physical status of a 
location in time which could vary is its state of determinacy. I shall refer to the type of 
objectively distinguished present theory in which the determinacy of locations in time is 
conceived of as varying as a growing determinacy theory. 
What do I mean when I talk about the determinacy of a location in time? Why 
do I refer to the third type of objectively distinguished present theory as a growing 
determinacy theory? In order to answer these questions, I will begin by examining the 
meaning of the terms determinate and indeterminate. 
21 Lucas 1989 identifies at least one other possible type of objectively distinguished present theory, in 
which all future moments of time exist, and the present moment is that location in time at which locations 
in time go out of existence rather than, as in a growing block universe theory, that location in time at 
which locations in time come into existence. I am not going to consider this type of theory since very few 
philosophers have proposed this type of theory as their preferred temporal metaphysics. 
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Suppose that I am experiencing the location in time t, as the present moment. 
Consider the following proposition. 
(1) At the present moment, either it is raining or it is not raining. 
I will use p to symbolize the proposition "it is raining". I will introduce the 
symbol @ to indicate the location in time at which the proposition is uttered, so that I 
can use @t, to symbolize the temporal reference "at the present moment". I will 
therefore represent (1) as follows. 
pv-p 
The law of excluded middle says that, for any proposition p, the proposition 
pv-p is true as a matter of logical necessity. 22 Using 0 to indicate logical necessity, I 
could also write the following therefore. 
(I**) @t,: Apv-p) 
From this proposition, I can deduce that either p is true at t, or --ip is true at t,, 
that is, either it is raining at the present moment or it is not raining at the present 
moment. This can be deduced directly from (I *), in fact, without reference to the 
necessity of the truth of pv--p. 
I am going to assume that my entitlement to deduce that either p is true at i,, or 
--p is true at 1, derives from the assumption that t,, the present moment, is determinate. I 
will therefore introduce the following principle. If the location in time t, is determinate 
then the proposition @t,: pv-, p implies that either p is true or --- ip is true at t,. I will 
represent this principle symbolically as follows, and label it (N) for "now". 
ý(t, is determinate) /-\ (gt,: pv-, p)) => f gi,,: (p is true) v (-, p is true)l 
The claim that either p is true or --, p is true is essentially equivalent to the 
principle of bivalence, which states that every proposition is either true or false. The 
22 This description of the law of excluded middle is adapted from Flew 1979. Expressed in the terminology 
of possible worlds, the law of excluded middle says that pv-p is true in all possible worlds. 
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principle of bivalence claims that every proposition has a truth value, and that there are 
just two possible truth values, true and false. Provided that a negation operator is 
introduced, the principle of bivalence entails the law of excluded middle, but it is not 
equivalent to it. The law of excluded middle is a law of logic and is therefore true, if it 
is true at all, regardless of what the proposition p is taken to mean. The principle of 
bivalence, on the other hand, is a semantic principle which applies to the interpretation 
of the proposition p, rather than to the logic of the use of the symbol. 23 
Assuming, as before, that p symbolizes "it is raining", what would make p true 
at t,? If a correspondence theory of truth is assumed, then p is true if a state of affairs 
which amounts to the failing of rain obtains at t,. Evidently, to avoid contradiction, p 
would need to include, or be interpreted as implying, reference to a spatial location, 
since it could be raining in some locations and not in others at t, Thus we could 
interprelp as implying "it is raining (at the spatial location where this proposition is 
uttered)". 
I am also going to suggest that, in the context of explaining what is meant when 
a location in time is described as determinate, p needs to include, or be interpreted as 
implying, reference to a temporal location. I am going to interpret p, in the example 
which I have been considering, as implying "it is raining (at the spatial location where 
this proposition is uttered and at the temporal location when this proposition is 
uttered)". In general, I am only going to allow p to symbolize propositions which 
describe states of affairs at the temporal location at which p is uttered. The reason for 
this restriction will become apparent in the course of considering the state of 
determinacy of locations in time which are past or future relative to the location in time 
which I am experiencing as the present moment. 
On the basis of what has been said so far, the assumption that a location in time 
is determinate can be seen to amount to the assumption that all propositions describing 
possible states of affairs at that location in time are either true or false. 
I have assumed so far that the present moment of time, t, is determinate, and 
that this assumption entitles me to deduce from @t,,: pv-, p that either p is true at t, or 
-, p is true at /,. I am now going to further assume that all past 
locations in time are 
determinate. By a past location in time I mean a location in time which is earlier than 
the location in time which I am experiencing as the present moment. I will denote an 
arbitrary location in time which is earlier than the present moment t, by the expression 
23 This description of the principle of bivalence is adapted from Flew 1979. 
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t, -At. Since I am assuming that all past locations in time are determinate, I am 
effectively saying that I am prepared to deduce the principle of blvalence from the law 
of excluded middle at any past location in time. I can express this symbolically as 
follows, using the label (P) for past. 
(P) f (t, -At is determinate) A (@t, -At: pv-, p)l => f@t, -At: (p is true) v (, p is true)l 
Notice, given the stipulation made earlier, that p can only describe a state of 
affairs at the location in time t, -At. 
I am now going to postulate that all future locations in time are indeterminate. 
By a future location in time I mean a location in time which is later than the moment in 
time which I am experiencing as the present moment. I will denote an arbitrary location 
in time which is later than the present moment t, by the expression t, +At. Since I am 
assuming that future locations in time are indeterminate, I am no longer prepared to 
deduce the principle of bivalence from the law of excluded middle at any future 
location in time. I can express this symbolically as follows, using the label (F) for 
future. 
(F) f (t, +At is indeterminate) A (gl, +At: pv-, p)l #> fgt, +At: (p is true) v (--, p is true)l 
Once again, given the stipulation made earlier, p can only describe a state of 
affairs at the location in time tn+At. 
What (F) implies, assuming once again a correspondence theory of truth, is that 
there is no state of affairs at a future location in time t, +At which would make 
proposition p either true or false, where proposition p describes a state of affairs at that 
future location in timetn+At. 
Evidently (F) would not necessarily hold if p could refer to a past state of affairs. 
From the proposition "It was raining two days ago or it was not raining two days ago", 
uttered tomorrow, I am prepared to deduce that either it is true that it was raining 
yesterday or It is false that it was raining yesterday. Hence the need to stipulate that p 
can only describe a state of affairs in the location in time at which it is uttered. 
Given the above, the assumption that a location in time is indeterminate can be 
seen to amount to the assumption that not all propositions describing possible states of 
affairs at that location in time are either true or false. If a location in time is described as 
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absolutely indeterminate, then this should be interpreted as implying that no 
propositions describing possible states of affairs at that location in time are either true 
or false. If a location in time is described as partially indeterminate, then this should be 
interpreted as implying that not all propositions describing possible states of affairs at 
that location in time are either true or false. 
I am now in a position to explain what is meant by a growing determinacy theory 
of time. I will refer to a location in time as a moment. I will call past moments those 
locations in time which are earlier than the location in time which I am experiencing as 
the present moment, I will call the present moment that location in time which I am 
experiencing as the present moment, and I will call. future moments those locations in 
time which are later than the location in time which I am experiencing as the present 
moment. In a growing determinacy theory, all moments exist. Past moments are 
regarded as detenninate (proposition (P) is assumed) and future moments are regarded 
as indeterminate (proposition (F) is assumed). The present moment of time is therefore 
defined in such a theory as that moment which is becoming determinate (proposition 
(N) is assumed). The theory is called a growing determinacy theory since the number of 
deternimate moments in the universe is growing. 
The concept of a growing determinacy theory is not a new one. A number of 
passages from Aristotle's De Interpretatione imply a view of time in which past 
moments and the present moment are regarded as determinate whilst future moments 
are regarded as indeterminate. I will consider some extracts from Aristotle in the light 
of the analysis of the concepts determinate and indeterminate given above. 
"With regard to what is and what has been it is necessary for the affirmation or 
the negation to be true or false ... But with particulars that are going to 
be it is 
different. " (Aristotle, De Interpretationeg)24 
In this extract, Aristotle is effectively stating that bivalence holds for past 
moments and the present moment, but does not hold for future moments. The reference 
specifically to "particulars that are going to be" is a reminder that bivalence holds for a 
proposition describing universals regardless of the determinacy status of the moment at 
which the proposition is uttered. The proposition "two plus two equals four" is either 
true or false regardless of when it is uttered. This is another reason for restricting p in 
propositions (P), (N) and (F) to symbolizing propositions which describe states of affairs 
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at the temporal location at which p is uttered. Although (P) and (N) would still be valid 
if p were allowed to symbolize propositions describing the properties of universals, (F) 
would be invalid. 
"[I]n general, in things that are not always actual there is the possibility of being 
and of not being ... 
Clearly, therefore, not everything is or happens of necessity: 
some things happen as chance has it, and of the affirmation and the negation 
neither is true rather than the other; with other things it is one rather than the 
other and as a rule, but still it is possible for the other to happen instead. " 
(Aristotle, De Interpretatione 9) 
Although this passage amounts to more than just the claim that future moments 
are indeterminate, it contains the assertion that bivalence fails in relation to future 
moments, "of the affirmation and the negation neither is true rather than the other", and 
the passage is therefore a further expression of Aristotle's growing determinacy theory 
"I mean, for example: it is necessary for there to be or not to be a sea-battle 
tomorrow-, but it is not necessary for a sea-battle to take place tomorrow, nor for 
one not to take place-though it is necessary for one to take place or not to take 
place. " (Aristotle, De Interpretatione 9) 
Using p to symbolize "there is a sea battle" and @t,, +At to symbolize 
"tomorrow", the two claims which Aristotle is making in this passage can be 
represented logically as follows. 
, t, +At: J(pv--, p) 
g, t,, +At: -, ('-(p) v [7(-, p)) 
These can be combined to give the following. 
@t,, +Al: --(pv-, p) #> 
(EI(p) v --(-, p)) 
24 Confer Ackrill 1987. The translations of De Interpretatione are by Ackrill. 
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This is very close to, although not quite equivalent to, proposition (F). It 
constitutes an alternative way of stating the consequence of the assumption that future 
moments are indeterminate. 
"Clearly, then, it is not necessary that of every affirmation and opposite negation 
one should be true and the other false. For what holds for things that are does not 
hold for things that are not but may possibly be or not be; with these it is as we 
have said. " (Aristotle, De Interpretatione 9) 
This passage implies that although bivalence holds for the present moment, it 
does not hold for future moments, the import of propositions (N) and (F). 
It is worth observing that in this particular passage Aristotle refers to "things that 
are not". This could be interpreted as an indication that Aristotle is envisaging a 
temporal metaphysics in which things located in future moments of time do not exist, 
although this need not necessarily be interpreted as implying that the future moments of 
time do not exist. Nonetheless, it could be objected to a growing determinacy theory 
that the only way a future moment of time could be indeten-ninate would be if that 
moment of time did not exist at all. 25 In that case, there would be no difference between 
growing determinacy theories and growing block universe theories. 
I have, nonetheless, distinguished growing determinacy theories from growing 
block universe theories on the grounds that it at least seems conceivable that a moment 
of time should exist in either an indeterminate state or a determinate state, and that 
therefore the claim that future moments of time are indeterminate does not logically 
necessitate the claim that future moments of time do not exist. 
If growing determinacy theories are admitted as a possible type of objectively 
distinguished present theory, it will be observed that they have a fundamental feature in 
common with static block universe theories. Both growing determinacy theories and 
static block universe theories assert that all locations in time share the same existential 
status, namely that all locations in time exist, 
However, unlike static block universe theories, growing determinacy theories 
claim that future locations in time are indeterminate whilst past locations in time are 
determinate, and furthermore, that there is a dynamic transition of moments of time 
from indeterminacy to determInacy, the hypersurface at which this transition is 
occurring constituting that location in time which we experience as the present moment. 
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Torretti sketches a view along these lines in his assessment of the argument for a static 
block universe metaphysics on the basis of special relativity. 
"Contingent (i. e. non-necessary) propositions about the future acquire whatever 
truth values they will have as time goes by. This thesis is obviously tailored to fit 
the Aristotelian idea of time: The "now" is the omnipresent catalyser that 
activates transmutation of indeterminate propositions into truth or falsehood. " 
(Torretti 1983, p. 249) 
Part of the reason for attempting to identify a type of objectively distinguished 
present theory which is not couched in terms of the existence of moments of time is 
that, as we will see, many static block universe theorists imply that presentist and 
growing block universe theories are the only alternatives to static block universe 
theories. Although many of the arguments used by static block universe theorists against 
presentist and growing block universe theories would, if valid, also rule out growing 
determinacy theories, it is nonetheless useful to acknowledge that the state of 
determinacy of moments of time, rather than the state of existence of moments of time, 
can serve to distinguish past, present and future moments. 
Summary Of The Behefý Embodied In A Growing Determinacy Theory 
(1) All locations in time share the same existential status, that is, all locations in 
time exist. 
(Ii) That location in time which is experienced as the present moment is the location 
in time which is becoming determinate. 
(111) Locations in time which have previously been experienced as the present 
moment, that is, past moments, are determinate. 
(IV) Locations in time which have not yet been experienced as the present moment, 
that is, future moments, are indeterminate. 
(V) The location in time which I experience as the present moment is not becoming 
determinate eternally, but transiently. 
(vi) As that location in time which I have just experienced as the present moment 
becomes a past moment, so a new location in time becomes determinate. 
25 This objection was drawn to my attention by Roman Frigg. 
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(vi i) The total number of determinate locations in time existing in the universe is 
increasing. 
(viii) One location in time can be referred to as earlier than another location in time. 
(ix) An object is composed of temporal parts. 
(X) One temporal part of an object exists at one location in time. 
(xi) Any object composed of a single temporal part is a three-dimensional entity. 
(Xii) Any object composed of two or more temporal parts is a four-dimensional entity. 
(xiii) Past temporal parts of an object are determinate. 
(xiv) Future temporal parts of an object are indeterminate. 
Whenever I use the term growing determinacy theory in the following pages, I 
will mean the collection of beliefs stated above, unless specifically stated otherwise. 
3 Visualising The Theories Of Temporal Metaphysics 
If a moment of time is represented by a two-dimensional SljCe26' then we can visualize 
the differences between the various types of theories of temporal metaphysics, static 
block universe theories and objectively distinguished present theories, in the manner 
illustrated in figures 1.2 to 1.5. 
Static block universe theorists claim that all moments of time, represented by 
two-dimensional slices in figure 1.2, have the same existential status. They may have 
some variation in physical status which forms the basis of the temporal ordering from 
earlier moments of time to later moments of time. The variation in physical status is 
represented in the diagram by the ascription of a different number to each moment. 
There is however no physical basis for describing any particular moment as the present 
moment, and therefore no physical basis for identifying past or future moments relative 
to a present moment. 
26 In our universe, we experience three spatial dimensions at any particular moment of time. If we suppress 
one of these three spatial dimensions, we can represent a universe by a three dimensional object, two of the 
dimensions being used to represent space and the third dimension being used to represent time. A slice 
through this universe orthogonal to the time dimension therefore represents a moment of time. A square 
used to represent a moment of time in figures 1.2 to 1.5 defines an arbitrary boundary on a slice for the 
purposes of representation, not the spatial extension of the universe. 
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Fig. 1.2 In a static block universe, all moments of time, represented in the diagram 
above by solid line two dimensional slices, have the same existential status. That is, 
they all exist. A notional physical property (p is indicated as varying between the 
moments by assigning a different number to it at each moment. Such a property could 
form the physical basis of the temporal ordering of the moments from earlier to later. 
A presentist claims that the present moment of time has a different existential 
status to both future and past moments of time, and is in fact the only existing moment 
of time, as illustrated in figure 1.3. 
A Presentist Universe 
................... future moments 




Fig. 1.3 In a presentist universe, the present moment of time is the only existing 
moment. The existing present moment is represented by a solid line two dimensional 
slice. Non-existent past and future moments are represented by dotted line two 
dimensional slices to clarify the position of the present moment. 
A growing block universe theorist claims that the present moment is the 
interface between existing moments which constitute the past, and non-existing 
moments which "constitute" the future, and is in fact the moment which is just coming 
into existence, as illustrated in figure 1.4. 
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A Growing Block Universe 
future moments 
4 present moment 
........... 
past moments 
Fig. 1.4 In a growing block universe, past moments of time exist, the present moment 
of time is coming into existence, and future moments of time do not exist. Existent 
past moments are represented by solid line two dimensional slices, the present moment 
coming into existence is represented by a dashed line two dimensional slice, and non- 
existent future moments are represented by dotted line two dimensional slices. 
A growing determinacy universe theorist claims that the present moment of time 
has a different physical status, but not a different existential status, to other moments of 
time. Past moments are determinate, future moments are indeterminate, and the present 
moment is the location in time where the transition from indeterminacy to determinacy 
occurS27, as illustrated in figure 1.5. 
A Variable Detern-tinacy Universe 
/ future moments 
pvýp 4 present moment 
?, -> (p is true) v (-p is true) 
PV-P past moments 
=> (p is true) v (-, p is true) 
go 
Fig. L5 In a variable determinacy universe, past moments of time are determinate, the present 
moment of time is becoming determinate, and future moments of time are indeterminate. All 
moments of time exist, hence all moments are represented by solid line two dimensional slices. 
The distinction between past and future moments can be seen to reside in the state of 
determinacy of those moments. We are entitled to make a logical deduction in relation to 
determinate past moments of time which we are not entitled to make in relation to 
indeterminate future moments of time, and this feature of a growing determinacy universe has 
been employed to represent pictorially the distinction between past and future moments. 
4 Theories Of Physics As A Source Of Temporal Metaphysics 
Although, as we have just seen, a variety of different theories of temporal metaphysics 
are conceivable, we have not yet established any basis on which we might select from 
amongst them the theory of temporal metaphysics which correctly describes the 
universe which we inhabit. Since our experience is only ever of the present moment, it 
27 The term "occurs" needs to be understood tenselessly here. Confer footnote 18. 
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is not obvious how we can select, on the basis of our experi I 'ence, between a static block 
universe theory or an objectively distinguished present theory, nor how, if we opt for an 
objectively distinguished present theory, we can select between the various different 
types of objectively distinguished present theory available. In an attempt to establish a 
basis other than our experience on which to select a temporal metaphysics, therefore, 
some philosophers have looked to theories of physics for guidance. 
It can be observed that various theories of physics embody some temporal 
concepts within them, either implicitly or explicitly, and this observation has led some 
philosophers to speculate that such theories of physics might imply a particular 
temporal metaphysics from amongst the various temporal metaphysics which appear to 
be logically possible. The hope amongst such philosophers is that by analyzing a theory 
of physics, a theory which has been accepted as a correCt28 description of the universe 
which we inhabit, we can establish that the theory categorically implies a particular 
temporal metaphysics, and we can therefore deduce that the temporal metaphysics so 
implied constitutes, or at least is likely to consitute, the temporal metaphysics of the 
universe which we inhabit. Over the following chapters I will consider four of the most 
important theories of modem physics, and the various attempts which have been made 
by philosophers to establish a temporal metaphysics on the basis of these theories. 
(a) Special Relativity As A Source Of Temporal Metaphysics 
The branch of physics which has proved most popular amongst philosophers attempting 
to establish a temporal metaphysics on the basis of a theory of physics is relativity 
theory. Philosophers have cited both special and general relativity as implying a 
particular theory of temporal metaphysics, and have in the majority of cases claimed 
that the theory of temporal metaphysics which is implied by these theories of physics is 
a static block universe metaphysics. 
In chapter 2,1 will examine an argument which the philosopher Hilary PutnaM29 
formulated with the intention of demonstrating that special relativity implies a static 
block universe temporal metaphysics. Putnam argues that special relativity implies that 
past, present and future locations in time, defined relative to some observer, all share 
28 The description "correct" in this context will usually imply that the theory has been used to make 
predictions and that the outcomes predicted by the theory have been observed under controlled conditions 
which minimize the possibility of factors not incorporated within the theory bringing about the outcomes 
which are observed- This understanding of "correct" leaves open the possibility that a correct theory could 
be replaced by another theory which makes the same predictions but offers other advantages, such as 
coherence with other theories, over the original theory. 
29 Confer Putnam 1967. 
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the same existential status. Putnam therefore takes it that special relativity rules out an 
objectively distinguished present temporal metaphysics. 
As we will see, Putnam and other philosophers who argue in favour of a static 
block universe temporal metaphysics on the basis of relativity theory, both special and 
general, tend to refer to presentism without acknowledging the other types of 
objectively distinguished present theory which I identified in section 2 of the current 
chapter. Philosophers who base their arguments for a static block universe temporal 
metaphysics on relativity theory may be conceiving of objectively distinguished present 
theorists as exclusively claiming that the present moment is existentially distinct from 
past and future moments, or they may be working on the assumption that if it is 
impossible to unambiguously define a present moment in a universe then it is 
impossible to describe that universe in terms of any objectively distinguished present 
theory. Certainly it does seem to be the case that any physical theory which prohibits 
presentism will necessarily prohibit any objectively distinguished present theory. 
In considering Putnam's argument for a static block universe temporal 
metaphysics on the basis of special relativity, I will assume that Putnam's argument 
constitutes an argument against presentism, and I will therefore examine what counter 
arguments, if any, are available to a presentist. I will assume that any successful counter 
arguments would be equally valid for the other objectively distinguished present 
theories, namely the growing block universe theories and the growing determinacy 
theories. 
As already indicated, although Putnam's argument is aimed against presentism, 
it raises problems for the other objectively distinguished present theories as well. 
Although Putnam's argument is designed only to show that there is no existential 
difference between moments of time, it would also tend to imply, if successful, that all 
moments of time are determinate and therefore that can be no difference in the state of 
determinacy of moments of time. Although growing determinacy theorists accept, along 
with static block universe theorists, that all moments of time share the same existential 
status, that is, they all exist, where growing determinacy theorists disagree with static 
block universe theorists is in asserting that an existing moment of time can be 
indeterminate, becoming determinate, or determinate. Therefore, if Putnam's argument 
precludes the possibility of a difference in the state of determinacy of moments of time, 
it is as problematic for growing determinacy theorists as it is for presentists and growing 
block universe theorists. 
In chapter 2, therefore, I will consider Putnam's argument, and the responses 
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which an objectively distinguished present theorist can make to it. 
(b) General Relativity As A Source Of Temporal Metaphysics 
In the course of examining Putnam's argument for a static block universe temporal 
metaphysics on the basis of special relativity, we will observe that there are various 
problems with the argument. These problems are sufficient to undermine Putnam's 
conclusion that we are compelled by special relativity to adopt a static block universe 
temporal metaphysics as the temporal metaphysics of the universe which we inhabit. 
In chapter 3, we will see that the logician Kurt G6del30 considered an argument 
for a static block universe temporal metaphysics on the basis of special relativity some 
ghteen years before Putnam, 
but dismissed it. Godel preferred instead to argue for a eig 
static block universe temporal metaphysics on the basis of general relativity. Godel's 
argument is based upon a set of solutions which he had discovered to Einstein's field 
equations, the set of equations which constitute the mathematical basis of general 
relativity. G6del's solutions model universes, which I will term G6delian universes, 
which are time orientable and simply connected but which do not admit foliation3l by 
global smooth spacelike hypersurfaces, often referred to in general relativity as time 
slices. Such universes do not admit description by any of the objectively distinguished 
present theories, since each of these theories requires that a global time slice32 be 
identifiable as the present moment. 
G6del argues that Godelian universes, those universes modelled by his solutions 
to Einstein's field equations, can only be described in terms of a static block universe 
temporal metaphysics, since such universes are not describable in terms of an 
objectively distinguished present theory. He then goes on to suggest if one physically 
possible universe (that is, one universe which obeys the laws of physics) has a static 
block universe metaphysics, then all physically possible universes must have the same 
static block universe metaphysics, apparently on the grounds that the temporal 
metaphysics of a universe cannot be a contingent matter. He can also be interpreted as 
making the related claim that even though the universe we inhabit may not have the 
same topology as a Godellan universe, that topology which precludes the foliation of the 
universe by global time slices, the fact that our universe conforms to the same set of 
30 Confer Godel 1949a. 
31 By the. fohation of a universe is meant the defining in that universe of a sequence of time slices. 
32 The term "time slice" implies that the smooth spacelike hypersurface is global, so that the addition of the 
term "global" is not strictly necessary. I amend the term in this way for clarity, however, since it is feasible 
to define a local time slice in a Godelian universe. 
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field equations as the G6delian universes implies that our own universe should also be 
described in terms of a static block universe temporal metaphysics. 
G6del, like Putnam, appears to conceive of objectively distinguished present 
theories purely in terms of presentism, and the brief description of presentism which he 
gives suggests that he conceives of a presentist as a theorist who asserts that the 
existential status of the present moment is different to the existential status of past and 
future moments, in accordance with the description of presentism given in section 2 of 
the current chapter. 
It is therefore presentism which G6del's argument appears to be intended to 
preclude, rather than objectively distinguished present theories in general. However, just 
as Putnam's argument on the basis of special relativity would, if successful, preclude 
any objectively distinguished present theory even though it is aimed specifically at 
presentism, likewise an advocate of an objectively distinguished present theory other 
than presentism would not have any advantages over a presentist when it comes to 
giving an account of the temporal metaphysics of a Godelian universe. 
Any objectively distinguished present theory requires that global time slices be 
identifiable in a universe. One of these time slices can then constitute the objective 
correlate of what we experience as the present moment of time, A presentist will 
distinguish one time slice as the only existing time slice, constituting the present. A 
growing block universe theorist will distinguish some time slices as existing, 
constituting the past, one time slice as coming into existence, constituting the present, 
and time slices which do not yet exist as the future. A growing determinacy theorist will 
distinguish some time slices as determinate, constituting the past, one time slice as 
becoming determinate, constituting the present, and some time slices as indeterminate, 
constituting the future. 
However, it is not possible to define any global time slices in a G6delian 
universe so that such a universe simply cannot be described in terms of any of the 
objectively distinguished present theories. 
As we will see, however, even though an objectively distinguished present 
account cannot be given of a Godelian universe, it is not clear whether Godel is entitled 
to deduce anything from this fact about the temporal metaphysics of the universe which 
we inhabit. In chapter 4,1 will examine Steven Savitt'S33 assertion that G6del needs to 
take a modal step in order to move from the conclusion that the temporal metaphysics 
of a G6delian universe can only be described in static block universe terms to the 
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conclusion that the temporal metaphysics of our universe can only be described in static 
block universe terms. I therefore consider in chapter 4 whether such a step can be 
justified. 
Thermodynamics As A Source Of Temporal Metaphysics 
In considering Godel's argument for a static block universe temporal metaphysics on 
the basis of general relativity, I noted that he modelled his G6dellan universes purely on 
the basis of Einstein's field equations. It emerges in G6del's solutions to the field 
equations that an integral structural feature of a G6delian universe is the closed time- 
like curve. A time-like curve in general is a curve through space-time such that if one 
moved along it, one would be moving through time rather than through space. A closed 
time-like curve is therefore a time-like curve such that if one moved along it, one would 
eventually arrive back at the same time at which one started. 
As Albert Einstein34 himself points out, however, in order to establish a temporal 
orientation on a closed time-like curve, or indeed on any time-like curve in a manifold 
modelled on the basis of general relativity, one needs to resort to theories of physics 
other than general relativity. Einstein suggests a method of establishing a temporal 
orientation on a closed time-like curve, a method based on signalling, which relies upon 
thermodynamic considerations. 
In chapter 5,1 examine Einstein's signalling technique and demonstrate that 
when the technique is applied to a closed time-like curve, a paradox ensues. The only 
way to avoid this paradox is to conclude that a single direction of time cannot be 
established all the way around a closed time-like curve. Since however the curve would 
no longer be time-like if a single direction of time could not be established all the way 
around it, this implies that a universe which is compatible with the second law of 
thermodynamics, upon which Einstein's signalling technique depends, cannot contain 
closed time-like curves. Given that closed time-like curves are an integral structural 
feature of Godelian universeS, 35 this implies that any universe which conforms to the 
second law of thermodynamics cannot be a G6delian universe. If we assume that the 
universe which we inhabit conforms to the second law of thermodynamics, then we can 
deduce that our universe is not a G6delian universe. 
G6del argued on the basis of general relativity that only a static block universe 
33 Confer Savitt 1994. 
34 Confer Einstein 1949. 
35 Confer Malament 1985. 
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account can describe the temporal metaphysics of a G6delian universe, given that such a 
universe does not admit foliation by global time slices. By extension, he wanted to 
claim that only a static block universe account can describe the temporal metaphysics of 
our universe, on the grounds that our universe is modelled by the same field equations 
as those used to model a G6delian universe. 
However, as already noted, a universe which conforms to the second law of 
thermodynamics cannot contain closed time-like curves and cannot therefore be a 
G6delian universe. It therefore remains possible to foliate any universe which conforms 
to the second law of thermodynamics by global time-slices. Furthermore, it must be 
possible to define at least one objectively distinguished sequence of time slices in that 
universe, namely that sequence of time slices along which entropy increaseS. 36 A 
universe in which such a sequence can be defined is one of which an objectively distinct 
present account can in principle be given, since an objectively distinct present theorist 
can assert that one of the time slices in the sequence is objectively distinguished from 
the other time slices in the sequence. The time-slice so distinguished can then constitute 
the objective correlate of what we experience as the present moment. 
Therefore, it turns out that Godel's claim that an objectively distinct present 
account cannot be given of the temporal metaphysics of a G6delian universe is only 
valid for universes which do not conform to the second law of thermodynamics. At best, 
G6del is left claiming that our universe should only be described by a static block 
universe theory because it conforms to the same field equations as those to which 
G6delian universes conform, a claim which involves a questionable modal step. 
Although it is possible in principle to give an objectively distinct present account 
of the temporal metaphysics of any universe which conforms to the second law of 
thermodynamics, since it is possible to define a distinguished sequence of global time 
slices in such a universe, the question arises as to what would distinguish one of the 
time slices in the distinguished sequence from all of the other time slices in the 
distinguished sequence as the objective correlate of what we experience as the present 
moment. 
The second law of thermodynamics states that the entropy of an isolated 
thermodynamic system inexorably increases over time. Some theorists have suggested, 
therefore, that increase in entropy might be the objective correlate of what we 
36 It is conceivable that entropy is increasing along more than one possible sequence of time slices, so that 
the conformity of a universe to the second law of thermodynamics does not necessarily tell us which 
foliation by global time slices we should choose. 
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experience as the passage of tiMe. 37 However, the second law of thermodynamics does 
not provide us with any basis for distinguishing one time slice in a sequence of time 
slices from all the other time slices in that sequence, thereby allowing us to identify one 
time slice as the objective correlate of what we experience as the present moment. 
As indicated previously, a presentist would claim that only one of the time slices 
in the sequence actually exists and that this is what defines it as the objective correlate 
of the present moment. A growing block universe theorist would claim that all those 
time slices in the sequence exist which constitute the objective correlates of past 
moments, whilst the time slice which is just coming into existence constitutes the 
objective correlate of the present moment. A growing determinacy theorist would claim 
that all the time slices in the sequence have the same existential status, but that those 
time slices which are determinate constitute the objective correlate of past moments, 
that time slice which is becoming determinate constitutes the objective correlate of the 
present moment, and those time slices which are indeterminate constitute the objective 
correlate of future moments. None of these positions emerge out of thermodynamic 
considerations. 
Thus, whilst I observe in chapter 5 that a universe which conforms to the second 
law of thermodynamics is as compatible in principle with an objectiVely distinguished 
present temporal metaphysics as with a static block universe temporal metaphysics, I 
also observe that thermodynamic considerations do not imply an existential distinction 
between moments of time, nor any possible variation in the state of determinacy of 
moments of time. Thermodynamic considerations do not therefore help us to select 
between the static block universe and physically distinguished present accounts of 
temporal metaphysiCS. 38 
(d) Quantum Mechanics As A Source Of Temporal Metaphysics 
In chapter 6,1 examine an experiment in which quantum entities exhibit two types of 
behaviour, wave-like behaviour and particle-like behaviour. Consideration of this 
experiment suggests that the transition from wave-like behaviour to particle-like 
37 This suggestion embodies the assumption that the second law of thermodynamics is true in our universe. 
38 Thermodynamics might however suggest one way in which the physical status of locations in time could 
vary in a static block universe. If we were to associate an entropy with each location in time in a static 
block universe, then the increase in entropy specified by the second law of thermodynamics would imply 
that each location in time had a different entropy associated with it. Furthermore, locations in time ordered 
in terms of increasing entropy would, if the second law of thermodynamics is true, be ordered from earlier 
to later. Entropy could in that case serve as the physical property depicted in figure 1.2. 
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behaviour may be related to measurement, but it turns out that it is not easy to define 
what constitutes measurement of a quantum system. The way in which one conceives of 
measurement is found to depend upon how one interprets quantum mechanics, and I 
therefore examine a number of possible interpretations of quantum mechanics. 
I then proceed to examine whether measurement invariably brings about an 
irreversible change in the state of a quantum system. I examine an argument formulated 
by Penrose" which suggests that quantum measurement does indeed bring about 
irreversible change. I also consider a paper by Aharanov, Bergmann and LebowitZ, 40 
however, which throws the connection between quantum measurement and 
irreversibility into some doubt. 
In chapter 7,1 demonstrate that it is possible to devise a quantum mechanical 
equivalent to Einstein's signalling technique, provided that a measurement upon a 
quantum system is assumed to bring about an irreversible evolution in the behaviour of 
that system. I proceed to demonstrate that by applying the quantum meebanical 
equivalent of Einstein's signalling technique to a closed time-like curve of the type 
which occurs in a Godelian universe, a similar paradox arises to that which arises when 
we apply Einstein's signalling technique to such a curve. The paradox implies that a 
single direction of time cannot be established all the way around a closed time-like 
curve, as did the paradox which arose from Einstein's signalling technique. 
It emerges that we can identify at least one sequence of global time slices in any 
universe which conforms to the laws of quantum mechanics, provided that measurement 
of a quantum system brings about an irreversible evolution In that system. This result 
corresponds to the observation that we can identify at least one sequence of global time 
slices in any universe which conforms to the second law of thermodynamics. Universes 
in which measurement of quantum systems brings about irreversible evolution are 
therefore universes which are compatible in principle with an objectively distinguished 
present temporal metaphysics, for the same reason that universes which conform to the 
second law of thermodynamics are universes which are compatible in principle with an 
objectively distinguished present temporal metaphysics. 
39 Confer Penrose 1989. 
40 Confer Aharanov, Bergmann and Lebowitz 1964. 
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5 The Aim Of The Analysis 
The aim of the analysis in the following chapters is to indicate why caution must be 
exercised if one wishes to attempt to extract a temporal metaphysics from a theory of 
physics. 
As we will see, a theory of physics may itself embody metaphysical assumptions 
which ultimately derive from the metaphysical beliefs of those physicists who 
formulated the theory. Thus a philosopher who treats a theory of physics as if it were 
devoid of metaphysical assumptions risks simply reproducing those assumptions which 
are embodied in the theory whilst attempting to formulate a temporal metaphysics on 
the basis of the theory. 
It is already apparent that different theories of physics may imply different 
temporal metaphysics. Therefore, attempting to extract a temporal metaphysics from 
one theory of physics without considering other theories of physics cannot be justified. 
In the course of the analysis, it becomes apparent that a universe which conforms to the 
laws of thermodynamics and quantum mechanics, as well as the laws of special and 
general relativity, can be as readily described in objectively distinguished present terms 
as in static block universe terms. Therefore it turns out that, taken as a whole, our 
current laws of physics in no way constrain us to accept a particular temporal 
metaphysics as the temporal metaphysics of our universe. 
Whilst the following analysis Will imply certain methodological procedures 
which might constructively be employed if one wishes to attempt to establish one's 
temporal metaphysics on the basis of theories of physics, it will not be my aim to 
attempt to establish which temporal metaphysics constitutes the correct temporal 
metaphysics for our universe. Instead, the analysis will only go so far as to suggest that 
the theories of physics which we currently possess do not conclusively imply which 
temporal metaphysics we should adopt. 
2 
C- 
Special Relativity And 
The Relative Present 
I Introduction 
A number of philosophers have looked to the special theory of relativity to guide them 
in constructing a metaphysics of time. Perhaps the best known paper is that by Hilary 
Putnam, entitled "Time And Physical Geometry" (Putnam 1967). The general structure 
of Putnam's paper is worth noting. He begins by describing a possible metaphysics of 
time, essentially an objectively distinguished present metaphysics of the presentist 
variety described in chapter 1, then goes on to show that this metaphysics is 
incompatible with a theory of physics, the special theory of relativity, He concludes that 
there is only one metaphysics of time available, namely that one which accords with the 
special theory of relativity. This metaphysics, which he believes we are compelled to 
accept, directly contradicts the metaphysics which he first described, and corresponds to 
a static block universe metaphysics. Two basic assumptions about special relativity 
underlie Putnam's argument: that there is only one metaphysics of time compatible with 
the theory, and that the theory itself is "correct" in a way that the posited presentist 
metaphysics was deemed not to be. The dependence is thus of metaphysics upon 
physics, although no theories of physics apart from special relativity are adduced in 
support of the argument. 
We will see that the same structure of argument is employed by other 
philosophers who have examined the metaphysics of time, although the theory of 
physics chosen as the basis of the argument, and the philosophical conclusions drawn, 
vary. In this chapter, I will consider only arguments based upon special relativity. I will 
begin by considering Putnam's argument in detail, with reference also to the paper by 
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Rietdijk, "A Rigorous Proof Of Determinism Derived From The Special Theory Of 
Relativity" (Rietdijk 1966). In this paper, Rietdijk runs essentially the same argument as 
Putnam. Both Putnam and Rietdijk conclude that there is no difference in the existential 
status of "things" located in the past, present and future, a conclusion which is 
incompatible with presentist and growing block universe theories of temporal 
metaphysics, although not incompatible in principle with growing determinacy theories. 
However, the implication of the arguments employed by Putnam and RietdJik that an 
objectively distinguished present cannot be identified in a universe conforming to the 
theory of special relativity would also rule out growing determinacy theories, if it turned 
out to be a valid implication. 
Once I have examined the Putnam/Rietdijk argument, I will consider how the 
argument might be challenged. A paper by Maxwell, "Are Probabilism And Special 
Relativity Incompatible? " (Maxwell 1985), employs as Its starting point the assumption 
that special relativity implies a static block universe metaphysics, but differs from the 
Putnam and Rietdijk papers in considering the compatibility of this metaphysics with 
other theories of physics, in particular quantum theory. I will conclude the current 
chapter with an appraisal of Maxwell's results, thereby providing a bridge between this 
chapter and chapter 6, where the implications of quantum theory for temporal 
metaphysics are considered in detail. 
2 Putnam's Argument For The Equivalent Existential Status Of Things 
In the paper "Time And Physical Geometry" (Putnam 1967), Putnam argues on the 
basis of special relativity that "things" in the past and future enjoy exactly the same 
existential status as "things" in the present. What exactly constitutes a thing is left open, 
though Putnam points out that the term "a thing" must be capable of referring to a thing 
in the past and future, as well as in the present. The metaphysics of time which Putnam 
believes is dictated by special relativity is compatible with a straightforward 
correspondence theory of meaning for the term "a thing", since things are deemed to 
exist in this metaphysics in the same way whether located in the past, present or future, 
relative to some observer. Such a straightforward theory is not available, however, to an 
objectively distinguished present theorist who equates existing with being present, that 
is, to a presentist. If a presentist refers to past or future "things", only things which do 
not exist (at the present moment) can be meant. A presentist, therefore, will require a 
more sophisticated theory of meaning for the term "a thing". 
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Putnam states three apparently uncontentious assumptions linking time with 
existential status, this status being couched in terms of whether or not a thing is real. 
Before considering Putnam's assumptions, therefore, let us consider his interpretation 
of what it is for a thing to be real. Putnam discusses towards the end of his paper the 
relationship between being real and existing, concluding that a thing is real if and only 
if it exists, in the tenseless sense of existence, 
"[T]he notion of being 'real' turns out to be coextensive with the lenseless 
notion of existence. " (Putnam 1967, p. 204) 
For Putnam, therefore, the claim that things in the past and future are real is equivalent 
to the claim that they exist tenselessly. 1 This clearly accords with the temporal 
metaphysics which he concludes we are compelled to accept on the basis of special 
relativity. In a static block universe, (real) things exist (tenselessly) whether they are 
located in the past, present or future of sorne observer. So it is natural to conclude that a 
thing's being real is equivalent to its existing in some region of the space-time 
continuum. 
But should a presentist assume the same equivalence between being real and 
existing tenselessly? Let us assume that pTesentism amounts to the claim that only 
things which are present exist. This removes the need for a tenseless sense of existence 
(at least in relation to things), since if something exists, by definition it exists "now'. 
However, this need not amount to the claim that past and future things are not real. 
Indeed, the presentist may find a distinction between the statements "X is real" and "X 
exists" advantageous in defining what it is for a thing to be present, particularly in the 
light of the requirement for an explanation of meaningful reference to past and future 
things. The presentist could argue, for instance, that we can meaningfully refer to past 
and future things because they are real, even though they do not now exist. 
Evidently, if the equivalence between being real and existing is maintained, then 
the presentist is barred from coherently claiming that past and future things are real, 
since only present things exist, and thus only present things are real. However, if the 
presentist is constrained to maintain an equivalence between being real and existing, the 
basis of such a constraint is not yet apparent. Therefore, in the analysis of Putnam's 
argument, an awareness of the possibility of distinguishing between being real and 
"Being real" is itself a tenseless concept for Putnam (e. g. "all future things are real" (Putnam 1967, 
p. 204, my underline)) as a consequence of his argument. 
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existing tenselessly will be of assistance, even if the metaphysics of time to which 
Putnam concludes we are compelled has no use for such a distinction. 2 
The three assumptions on which Putnam bases his argument can be stated as 
follows. I have subdivided Putnam's second and third assumptions for clarity. The 
relation R which is employed in the assumptions is some relation between an observer 
and things such that things which stand in the relation R to an observer are real. For this 
reason, R is sometimes referred to as the reality relation. The possible candidates for R 
are discussed in more detail below. 
(1) 1-now am real. 
(2.1) At least one other observer, 0, is real. 
(2.2) The observer 0 may be in motion relative to me. 
(3.1) All and only the things which stand in the relation R to I-now are real. 
(3.2) If O-now stands in the relation R to 1-now, then all and only the things that stand 
in the relation R to O-now are real. 
Putnam's first assumption echoes the Cartesian cogito and expresses the thought that a 
subject can with relative certainty assert its own reality. Note however that the assertion 
is temporally restricted to the present moment, an essential modification in the context 
of Putnam's argument. To assert temporally unrestricted reality of one's self would be 
to assume at least part of what Putnam is trying to prove. 
The first part of the second assumption could be challenged by a solipsist, 
though such a challenge would not depend upon any temporal considerations, For any 
non-solipsist, (2.1) is uncontroversial, as is (2.2). 
It is assumption (3) which contains the bulk of the temporal metaphysics, 
suggesting as it does that a thing's reality is related to its temporal status, whether it is 
past, present or future. It is the fact that, according to special relativity, a thing's 
temporal status is relative to an observer which leads Putnam to conclude that its reality 
cannot be dependent upon its temporal status, in effect to delete the phrase "and only" 
from (3.1) and (3.2). However, as Putnam indicates, the third assumption is vacuous 
2A growing block universe theorist allows that present and past things exist and are real. TNs need not 
preclude future things from being real, even though they do not exist in a growing block universe. A 
growing determinacy theorist allows that past, present and future things exist and are real, since the 
objective difference between them is explained in terms of their state of determinacy in a growing 
determinacy universe. I have focussed upon the presentist position here, however, since Putnam is 
specifically arguing against presentism. 
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unless we allow that we can refer to things in the past and future, as well as in the 
present, whether or not we decide that they are real. 
What is the relation R? Putnam, in an attempt not to prejudge the issue, suggests 
that it must be a physical relation independent of co-ordinate system and definable 
"tenselessly" in terms of fundamental physical notions. If we understand R as the 
relation "simultaneous with", then, in conjunction with (1), (3.1) can be interpreted as 
the belief that being simultaneous with I-now, what we would usually term "being 
present", is the necessary and sufficient condition for being real. This belief, which it is 
Putnam's aim to challenge, can also be expressed as the belief that past and future 
things, things which are not now present, are not real. 
The assumption that R is the simultaneity relation creates no problems in 
classical physics. If I take O-now to be simultaneous with 1-now, then things which are 
present (and therefore real) for O-now are also present (and therefore real) for I-now, 
even though they may not be directly observable by me (in which case I must rely on 
O's report of their presentness). This relies on the assumption in classical physics that 
all observers share the same present, regardless of their location in the universe and 
their velocities relative to each other. However, treating R as the simultaneity relation is 
less innocuous when special relativity is assumed. By (2.2), 0 may be in motion relative 
to me. If O's relative velocity is large, some sizable percentage of the speed of light, 
relativistic effects are significant. 3 
ýight ray light ray' 
a'thing'inyour 





Fig. 2.1 Observers moving relative to one another experience different 
'nows' in special relativity. Adapted from Putnam 1967, p. 241. 
3 Relativistic effects exist where there is any velocity difference between two bodies, but for low velocity 
differentials such effects are so small as to be negligible for most purposes. 
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It is then the case, according to special relativity, that some things which are present for 
O-now (where "O-now" Is 0 simultaneous with I-now) lie in 1-now's future, as shown 
in figure 2.1.4 But things which are present for O-now, that is, which stand in the 
relation R to 0, are real by (3.2). Therefore, I must conclude that some things in my 
future are real just as all things in my present are real. 
One argument against this conclusion can be quickly ruled out. We could insist 
that only those things simultaneous with I-now are real (i. e. interpret the relation R as 
"simultaneous with 1-now"). Since the things simultaneous with O-now are not 
simultaneous with 1-now, even though O-now is simultaneous with 1-now, this version 
of R does not allow us to draw the conclusion that things in ]-now's future, things 
simultaneous with O-now, are real. (It is worth noting the lack of transitivity evident in 
what I-now and O-now take to be present. From 1-now's point of view, O-now is 
simultaneous with I-now. From O-now's point of view, however, I-now am not 
simultaneous with O-now. In fact, some future part of 1-now ("I-later") is simultaneous 
with O-now, from O-now's point of view. )5 The interpretation of R as the relation 
"simultaneous with 1-now" is not permitted in the context of special relativity, however, 
since it contradicts the assumption that there are no privileged observerS. 6 The 
suggested relation awards special status to 1-now because if I-now experience a 
different present from O-now, it is my present which is deemed to define what is real. 
Is it legitimate to interpret R as the relation "simultaneous with (any observer- 
now)", implying that what is real can be defined in relation to the present of any 
observer? Assumption (3.2), which gives rise to the conclusion that things in 1-now's 
future have the same existential status as things in 1-now's present, implies that if a 
thi ng 1s real for 0-now, and 0-now Is real for 1-now, then that thing 1s real for 1-now. In 
other words, "being real for" is a transitive relation. However, we have already seen 
that, if we interpret R as a simultaneity relation, then R is not a reciprocal relation in 
Special Relativity. Thus, even if 0-now is simultaneous with I-now (from 1-now's point 
of view), it is not necessarily the case that I-now is simultaneous with 0-now (from 0- 
now's point of view). On the same basis, it can be seen that R interpreted as the 
4A number of space-time diagrams appear in this chapter. These are two-dimensional representations of 
four-dimensional space-time. The convention of these diagrams is to represent time on the vertical axis, 
and (one-dimension of) space on the horizontal axis. 
5See Rietdijk 1966, p. 341. The point is not apparent from Putnam's diagram, but is discussed in detail in 
section 4 (a) below. 
6This assumption is a fundamental tenet of special relativity, but not of general relativity. In the latter, a 
privileged observer may be chosen to be one whose velocity is the same as that of the average velocity of 
matter in the universe. Since special relativity neglects effects due to the existence of matter, there is no 
basis for establishing a privileged reference frame in the theory. 
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simultaneity relation is not transitive either. O-now may be calculated to be 
simultaneous with something which ties in I-now's future, whilst I-now is calculated to 
be simultaneous with O-now. Yet it is clearly not the case that J-now can be calculated 
to be simultaneous with the thing in its own future. So, if we do interpret R as the 
relation "simultaneous with (any observer-now)", we need to bear in mind that this is an 
intransitive relation, given special relativity, whilst "being real for" is transitive. 
Putnam seems to suggest that the failure of transitivity if we interpret R as the 
relation "simultaneous with (any observer-now)" rules it out as the correct 
interpretation of R. Confusingly, he then neglects to say what he takes the correct 
interpretation of R to be. In fact, it makes sense to take R to be the relation 
Cý simultaneous with (any observer-now)", provided we acknowledge that being real for 
an observer is not equivalent to being simultaneous with that observer. In other words, 
it is possible for something to be real for an observer without being simultaneous with 
that observer. If R is interpreted as the simultaneity relation, however, assumptions (3.1) 
and (3.2) are contradictory, since all and only the things which are simultaneous with I- 
now are not all and only the things which are simultaneous with O-now. We need a 
reformulated assumption along the lines of the following. 
(3 *) All and only the things which stand in the relation R to I-now, or which stand in 
the relation R to O-now, where O-now stands in the relation R to I-now, are real. 
It should be clear that the consequence of this assumption is that events in my (I-now's) 
future are real (confer figure 2.1). Putnam expresses a modified version of the third 
assumption as the claim that I should count as real every thing which bears the 
transitive closure of R to me: "i. e. which bears R to me, or which bears R to something 
that bears R to me, or which bears R to something that bears R to something that bears 
R to me, or ...... (Putnam 1967, p. 204). 
7 If we consider just the two observers 1-now and 
O-now, it can be shown that the range of things in I-now's future which are either 
present or past for O-now is limited by the fact that the maximum relative velocity 
difference between 1-now and O-now is c, the speed of light. ' 
7 Observe that it does not matter if the relation R itself is not transitive when the condition for reality is 
formulated in this way, obviating the objection to the interpretation of R as the (intransitive) relation 
"simultaneous with (any observer-now)". 
8 One of the two fundamental axioms of special relativity is that the maximum relative velocity is c, the 
speed of light. Light is just one form of electromagnetic radiation, which also includes radio waves, x-rays 
and microwaves: all such radiation travels at c. The other axiom, alluded to in footnote 6, is that there are 
no privileged reference frames. 
C- 
Special Relativity And The Relative Present 55 
If reality were restricted only to things standing in first and second order R- 
relations to 1-now, that is, to things which bear R to me, or which bear R to something 
that bears R to me, then the things in J-now's future would only be real up to a horizon 
defined by O-now's present when O-now is moving at c relative to 1-now. Transitive 
closure of R (i. e. third order and higher R-relations) is required to ensure that all things 
in 1-now's future are real. This raises the problem, which Putnam notes, of whether 
there will be enough future observers (future relative to I-now), since it is easy to 
envisage a future time during which no observers exist. The problem is overcome "if we 
allow all physical systems (even electromagnetic fields, etc. ) as 'observers' ... and allow 
observers to use co-ordinate systems in which they are not at rest" (Putnam 1967, 
p. 204). There is no obvious objection to this broad definition of what is to constitute an 
observer. 
The argument on the basis of special relativity that "future" things enjoy the 
same reality status as "present" things (all temporal references relative to I-now) can be 
run for "past" things as well. Because the hypersurface, in this case hyperplane, 9 of 
simultaneity defined by O-now is "tilted" relative to the hyperplane defined by I-now, 
some things on O-now's hyperplane will lie in 1-now's past, just as some of the things 
lie in I-now's future (confer figure 2.1). We can argue for the "identical to present" 
reality of these past things on the basis of their simultaneity "qth O-now (we are 
assuming as before that O-now is simultaneous with I-now). 
As it stands, therefore, Putnam's argument from special relativity seems to offer 
a convincing basis for adopting a static block universe model of reality, with things in 
the past, present and future of any arbitrary observer enjoying the same reality status. 
There are, however, a number of problems with the argument. Before considering these, 
I want to examine an important consequence of adopting the static block universe 
model, a consequence which Putnam himself considers. When we come to examine the 
problems with Putnam's argument, it will be useful to remember that we can avoid (or 
lose, depending on one's point of view) this consequence by rejecting Putnam's 
conclusion. 
9A hyperplane is the three dimensional equivalent of a two dimensional spatial plane In the context of 
special relativity, it is legitimate to speak about hyperplanes, since curvature of space-time does not occur 
in universes described purely in special relativistic terms. However, a simultaneity hyperplane has no 
invariant meaning in general relativity, where reference is made to hypersurfaces. Hyperplanes are a subset 
of hypersurfaces, where a hypersurface is the three dimensional equivalent of a two dimensional spatial 
surface. Hypersurfaces may or may not be curved, but if they are curved they are not hyperplanes. 
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3 The Relation Between Truth Values, Determinacy And Determinism 
Consider the statement "There will be a sea battle tomorrow". According to Aristotle, 
this statement has no truth value, that is to say, there is no state of affairs") which it 
either correctly describes (in which case the statement would be true)" or incorrectly 
describes (in which case the statement would be false). 12 On the other hand, the 
statements "There was a sea battle yesterday" or "There is a sea battle happening now" 
do have truth values. To say that the statement "There is a sea battle happening now" is 
true is to say that the statement correctly describes some currently existing state of 
affairs. To say that it is false is to say that it does not correctly describe some currently 
existing state of affairs, Similarly, if the statement "There was a sea battle yesterday" is 
true, this indicates that a state of affairs existed13 which corresponds to a sea battle. 
Aristotle's denial that statements about future14 states of affairs have truth 
values may stem from the fact that he takes future states of affairs to be at least partially 
undetermined: "not everything is or happens of necessity: some things happen as chance 
has it" (Aristotle, De Interpretatione 9). That is, he may consider that future states of 
affairs are indeterminate because they are not fully determined by the currently existing 
state of affairs. Whatever Aristotle's motivation for believing that future states are 
indeterminate, they contrast with past and present states of affairs which he takes to be 
determinate. 
It is useful to clarify what it means to say that one state of affairs is determined 
by another state of affairs. Suppose that we use the proposition q to describe a future 
10 So far only "things" have been introduced into the ontology. By a state of affairs is meant the particular 
arrangement and properties of a group of things at a particular time. For example, a sea battle at a 
particular moment consists of a group of ships and their crews arranged at sea, the ships then possessing 
certain properties such as being afloat, being on fire, and so on. In addition, an "event" can be defined as a 
change or group of changes in a state of affairs, that is, a change or group of changes in the arrangement 
and properties of things. Taken as a whole, a sea battle constitutes an event which can be defined as the 
various movements of the group of ships involved, together with the changes in the properties of those 
ships. Thus a ship may possess the property of being undamaged at the beginning of the battle, and possess 
the property of being damaged at the end. (Strictly, position itself is a property. The distinction between 
arrangement and other properties is made here solely for clarity. ) It should be observed that both states of 
affairs and events are defined in terms of things. Following Prior 1969,1 take things to be the basic 
component of my ontology. Confer the discussion of change in chapter 3, sections 3 and 4. 
11 Afistotle assumes a correspondence theory of truth. 
12 Confer Aristotle, De Inlerprelatione 9, ed. Ackrill 1987, pp. 17-19. 
13 It might, perhaps, be suggested that for statements about the past to have truth values, past states of 
affairs must exist tenselessly, that is, must exist in the same way as present states of affairs. This model 
would conflict with the presentism described by Putnam (in which only present things exist). However, the 
possibility of attaching a truth value to a statement about the past appears only to require that a state of 
affairs did once exist, rather than that it exists tenselessly. The attachment of a truth value does not 
necessarily imply that the state of affairs referred to exists now or exists tenselessly. 
14 Future, as always, defined relative to some observer. 
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state of affairs and the proposition p to describe the present state of affairs. To say that 
the future state of affairs q is determined by the present state of affairs p is to say that q 
is true as a description of a future moment, given the state of affairs described by p 
which obtains at the present moment. For example, if p is the proposition "Greece and 
Persia are at war and their naval fleets are assembled within a day's sailing of each 
other" and q is the proposition "There will be a sea battle tomorrow", then we might 
take q to be true given p, if we take it that the state of affairs described by p determines 
the state of affairs described by q. 
David Lewis defines determinism in terms of possible worlds as follows. 
"A world is deterministic if every world with the same past and the same laws 
has the same future. " 
An alternative definition which avoids reference to possible worlds is as 
follows. 
"A world is detenninistic if its past and its laws entail its future. "15 
To say that some future state of affairs is determinate, on the other hand, is to 
say that q is true or false as a description of some future moment. So if all future states 
of affairs are determinate, then the proposition "There will be a sea battle tomorrow" is 
either true or false. 16 
Aristotle's refusal to attach truth values to statements about the future can be 
interpreted as implying that he did not take future states of affairs to exist in the same 
way as present states of affairs. It is not coherent to assert that statements about the 
future do not have truth values, whilst allowing that (1) statements about the present do 
have truth values and (11) future states of affairs exist in the same way as present states 
of affairs. Since Aristotle maintained (1), he must reject (11). Note however that the 
claim that future states of affairs do not exist in the same way as present states of affairs 
is not the same as the claim that future states of affairs do not exist simpliciter. 
On the assumption that future states of affairs are fundamentally different to 
past and present states of affairs, it is legitimate to deny that future states of affairs are 
15 This reformulation of Lewis's definition was proposed by Keith Hossack. Confer Lewis 1986. 
16 Confer chapter 1, section 2(b)(iii). 
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determinate. 17 Aristotle's assumption that truth values can be attached to statements 
about the past, although it does not imply that past states of affairs exist in the same 
way as present ones (confer footnote 13), does imply that he takes it that only one past 
existed. To that extent, his view of the past resembles the one implicit in the 
metaphysics to which Putnam believes we are compelled by special relativity. Clearly, 
however, Aristotle's metaphysics is at odds with Putnam's because of his different 
position in relation to the status of future states of affairs. 18 
Let us compare Aristotle's claim that future states of affairs19 are not 
determinate with Putnam's conclusion. For my future'O to be indeterminate, it must be 
the case that, at this present moment, a proposition q describing the future is neither 
true nor false. 
Present experience is never of contradictory states of affairs, however. Either 
there is a sea battle happening now, or there is not. From experience I deduce that, in 
my present, contradictory states of affairs cannot co-exiSt. 21 That is to say, the present is 
determinate. The proposition p proposed as a description of the present state of affairs 
is either true or false. 
In the metaphysics envisaged by Putnam, the future exists in the same way as 
the present and past. The implication is that contradictory states of affairs cannot co- 
exist in the future (or past), and thus that there is only one possible way my future could 
be. Putnam's metaphysics, therefore, implies that the future is determinate. The 
proposition q proposed as a description of the future state of affairs is true or false. 
It is important to observe, however, that Putnam describes Aristotle as an 
"indeterminist" (Putnam 1967) and does not appear to distinguish the claim that the 
future is indeterminate from the claim that the future is undetermined. Given that 
17 To be precise, Aristotle did not want to attach truth values to all statements about the future, only to 
some. His model is of a partially, not wholly, indeterminate fature. 
18 Aristotle is essentially proposing what I have identified as a growing determinacy theory. 
19 1 have moved from talking about things to talking about states of affairs. It might be objected that 
Putnam's argument was only about things, rather than states of affairs. However, any present experience 
is of a state of affairs, not simply of "things". Thus, my present experience is of a state of affairs. 
According to special relativity, someone may experience, in their present, things which are in my fiiture. 
Once again, they must experience not simply the things but the arrangement and properties of those things, 
that is, the state of affairs which the things constitute. This state of affairs is in their present, my future, 
with all the consequent implications for its existential status. So the argument that future and past things 
have the same existential status as present things can be extended to future and past states of affairs. Hence 
the move from talking about things to talking about states of affairs is justified. 
20 One often sees expressions such as "the future (past, present) is determined" or "the future (past, 
present) is open". I take the expression "the future (past, present)" to be shorthand for "future (past, 
present) states of affairs", and use it as such. 
21 Whether this deduction is valid will have to be re-examined subsequently in the context of quantum 
mechanics. Confer chapters 6 and 7. 
Cl- 
Special Relativity And The Relative Present 59 
Putnam takes himself to be refuting Aristotle ("Aristotle was wrong" states Putnam), it 
may be that Putnam believes that his metaphysics implies determinism, rather than the 
determinacy of the future. 
4 Problems With Putnam's Argument 
There are a number of problems with Putnam's argument for a static block universe 
temporal metaphysics. He glides over the fact that two observers cannot coincide 
spatio-temporally, a fact which impacts on his argument. Furthermore, his argument 
employs the definition of simultaneity used in special relativity, a definition grounded 
upon the assumption that the speed of light is constant. We need to consider whether 
this assumption can be justified, and also whether there are any alternative methods of 
defining simultaneity which do not depend upon this assumption. We will then examine 
whether it is appropriate to equate a thing's reality with its simultaneity with 1-now. 
Finally, we will acknowledge that the argument employed by Putnam and Rietdijk was 
already known by Kurt Godel, some twenty years before they gave it full philosophical 
expression, and that he rejected it on the grounds that special relativity itself is of 
limited applicability in the type of universe we inhabit. 
(a) Observers Never Coincide Spatio-Temporally 
The diagram which Putnam uses to illustrate his argument (confer figure 2.1) shows "I" 
and "you" coinciding. The diagram in Rietdijk's 1966 paper is more accurate, since 
(WI) and "you"(W2) are spatially separated. 22 
In Rietdijk's diagram, reproduced in simplified form in figure 2.2, W, is the first 
observer and W2 is the second observer. W2 is moving towards W, with constant 
velocity. WI-now, the point A, is simultaneous with W2-now, the point B, from the point 
of view of WI, but W2-now is simultaneous with the point P, some future stage of WI, 
from the point of view of W2. 
Information from P, the point in WI-now's future which W2-now considers to be 
simultaneous, cannot reach W2before point L (since no signal can travel faster than the 
speed of light according to special relativity). Notice that, from Wl's point of view (as 
well as W2's), when the light signal reaches W2, P will be in Wl's past. If W2 then sends 
a message to W1, saying what happened at P, the message cannot reach W, before point 
22 The point which Putnam's diagram obscures is that physically distinct things cannot, by the definition of 
"distinct", occupy exactly the same space-time location. 
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M. Since, from both Wj's and W2's point of view, P was already in Wj's past when the 
information from P reached W2 at L, it must of course be in Wj's past when W, receives 
the information about P back from W2. 
In fact, no signal about some point in Wj's future from any other spatially 
separated observer can ever reach W, before that point in Wj's future becomes a point 
in Wj's past. Although this observation does not disprove Putnam's argument that an 
observer, with whom I-now consider myself simultaneous, may in turn consider himself 
simultaneous with some state of affairs in 1-now's future, it does illustrate that no 
observer in my present is ever privy to information about my future. As we will see, this 
is significant in the context of the next problem with Putnam's argument. 
-light ray light ray.. '* 
light ray%. light ray 
P_ 
B Wl's'now' 
---- --------- -------- 
light ray 
W2's world line Wj's world line 
Fig. 2.2 Two spatially separated observers can only observe 
and communicate at speeds less than or equal to the speed of 
light. Adapted from Rietdijk 1966, p. 341. 
(b) The Conventionality Of Simultaneity 
Putnam argues for the equivalent existential status of past, present and future on the 
grounds that everything simultaneous with 1-now is real, and that some things 
simultaneous with I-now (moving at high velocity relative to 1-now) are themselves 
simultaneous with things in I- now's future and I-now's past. The notion of simultaneity 
invoked by Putnam is that used by Einstein in formulating special relativity. 
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Simultaneous space-time points on the world-lines of two observers, E and E'l who are 
stationary relative to one another, can be defined as follows. A light (or other 
electromagnetic) signal is sent at time to from world-line E towards world-line E'. The 
space-time point at which the signal arrives at E' is termed B. The signal is then 
reflected back towards E, and arrives there at time t. The space-time point on E which 
is defined to be simultaneous with B is termed A. Both A and B are deemed to occur at 
time (t-to)12 after the signal was sent from world-line E, from the point of view of an 
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Figi 2.3 (a) The construction of simultaneous space time points in special relativity. (b) 
Original diagram (slightly modified) from Ciftinbaum 1973, p. 684, on which (a) is based. 
When the observers are not stationary relative to one another, the world-line of one 
observer is no longer parallel to the other. An observer in one inertial frame will 
therefore disagree with an observer in another inertial frame as to which space-time 
point is simultaneous with which. This is the situation illustrated in figure 2.2, where 
W, considers A and B to be simultaneous, but W2 considers B and P to be simultaneous. 
In order to understand how this situation comes about, it is helpful to employ a slightly 
different method of constructing two simultaneous space-time points. This method uses 
the same underlying assumptions as the method illustrated in figure 2.3(a), but makes 
use of two light signals, rather than one. In figure 2.4(a), a light signal is einitted from 
station B, and is deemed to arrive at the world-lines of stations A and C at the same 
time, from the point of view of the three stations and also from the point of view of a 
reference frame, stationary with respect to A, B and C, shown here as the x-t axes. 
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Space-time points A, and C, are therefore deemed to be simultaneous in the x-t axes 
reference frame. In figure 2.4(b), A, B and C all have a velocity with respect to the x-t 
axes reference frame. Thus, whilst A and C deem the light signal to arrive at their 
respective world-lines at the same time, from the point of view of the x-t axes reference 
frame the light signal reaches the world-line of A before it reaches the world-line of C. 
Thus the points Al'and Cj'are simultaneous in the reference frame of the stations A, B 









Fig. 2.4 (a) Space-time diagram showing experiment to define simultaneity at stations 
A and C (at rest in this reference frame) by light signals emitted frorn a station B 
midway between them. (b) Equivalent experiment for the case in which A, B, and C 
all have a velocity with respect to the reference frame. From French 1968, p. 75. 
The methods used to define simultaneous space-time points which we have been 
examining rest on the assumption that the speed of light is constant. 23 The speed of the 
light signal on the outward bound journey from E to Pin figure 2.3)(a) is taken to be the 
same as the speed on the inward bound journey from E' to E. In that case, since the 
distance between E and Premains constant, the time taken to complete each leg of the 
journey is the same. Hence we conclude that the signal reaches Pat the time (t-to)12, 
and proceed to define the simultaneity of A and B on this basis. However, the 
assumption that the speed of light is constant cannot be independently confirmed, since 
the speed is just the distance divided by the time, and we do not know how long it takes 
the light ray to reach E" from E. All we have is an upper bound on the journey time from 
E to Pand back to E, which must take less than (t-to). 24 As was mentioned earlier, the 
23 The speed of light to which I am referring is its speed in a vacuum (often represented as e). The speed 
of light varies in mediums, such as air or water. 
24 Confer GrUnbaum 1973, pp, 348-350. 
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constancy of the speed of light is one of the two fundamental axioms of special 
relativity, the other being that the laws of physics are the same in all inertial frames (see 
footnotes 7 and 9). However, despite the fact that the constancy of the speed of light is 
specified as an "axiom", there is no direct evidence for constancy of the speed of light 
beyond the definition of simultaneity given above. 25 As Griinbaum points out, 
"Einstein's philosophical supplanting of Newton's conception of simultaneity is 
presupposed by rather than first derived from his enunciation of the fundamental 
postulate of the constancy of the speed of light" (Griinbaum 1973, p. 343). We see in 
figure 2.3(b) that a whole set of space-time points between t and to, E, through to E?, 
could be simultaneous with B if the speed of light varied on the outward and inward 
journeys. If in fact it is not the case that the speed of light is constant, then it is possible, 
at least in principle, to construct universes in which a single hyperplane of simultaneity, 
a universal present, is defined. 
We proceed as follows. One inertial frame is defined to be "privileged", for 
example, one which is at rest relative to the centre of mass of the universe. 26 Suppose I 
am in this frame. Then I can define a hyperplane of simultaneity using one of the 
methods described above. Now suppose that you are in my hyperplane of simultaneity, 
and you are in motion relative to me. If you assume special relativity, you must assume 
that light always travels at the same speed for you as it does for me. Using the methods 
described above, you will calculate that you are simultaneous with things in my past or 
future. However, if in fact the speed of light can vary, it is possible that your plane of 
simultaneity is the same as mine, even though, by assuming the axioms of special 
relativity, you are misled into concluding that it is not. This is illustrated in figure 2.5. 
If I (as the "privileged" observer) accept Putnam's assumption that everything 
simultaneous with I-now exiStS27' I am entitled to assume that everything I am 
simultaneous with at this moment exists. However, since I am in the privileged inertial 
frame, I am further entitled to conclude that only those things I am simultaneous with 
exist. All those things which you (moving relative to me) calculate yourself to be 
simultaneous with on the basis of special relativity do not exist, since they do not lie in 
25 There is, however, experimental evidence which suggests that the speed of light must be constant. This 
is discussed later in this section, 
26 This may not be the most appropriate inertial frame to choose, and is suggested here simply as an 
example. 
27 Putnam's assumption is that everything simultaneous with I-now "is real" rather than that it "exists". 
Since, as indicated earlier, a presentist may not wish to deny that past and future things are real, but 
probably does wish to deny that they exist, I shall speak in terms of existence. I shall leave aside for now 
what a growing block universe theorist or a growing determinacy theorist might say. Confer footnote 2. 
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the simultaneity hyperplane defined in the privileged inertial frame. Thus a model of 
reality in which the speed of light varies is compatible with the presentist position since 
a single simultaneity hyperplane to which existence is restricted can be defined in this 
model. 
Figure 2.6 illustrates the difference between the real and apparent simultaneity 











Fig. 2.5 (a) B, moving relative to the "privileged" inertial frame represented by the X-1 
axes, calculates A] -C, as its simultaneity hyperplane or "present" by assuming that the 
velocity of light is constant. (b) If a simultaneity hyperplane Ao-Co, in agreement with 
the "present" of the privileged inertial frame, is to be calculated light must travel 
faster than the velocity stated in special relativity from B to AO , and slower than the 
velocity stated in special relativity from B to Co. 




S= observer in privileged inertial frame 
S'= observer in motion relative to S 
Fig. 2.6 The real and apparent simultaneity hyperplanes in a universe 
containing a privileged inertial frame in which the speed of light varies. 
S S, 
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There are, however, some obvious objections to defining a privileged simultaneity 
hyperplane. The charge could be made that allowing the speed of light to vary in Just 
such a way that a privileged hyperplane of simultaneity is defined is ad hoc. In the 
example depicted in figure 2.5(b), If the speed of light were to vary in any way other 
than the way illustrated, no such hyperplane could be defined. In order to refute the 
charge that the allowed variation in the speed of light is ad hoc, it would be necessary to 
explain what is causing the speed of light to vary. However, someone wishing to defend 
a presentist position could retort that the assumption that distance and time vary in just 
such a way that the speed of light remains constant (as is the case in special relativity) is 
equally ad hoe, and equally unexplained. It could be argued that we must start with the 
consequences of our assumptions, and work back from them to determine which 
assumptions are the correct ones, on the basis that the assumptions themselves are not 
empirically determined. Thus if we find that the consequence of assuming that the 
speed of light is constant in all inertial frames is that past and future things can be 
shown to exist in the same way as present things, this may lead presentists to conclude 
that the speed of light is not in fact constant. 28 
However, a further objection to defining a privileged simultaneity hyperplane is 
that the "assumption" that the speed of light is constant can, in fact, be shown to be true 
by empirical means. If this were the case, it would preclude the attempt to retrieve a 
privileged simultaneity hyperplane by allowing the speed of light to vary. In relation to 
this objection, we may recall the search in the nineteenth century for "the aether". This 
search arose out of the assumption that light, like sound, must be mechanically 
propagated through a medium. The suggested medium was the aether, a substance so 
tenuous as to be invisible to almost all attempts to detect it. Nonetheless, it was 
suggested that, if the aether did exist, some effects of its existence should be apparent. 
In particular, it was proposed that the aether would affect the speed of light travelling 
through it. Numerous physics experiments were carried out towards the end of the 
nineteenth century to try to prove the existence of the aether, without success. Indeed, 
Einstein cites the failure of these experiments as a motivating factor in his formulation 
28 Here we may recall the demonstration in the previous section that, even assuming special relativity, no 
observer in my present is ever privy to information about my future. There is thus no observational 
evidence for the claim that an observer could be simultaneous with things in my future. Consequently, 
assuming that the speed of light is not constant would have no observational repercussions. 
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of the theory of relatiV, ty. 29 Some advocates of special relativity have argued that the 
results of these and subsequent experiments to detect the existence of the aether should 
be interpreted as empirical evidence that the speed of light is constant. 
"Einstein's second postulate, on the universality of c, was a dramatic innovation. 
It was framed in a way that would seem to deny the possibility of any 
independent experimental check. It has been argued, however, that this essential 
feature of special relativity can in fact be based on observational evidence. " 
(French 1968, p. 72) 
The observational evidence referred to is the results of aether detection experiments. 
Thus the "null result" of the Michelson-Morley experiment, one of the most famous 
attempts to detect the aether, "is consistent with the proposition that the speed of light Is 
the same in all directions with respect to a reference frame having some arbitrary (but 
unknown) motion through space" (French 1968, p. 73). However, evidence which is 
consistent with a constant speed of light is not proof of that constancy, and this 
criticism can be made of all the results of the aether experiments. None of the results 
prove that the speed of light is not constant (hence none of them provide evidence for 
the existence of aether). On the other hand, none of them prove that the speed of light is 
constant. As stated earlier, the assumption that the speed of light is constant cannot be 
independently confinned, since the speed is just the distance divided by the time, and 
we do not know at what time relative to one world line a light signal reaches another 
world line. 
With reference to figure 2.3(a), it might appear that Pcould simply record on a 
clock the time at which the light signal reached the P world line, and then show the 
clock to E. The problem with this is that we cannot be entirely sure how the time 
displayed on a clock from the Pworld line relates to the time displayed on a clock from 
the E world line. Even if we initially synchronize two clocks on the E world line, we are 
still required to move one of the clocks to the Pworld line, and then to move it back 
again after the light signal has been detected in order to compare the readings on the 
two clocks- Even if the two clocks remain synchronized when they are brought back 
together, we still cannot be sure that a time recorded on the clock on the Pworld line is 
simultaneous with the "same" time on the clock on the E world line. It is possible that, 
29 According to Zahar (1989), however, the failure of the aether detection experiments was probably not 
the factor which originally motivated Einstein to formulate his theory of relativity. 
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as a result of moving the clock from the E world line to the E'world line, a time reading 
of 11 on the clock on the P world line corresponds to a time reading of 11±At on the 
clock on the E world line. This time difference is then alleviated when the clock is 
moved back from the E'world line to the E world line, disguising the fact that the time 
recorded on the E'world line for the detection of the light signal does not correspond to 
the "same" time on the E world line. Why might we consider it possible for a clock to 
behave in such a fashion? In order to move a clock from the E world line to the E' 
world line and back again, we need to exert a force on it. We cannot be sure whether 
two synchronized clocks will remain synchronized when a force is exerted on one of 
them and not on the other. 
As a consequence, we are not entitled to conclude that the time recorded on a 
clock can be cited as the time taken for a light signal to travel from one world line to 
another. Therefore, all we can do is assume the constancy of the speed of light. The 
aether detection experiments, by their very nature, are incapable of proving or 
disproving this hypothesis. 
As we have seen, the objections against the possibility that the speed of light 
varies are not insurmountable. 30 The criticism of Putnam's argument, therefore, is not 
that there is conclusive evidence that the speed of light does in fact vary, nor that a 
p 'leged simultaneity hyperplane can be defined as a consequence, but rather that the riv, 
assumptions to the contrary, fundamental as they are to his argument, are themselves 
metaphysical assumptions. 
Defining Simultaneity By Non-Relativistic Means If 
As we saw in the previous section, Putnam employs the definition of simultaneity, used 
by Einstein in formulating special relativity, in his argument for the equivalent 
existential status of past, present and future. It was shown that this definition is 
conventional, based upon the assumption that the speed of light is constant, an 
assumption which does not appear to be empirically verifiable. It is useful therefore to 
consider whether simultaneity could be defined in a way which does not rest upon an 
assumption about the speed of light. 
Suppose that some form of signal could be sent at an infinite speed. That is, 
suppose that a signal could be sent which would be detected by an observer, spatially 
30 The proposal that the aether might affect the speed of light traveling through it could provide the basis 
of an explanation for Avhy the speed varies, if it does, thereby refuting the charge that the allowed variation 
in the speed of light is ad hoc. 
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separated from the sender by some arbitrary distance, at the same moment of time that 
the signal was sent. An alternative way of imagining an infinite speed signal is to 
imagine a signal with zero transmission time between sender and detector. In the case 
of such a signal, if A sends the signal at the moment AO, and B receives the signal at the 
moment BO, then both A and B could be sure that AO and BO were simultaneous, 
provided of course that they knew that the signal had infinite speed. The simultaneity of 
AO and BO would be guaranteed, no matter how far apart A and B were when the signal 
was transmitted, or what their relative velocity was. 31 This is the situation illustrated in 
figure 2.7. 
--------------------- Ao Bo, 
World line 
of A 
signal transmitted with 
infinite speed 
Fig. 2.7 A and B can be sure that AO and BO are simultaneous 
space-time points if a signal is transmitted at infinite speed 
between their respective world lines, even if B is moving relative 
to A, the situation illustrated here. 
Clearly an infinite speed signal allows us to define a privileged simultaneity hyperplane. 
An observer detecting an infinite speed signal can be sure that the detection of the 
signal is simultaneous with the transmission of the signal by its sender, regardless of 
what inertial frame either the sender or the observer occupy. Furthermore, the observer 
can be sure that any other observer detecting the signal detects it at exactly the same 
time as he does. The observer can therefore agree on a single simultaneity hyperplane 
with the sender, and also with any other observer of the signal, namely the hyperplane 
in which the sending and detection of the signal takes place. If then we accept Putnam's 
31 Special relativity implies that the signal could not be an electromagnetic signal since one of the 
fundamental tenets of the theory is that c, the velocity of electromagnetic signals, is the maximum possible 
relative velocity. Given that c is not infinite, an electromagnetic signal will always take a length of time 
greater than zero to travel from its point of transmission to its point of reception. The method examined in 
this section does not assume special relativity, so it does not asserl that the infinite velocity signal could 
not be an electromagnetic signal. It does not, however, appear likely that an infinite velocity signal could 
be electromagnetic, given the experimental evidence available. 
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assumption that any thing simultaneous with I-now is real, then every observer 
receiving an infinite speed signal from I-now would know that all observers of the 
signal, plus I-now, agree on a simultaneity hyperplane, and therefore agree on what 
things are real, namely all things falling within that hyperplane. Putnam's argurnent for 
the equivalent existential status of past, present and future can no longer be run in the 
context of infinite speed signalling, since all observers would define the privileged 
simultaneity hyperplane as their present. No observer would consider this hyperplane to 
be in his future or past, so we would not be in a position to deduce the existential status 
of the future or past, at least not in the way that Putnam does. 
If infinite speed signalling is possible, therefore, it would offer an alternative 
method of defining simultaneity which is not susceptible to the type of argument which 
Putnam runs. It is, therefore, more attractive to a presentist who wishes to avoid the 
conclusion reached by Putnam that past, present and future states of affairs enjoy the 
sarne existential status. However, if infinite speed signalling is physically impossible (it 
is evidently not logically impossible), as special relativity would seem to suggest, then a 
presentist is denied this means of evading Putnam's conclusion. 
In fact, although the possibility of infinite speed signalling remains speculative, 
there are some aspects of physical theory which may be construed as implying its 
physical possibility. The existence of particles which travel faster than the speed of 
light, commonly termed tachyons, has been posited by some physiCiStS. 32 These 
particles occur as theoretical components of quantum field theory and many versions of 
string theory, Although they are theoretical in the sense that we have no evidence of 
their existence, if such particles existed they might offer the possibility of infinite speed 
signalling, or at least signalling faster than the speed of light. 
The existence of such particles would, however, raise causal problems. If a 
tachyon could interact with a "tardyon" (any particle travelling at less than the speed of 
light), then a tardyon could, in theory, communicate with its past via the tachyon. 
Although we usually interpret causation as occurring from the past into the future, the 
existence of tachyons would raise the possibility of causation from the future into the 
past. This might be seen as an argument against the possibility of tachyons, or 
alternatively it might be seen as a challenge to our belief that causation is always from 
past to future. 
32 The Indian physicist George Sudarshan and German physicist Arnold Sommer-Md are taken to be the 
first physicists to give a theoretical description of tachyons. 
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The possibility of defining a privileged simultaneity hyperplane also emerges in 
another context. Experiments have been performed by phySiCjSts33 which exhibit some 
of the features we might expect of infinite speed signalling. In these experiments, the 
interaction of some apparatus, 0, with one entity, A, modifies the behaviour of another, 
spatially separated, entity B. The modification of B's behaviour as a consequence of the 
interaction of 0 with A occurs faster than a light signal could travel between A and B, 
and appears to be instantaneous. If we define B's change of behaviour as a consequence 
of a "signal" from A, then that signal has infinite speed. 
A's future B's future 
light cone light cone 
0 interacts behaviour of 
with A---------- --- --------B changes A signal transimitted with 
infinite speed? 
A's past B's past 
light cone light cone 
Fig. 2.8 In some experimental situations, it is observed that interaction of 0 with A 
appears to produce an instantaneous change of behaviour in spatially separated B. This 
may provide a non-relativistic basis for defining simultaneity. (A's and B's light cones 
are shown, to emphasise that any "communication" between them is faster than light). 
Could the type of behaviour observed in these experiments constitute infinite speed 
signalling? It has been pointed out34 that messages could not be transmitted by this 
means, since the state of A prior to its interaction with the apparatus 0, and 
consequently its state after the interaction, is not predictable. Although the behaviour of 
the spatially separated entity B is changed by the interaction of A with 0, the person 
operating 0 cannot determine the result of the interaction with A, and consequently 
cannot determine how the behaviour of B will be changed. The changes in behaviour of 
B will therefore be randoM35, although correlated to the changes in behaviour of A 
(which are themselves random). To this extent, it can be argued that the experimental 
33 The experiments were devised to test Einstein's principle of separability, his assertion that interaction 
with one entity could not influence the behaviour of any entity not in the future light cone of the first 
entity. The results of these so-called EPR experiments, named after the paper written by Einstein, 
Podolsky and Rosen (1935), are not as clear cut as they are sometimes taken to be, as Redhead (1989) 
illustrates. 
34 For example, by Gribbin 1984, p. 228. 
35 At least, they appear to be random, on the basis of our knowledge of the system. 
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results do not contradict special relativity, since the observed behaviour of the spatially 
separated entities does not provide a means of sending messages faster than light. 
Nonetheless, what the experiments do seem to indicate is that we can define a single 
hyperplane of simultaneity for A and B. The interaction of 0 with A, occurring as it 
must in A's present, changes B's behaviour in B's present. 36 Therefore A and B share 
the same present, and this is the case even if they are far apart in space. Furthermore, A 
and B are in motion relative to each other, and therefore inhabit different inertial 
frames. According to Putnam's reasoning, they should therefore define different 
simultaneity hyperplanes. The fact that it appears incorrect to assert that they do so 
undermines Putnam's argument, and indeed poses a challenge to the definition of 
simultaneity which underpins special relativity. 37 
It is worth observing that the possibility of instantaneous interaction between 
spatially separated particles is perhaps slightly less problematic in causal terms than the 
possible existence of tachyons. If the instantaneous interaction of two particles implies 
a privileged simultaneity hyperplane, then if we deem their interaction to be causal at 
all, it is a case of instantaneous causation rather than backward causation through time. 
Although instantaneous causation evidently conflicts with the assumption that cause 
precedes effect, it is perhaps misleading to think of an instantaneous interaction in 
causal terms anyway. How precisely we should conceive of instantaneous interaction in 
that case remains to be seen.. 
I have introduced the issue of instantaneous interaction here because if such an 
interaction can occur, then we can meaningfully conceive of a simultaneity hyperplane 
between spatially separated things which does not rely upon the relativistic definition of 
simultaneity, implying further caution before accepting Putnam's argument for the 
equivalent existential status of past, present and future. The possibility of such an 
interaction remains highly speculative, however. 
(4) Challenging The Equation Of Reality With Simultaneity 
We have, up to now, been accepting Putnam's assumption that all the things which are 
simultaneous with I-now are real. However, it has been proposed by Stein (1991) that 
using this assumption to formulate one's criterion of reality is unjustified. 38 The "reality 
36 Note the assumption implicit in this statement, that neither an interaction nor a change of behaviour can 
occur in an entity's past or future The assumption is justified by observing that implicit in our concept of 
"present" is the idea that this is the moment of time in which interaction and change occurs. 
37 Tooley 1997 offers a very similar argument in his chapter on special relativity. 
39 We should recall that a presentist may wish to maintain a distinction between being real and existing. 
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relation", which Putnam terms R, is not simultaneity by default. Stein, in a response to 
Maxwell's discussion of Putnam's argUrnent39, which is also intended as a criticism of 
Rietdijk's (1966) and Putnam's (1967) original argument, argues that special relativity 
tPM40 is not, contrary to the conclusion of R, a priori incompatible with a presentist 
model in which the existential status of the present is different from the existential 
status of the past and future. Stein argues that it is possible to choose a reality relation 
within special relativity which is compatible with presentism. 41 He envisages a 
presentist metaphysics in which the past is regarded as "ontologically fixed and 
definite" (he quotes the phrase from Maxwell) and the future is "not yet settled", and 
suggests four basic principles which must be observed. 42 
(1) The distinction between "definite" (past) and "unsettled" (future) must be made 
relative to the fundamental entity, the point here and now. 43 
If the state at point b is already definite as of point a, then everything already 
definite as of b is already definite as of a. That is, "is already definite as of' is a 
transitive relation between points. 
The state at any point a is already definite as of a itself That is, "is already 
definite as of' is a reflexive relation. 
(IV) For any point a, there are points whose state is still unsettled as of a. 
Of these principles, (i) and (iv) embody an objectively distinguished present 
metaphysics, and would clearly be disputed by supporters of a static block universe 
metaphysics. However, according to Stein, these principles are to be accepted or 
rejected prior to the selection of the reality relation, and assist in detennining which 
Strictly, the assumption which Putnam makes is that all the things which are simultaneous with I-now exist. 
On the basis of Putnam's conclusion, however, existing (tenselessly) is equivalent to being real. This 
subtlety is not considered by Stein (see below) who therefore treats the relation R as a criterion of reality, 
rather than existence. 
39 Maxwell's 1985 paper is discussed in detail in section 3.5 below. 
40 Clifton and Hogarth (1995) introduce the abbreviation RPM for Rietdijk, Putnam and Maxwell since 
they all employ essentially the same argument based on the theory of special relativity. I shall use this 
abbreviation henceforth. 
41 In fact, it is not clear that Stein's proposed reality relation is compatible with presentism. As we will see, 
his reality relation seems to imply a universe more like that of a growing block universe theorist or a 
growing determinacy theorist. 
42 1 have paraphrased Stein's four basic principles in order to clarify them. Confer Stein 199 1, p. 148. 
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relation is appropriate. The structure of Stein's argument suggests that the choice of 
reality relation may be determined by the metaphysics, rather than the metaphysics 
being determined by the reality relation. 
Although we have seen how the static block universe metaphysics follows from 
RPM's choice of simultaneity as the reality relation, the fact that simultaneity 
apparently entails a static block universe metaphysics could be viewed (and apparently 
is viewed by Stein) as the determining factor in the choice of simultaneity as the reality 
relation in the first place. This observation would carry additional weight if it could be 
shown that other viable reality relations can be formulated which do not entail a static 
block universe metaphysics. 
However, whilst Stein is suspicious of RPM's choice of simultaneity as the 
reality relation, on the grounds that this reality relation apparently entails a static block 
universe metaphysics in the context of special relativity, it should be noted that the 
assumption of simultaneity as the reality relation embodies what appears to be a central 
tenet of presentism, namely that if x exists now, then x and everything that is 
simultaneous with x is real. To criticise RPM for choosing simultaneity as their reality 
relation is to overlook the fact that this is precisely the reality relation adopted by most 
presentists. 44 
Nonetheless, Stein believes that it is possible to formulate an alternative reality 
relation, one acceptable to presentists, but one which does not have the consequence in 
the context of special relativity of precluding presentism. Stein is careful to ensure that 
his reality relation is compatible with special relativity, observing that, for it to be 
"definable in terms of the geometric structure" (of special relativity), it "must be 
invariant with respect to all automorphisms of that structure" (Stein 1991, p. 149). 
However, whilst attending to the essentially mathematical requirement of invariance, 
Stein suggests that a certain amount of interpretation of special relativity is required. He 
assumes that the Einstein-Minkowski (that is, special relativistic) structure, which 
provides the geometry in terms of which the reality relation is to be defined, is spatio- 
temporal. This assumption would be accepted by static block universe theorists, as well 
as presentists, as the standard interpretation of special relativity. 
However, Stein contends that we must in addition assume that the structure is 
time-oriented, that is, we must assume in effect that one region of the space-time 
structure ("the past") is distinguishable from another ("the future"). Clearly, this 
43 Stein uses the term "point" to refer to a space-time point. 
44 1 am grateful to Robin Le Poidevin for pointing out this problem with Stein's argument. 
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assumption is a necessary component of any objectively distinguished present 
metaphysics in which past, present and future are each assumed to have a different 
existential status, or at least a different physical, if not existential, status. Time- 
orientation is implicit in Stein's claim that the state at a point a must be "subject to 
influence by the states at all points in the 'causal past' of a" (Stein 1991, p. 149). Also 
implicit in this statement is the assumption of causality, a further addition to special 
relativity. 45 
Assuming a time-oriented, causal, spatio-temporal structure, Stein proposes a 
reality relation46 RP such that when the space-time point b stands in relation Rp to the 
space-time point a, that is, when Rpab, then b is definite as of a. 47 If b is definite as of a, 
then b is real as of a. The proposed relation Rp allows us to distinguish between a 
definite region of Einstein-Minkowski space-time (the past), and an indqfinite region 
(the future), in compliance with the assumption of time orientation, as follows. Stein 
demonstrates that point a can only stand in the relation Rp to point b (that is, Rpab) 
where the vector from a to b is past-pointing. Stein shows that, if the vector is space- 
like, principle (iv) is violated. If the vector is future-pointing, a space-like vector can be 
constructed from it, and again principle (iv) is violated. He thus proposes: 
THEOREM. If R. is a reflexive, transitive relation on a Minkowski space (of 
any number of dimensions - of course at least two), invariant under 
automorphisms that preserve the time-orientation, and if Rpab holds for some 
pair of points (a, b) such that ab is a past-pointing (time-like or null) nonzero 
vector, then for any pair of points (xy), R,, Yy holds if and only if xy IS a past- 
pointing vector. (Stein 199 1, p. 149, R in Stein's text replaced by Rp) 
45 It is interesting to consider whether we can assume causality in a model universe without assuming time 
orientation, and whether we can assume time orientation without assuming causality. If one assumes that 
causes alwaysprecede effects, then assumption of causality seems to imply assumption of time orientation. 
There is considerable debate, however, as to whether causes could be simultaneous with, or subsequent to, 
their effects (confer, for example, Tooley 1997). Thus assuming causality will only entail that we assume 
time orientation on a particular reading of causality (although we will still need the concept of time 
orientation to understand what is meant by a prior, simultaneous or subsequent cause). Assumption of time 
orientation, on the other hand, does not appear to imply assumption of causality, since it is possible to 
conceive of distinguishing between the past and future, without assuming that the future was caused by the 
past, Whether in practice, however, it would be possible to distinguish past from future without reference 
to cause remains to be seen, We will consider this issue again in chapter 7. 
46 1 have labeled Stein's reality relation R with a subscript p (for presentist), to distinguish it from 
Putnam's reality relation. 
47 Note, in relation to footnote 37, that it is appropriate for Stein to define R,: Rab " state at b is definite 
as of a, where Rp is the criterion of reality. It would make less sense if R. were the criterion of existence, 
since this would imply that all definite states exist. Stein interprets definite states as past states. The claim 
that the past exists is contrary to presentist metaphysics. The claim that the past is real need not be. 
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As we have noted, Stein is careful to define Rp in such a way that it does not violate any 
principles of special relativIty. 49 Nonetheless, Rp is consistent with an objectively 
distinguished present metaphysics in which a determinate past can be distinguished 
from an indeterminate future. Whether Rp is specifically consistent with presentism, 
however, is open to question, since it seems to throw into doubt the status of things 
which are simultaneous with point a. 
It can be objected that the definition of Rp depends crucially upon principle (iv), 
the assumption that the future is "not yet settled", and upon the introduction of time- 
orientation and causality into the Einstein-Mmkowski structure. However, the 
advantage of Stein's reality relation in terms of definiteness over RPM's reality relation 
in terms of simultaneity, from Stein's point of view, is that it appears to render 
presentism, or at least some form of objectively distinguished present theory, 
compatible with special relativity. Nonetheless, it remains the case that RPM's 
assumption of a reality relation in terms of simultaneity, a relation which, apparently, 
any presentist would accept, leads to the conclusion that presentism is incompatible 
with special relativity. This must invite a reappraisal of presentism, regardless of 
whether it is possible to formulate other reality relations which do not lead to this 
conclusion. It is not therefore clear that Stein has achieved much by way of a counter- 
argument against RPM. 
Furthermore, it is possible to object that Rp is not in fact satisfactory as a reality 
relation, independent of what temporal metaphysics one entertains. If 1-now employ Rp 
as my reality relation, 1-now must apparently conclude that things with which I-now am 
simultaneous are not real. Only things which are definite, things in my "causal past", 
are real. This conclusion does not appear to be compatible with a presentist metaphysics 
in which things become real in the (universal) present, the very metaphysics which 
Stein's proposed reality relation was designed to support. Clifton and Hogarth (1995), 
in a detailed analysis and development of Stein's argument, acknowledge this difficulty. 
48 Indeed, the light cone of a point, one half of which is interpreted by Stein as the causal past of that 
point, is well-defined in special relativity. On the other hand, as we have seen, the complaint can be raised 
that the simultaneity hyperplane of a point, although it does not conflict with the geometry of special 
relativity, is nonetheless defined by convention. 
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"[T]he relations of past chronological and causal connectibility do not, as 
becoming relations should, provide for a spatio-temporally extended 'now'. "49 
(C] ifton and Hogarth 1995, p. 38 1) 
However, they query the assumption that a presentist metaphysics requires an extended 
"now" (a universal hyperplane of simultaneity with 1-now) and suggest that the 
boundary between what does and what does not lie in the causal past of "here and now" 
is more convincing as a boundary between a definite past and an indefinite future than 
the simultaneity hyperplane defined with respect to "here and now". 
"[F]or advocates of indeterministic becoming candidates like I- and J- already 
look more promising than taking simultaneity places to partition what is unfixed 
or unsettled in the future from what is fixed in the past. "50 (Clifton and Hogarth 
1995, p. 383) 
Clifton and Hogarth's response still does not explain what reality, if any, I-now am 
entitled to attribute to things, including observers, with which I-now am simultaneous. 
The problem remains that using Rp to define what is real seems to imply a solipsistic 
determination of reality, by limiting reality to my "here and now" and everything in the 
causal past of my "here and now". Perhaps we should interpret Rp as defining what I 
can be sure is real, and add the assumption that other observers simultaneous with me 
are also entitled to ascribe reality to themselves and their causal pasts. If we do not add 
this assumption, then it seems that only my causal past is real, without explanation of 
why my reference frame is to be so privileged. But if we do add this assumption then a 
problem arises similar to the one described by RPM. Observers in my simultaneity 
hyperplane may define different simultaneity hyperplanes. Why then should my 
simultaneity hyperplane, rather than some other observer's simultaneity hyperplane, be 
selected as determining which observers are entitled to ascribe reality to themselves? 
Stein's Rp relation, even in the technically bolstered form proffered by Clifton 
and Hogarth, is not sufficient to ensure the compatibility of a presentist metaphysics 
49 Chronological and causal connectibility are Clifton and Hogar-th's development of Stein's original R, 
relation. Becoming relations are what I have referred to as reality relations. Within a presentist 
metaphysics, things become real, rather than being real at each space-time point, as is the case in a static 
block universe. 
50 1- and J- denote, in the nomenclature of special relativity, the boundary between what does and what 
does not lie in the causal past of a space-time point. 
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with special relativity, and indeed, if a presentist were to adoptR,, as the reality relation, 
it seems that such a presentist would be required to abandon a central tenet of presentist 
metaphysics, namely the assumption that things become real in the (universal) present. 
At this point, the problems with Rp might be interpreted as implying that special 
relativity is compatible with a static block universe metaphysics, but incompatible with 
a presentist temporal metaphysics. However, before drawing this conclusion, let us 
examine Stein's own response. 
Stein appears to be willing to relinquish the assumption of "present [spatially 
distant] actualities" (Stein 1991, p. 152), the assumption that things in the universal 
simultaneity hyperplane of an observer are real. Indeed, he criticizes RPM for making 
this assumption, an assumption which is essential as the starting point of their argument 
for a block universe, and points out with some justification that it is fundamental to 
special relativity "that it rejects any such notion" (ibid. ). Just as Stein requires 
assumptions about time-orientation and causality in order to formulate his RP relation, 
assumptions which are not implied by special relativity, so RPM can be seen, in their 
choice of simultaneity as their reality relation, to require an assumption which has its 
origins in presentist temporal metaphysics. There is nothing in special relativity to 
suggest that things in the universal simultaneity hyperplane of an observer should be 
considered real. Therefore, we must acknowledge that RPM's argument, like Stein's, 
imports an assumption which is not implied by the theory of special relativity. However, 
given that RPM are importing a presentist as opposed to a static block universe 
assumption, and given that their aim is to show that presentism is not compatible with 
special relativity, Stein's criticism of their use of an assumption which is not implied by 
special relativity carries little weight. 
In this context, however, it is perhaps worth recalling that Einstein formulated 
special relativity under the influence of Mach, an operationallst who would have 
regarded any attempt to extract an underlying metaphysics from the theory, or make the 
theory compatible with a metaphysics, to be absurd. The operationallst doubt which 
may remain in regard to RPM's argument, therefore, is whether it Is legitimate to 
import any metaphysical assumptions at all into a physical theory with the purpose of 
assessing whether the physical theory is compatible with a metaphysical theory. If we 
are to take an operationalist approach to theory formulation, it is difficult to see how 
special relativity on its own can be used to justify any temporal metaphysics, unless a 
reality relation can be formulated in special relativity which does not require any 
metaphysical assumptions at the outset. 
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Although operationalism has its merits, it is somewhat limiting as an approach 
to physical theory. There is no reason in principle why the consequences of adopting a 
particular metaphysical assumption should not be explored in the context of a theory of 
physics, and RPM can be seen to be doing just that. Given their results, however, it is 
fitting to consider, at this juncture, whether special relativity is even appropriate as the 
arbiter of our temporal metaphysics. 
(e) The Limited Applicability Of Special Relativity 
When Kurt G6del, some twenty years before Putnam, set out to derive almost exactly 
the same conclusion as Putnam, be was clearly aware of the possibility of doing so on 
the basis of special relativity, the theory on which Putnam based his argument. 
"The very starting point of special relativity theory consists in the discovery of a 
new and very astonishing property of time, namely the relativity of simultaneity, 
which to a large extent implies that of succession. "51 (Godel 1949a, p. 557)52 
Godel goes on to express, very concisely, essentially the same argument that Putnam 
was later to develop. However, G6del did not pursue the attempt to deduce the 
equivalent existential status of past, present and future from special relativity. Instead 
he used some solutions to the equations of general relativity, solutions which he had 
recently derived, as the basis of his argument. G6del's argument is examined in detail in 
the next chapter. The important point to observe here is his reason for not pursuing the 
argument on the basis of special relativity, namely his recognition of the limited 
applicability of the theory. 
"[I]t can be objected that the complete equivalence of all observers moving with 
different (but uniform) velocities, which is the essential point In It53, subsists 
only in the abstract space-time scheme of special relativity theory and I in n certa 
empty worlds of general relativity theory. " (G6del 1949a, p. 559) 
Quite aside from any technical difficulties with Putnam's argument, the fact that the 
theory of special relativity only applies to universes which do not contain matter, and in 
51 That is, special relativity implies the relativity of succession. 
52 The page number refers to G6del 1949a as printed in Schilpp 1949. 
53 That is, the argument on the basis of special relativity. 
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which bodies do not undergo acceleration, limits the significance of any conclusion 
drawn on the basis of the theory. 
5 Special Relativity In The Conawt Of Other Theories Of Physics 
Although Clifton and Hogarth's abbreviation RPM (confer footnote 40) links Maxwell 
with Rietdijk and Putnam, It should be observed that Maxwell, in the paper "Are 
Probabilism And Special Relativity Incompatible? " (Maxwell 1985), advocates a 
presentist metaphysics in opposition to the static block universe metaphysics espoused 
by Rietdijk and Putnam. 
Where Maxwell concurs with Rietdijk and Putnam is in concluding that special 
relativity is incompatible with presentist metaphysics, and for essentially the same 
reason that they do, namely the argument that the geometric structure of space-time 
described by special relativity implies that states of affairs in the future (and indeed the 
past), relative to some arbitrary observer's now, exist in the same way as states of 
affairs in the present of that observer. Maxwell expresses this point in terms of the 
apparent impossibility of introducing within special relativity a distinction between past 
and future regions of space-time without reference to a particular inertial frame. The 
underlying problem, as we have seen, is that the simultaneity hyperplane of a particular 
observer is specific to that observer's inertial frame. As Putnam demonstrates, this leads 
to the conclusion that one observer will calculate to be in his future, or past, things 
which another observer, in motion relative to the first observer, calculates to be in his 
present. Consequently the distinction between what is past, present and future appears 
to be relative to an inertial frame, leading Maxwell to express the problem with special 
relativity as follows. 
"According to special relativity, given any two physical events, EJ and E2, 
having space-like separation from each other (so that they lie outside each 
other's past and future light cones), then there is no absolute, frame-independent 
way in which El is unambiguously either earlier than, simultaneous with, or 
later than E2. " (Maxwell J 985, p. 23) 
Maxwell contrasts the type of universe which he takes to be implied by special 
relativity with the type of universe which he takes to be implied by what he terms 
probabilism. Probabilism is essentially the version of an objectively distinguished 
present theory with which Stein works, in which the future is "open" or indefinite and 
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the past is "closed" or definite, so that at the present moment of time, it is possible for 
different futures to ensue. 54 
"Probabilism, as understood here, is the thesis that the universe is such that, at 
any instant, there is only one past but many alternative possible futures. " 
(Maxwell 1985, p. 23) 
Maxwell refines the concept of probabilism by drawing a distinction between 
ontological probabilism and predictive probabilism. According to ontological 
probabilism, the possibility of different futures ensuing from the present moment of 
time is a real, as opposed to imagined, possibility: "the future is now in reality open 
with many onlologically real alternative possibilities" (ibid., p. 25, Maxwell's 
emphasis). Future states of affairs have yet to come into existence on this view, and 
consequently the future is indefinite. This version of probabilism, therefore, 
incorporates an objectively distinguished present metaphysics in which present states of 
affairs exist, but future states of affairs do not. 55 Predictive probabilism, on the other 
hand, assumes that the possibility of different futures ensuing from the present moment 
of time is only an imagined possibility. We imagine that different futures are possible 
because we never have sufficient information in the present to predict the future, 
although there is in reality only one possible future. 
"[A]Itemative possible futures represent no more than alternative possibilities 
relative to what can in principle be predicted on the basis of a complete 
specification of the present, and the basic laws: they are not alternatives in 
reality. " (Ibid., p. 25, Maxwell's emphasis) 
54 Probabilism resembles both growing block universe theories and growing deterrninacy theories to some 
extent. 
55 The precise status of past states of affairs is vague in Maxwell's account. For a presentist who wishes to 
claim that only present states of affairs exist, it would be misleading to claim that past states of affairs 
exist. Yet some distinction between past and future states of affairs must apparently be drawn. This is 
where a distinction between being real and existing may prove usefill. The presentist could claim that past 
states of affairs are real (or definite) but do not exist, that present states of affairs are real and exist, and 
that future states of affairs are not real (not definite) nor do they exist. The same problem does not anse 
for a growing block universe theorist, who can assert that past and present states of affairs exist, but that 
future states of affairs do not. A growing determinacy theorist can assert that past, present and future 
states of affairs exist, but that they are distinguished in terms of their state of determinacy. 
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Predictive probabilism assumes a block universe metaphysics in which future 
states of affairs exist in the same way as past and present states of affairs. Consequently 
only one future is possible on this view. 
Maxwell goes on to suggest that predictive probabilism is compatible with 
probabilistic laws: "predictive probabilism ... asserts that the future, like the past, is 
now in reality entirely fixed and determined even though the basic laws are 
probabilistic and not deterministic" (ibid., p. 25, Maxwell's emphasis). What does it 
mean to say that a law is probabilistic in a universe where only one future exists? 
Presumably, since a law is intended to specify the outcome whenever a particular set of 
circumstances obtain, a probabilistic law implies that more than one outcome is 
possible when a particular set of circumstances obtain, and specifies the probability of 
each particular outcome. This implication appears relatively unproblematic in an 
objectively distinguished present universe, where the future is indeterminate. However, 
in most versions of both objectively distinguished present and static block universe 
metaphysics, on each occasion where a specified set of circumstances obtain, only one 
outcome is deemed to occur. In a static block universe, this outcome exists even relative 
to observers who calculate that it is in their future, and therefore no other outcome is 
ontologically possible. However, it is still meaningful to describe a law as probabilistic 
in this context, since the law is about all occasions throughout space-time where the 
appropriate set of circumstances occur. The law is therefore intended to describe the 
distribution of outcomes across all these occasions. 
To say, for example, that the set of circumstances X has a 75% probability of 
giving rise to outcome Y, and a 25% probability of giving rise to outcome Z is to express 
the claim that, if there are 100 occurrences of X distributed through space-time, 75 are 
followed by Y and 25 are followed by Z This statement does not preclude that, at any 
particular occurrence of X, the ensuing outcome is fixed, as it must be in a static block 
universe. An observer witnessing X can therefore speak of either Y or Z being possible 
outcomes, whilst ontologically only one outcome exists. It is clear, therefore, that it is 
meaningful to consider probabilistic laws in the context of static block universe 
metaphysics. i6 
With the distinction between ontological and predictive probabilism established, 
Maxwell speculates as to how one is to choose between them. Given the way in which 
he defines the two varieties of probabilism, the choice amounts to one between an 
objectively distinguished present and a static block universe metaphysics. However, 
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although Maxwell concurs with Rietdijk and Putnam in concluding that special 
relativity is not compatible with ontological probabilism (that is to say, it is not 
compatible with presentism), he draws the opposite conclusion to them. He suggests 
that there must be a problem with special relativity, rather than with his version of an 
objectively distinguished present theory. A major factor in reaching this conclusion is 
Maxwell's belief that at least some interpretations of quantum mechanics, including his 
preferred one, imply ontological probabilism. 
In referring to quantum mechanics, Maxwell clearly distinguishes his 
methodology from that of Rietdijk and Putnam. Neither of them consider any theory of 
physics other than special relativity in formulating their argument. Their adherence to 
special relativity can be interpreted in at least three different ways. (i) It can be 
interpreted as an expression of the belief that all other theories of physics imply the 
same temporal metaphysics as special relativity (that is, a static block universe 
metaphySICS57). (ii) It can be interpreted as an expression of the belief that we should 
accept the temporal metaphysics implied by special relativity in preference to different 
temporal metaphysics implied by other theories of physics. (iii) Or it can be interpreted 
as an expression of the belief that only special relativity implies a temporal 
metaphysics. That is, we cannot deduce a temporal metaphysics from other theories of 
physics. 
Clearly, all three of these interpretations are open to question. Maxwell 
evidently assumes that, amongst the theories of physics, at least one interpretation of 
quantum mechanics implies a temporal metaphysics, that the metaphysics which it 
implies is not the same as the metaphysics implied by special relativity, and that the 
metaphysics implied by special relativity should not automatically take precedence over 
the metaphysics implied by this interpretation of quantum mechanics. Indeed, if 
anything, Maxwell appears to prefer the metaphysics implied by his interpretation of 
quantum mechanics over the metaphysics implied by special relativity. This is what 
leads him to propose that, if the metaphysics implied by special relativity is 
irreconcilable with his version of an objectively distinguished present theory, then the 
problem lies with special relativity. Whether Maxwell is any more justified in 
preferring the metaphysics implied by his interpretation of quantum mechanics than 
Rietdijk and Putnam are in preferring the metaphysics implied by special relativity 
56 This will be a useful point to bear in mind when we consider quantum mechanics in detail in chapter 7. 
57 This is setting aside, for now, the issue which we have already considered, namely, whether special 
relativity implies a temporal metaphysics at all. 
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remains to be seen. We will examine this in detail when we consider quantum 
mechanics in chapters 6 and 7. 
The main point to observe at this juncture is that we cannot, as Rietdijk and 
Putnam appear to do, simply assume that a temporal metaphysics, that of the static 
block universe, is implied by special relativity, and that this is the temporal metaphysics 
which we must accept as the correct description of our universe. It is illegitimate to 
propose such a conclusion prior to the analysis of other theories of physics to see what 
temporal metaphysics, if any, they imply, and a consideration of how we are to choose 
between temporal metaphysics, if different theories of physics imply different 
metaphysics. If we are required to choose between temporal metaphysics, should it be 
on the basis that the metaphysics implied by the "best" theory of physics is to take 
precedence? In that case, how are we to assess which is the "best" theory of physics? 
As indicated above, Maxwell considers that his favoured interpretation of 
quantum mechanics (which he terms the propensity version") implies an objectively 
distinguished present metaphysics. On this basis, he is obliged to reject special relativity 
which, in accordance with Rietdijk and Putnam, he takes to imply a static block 
universe metaphysics, It is interesting to note, therefore, that Maxwell suggests that it is 
general, rather than special, relativity which must be modified "to render it compatible 
with probabilism" (ibid., p. 40, Maxwell's emphasis), presumably on the grounds that, 
as the name implies, general relativity is a more general theory than special relativity. 
He sketches what would be required of a version of general relativity "in which there 
exists in space-time a unique set of temporally successive, spacelike hypersurfaces, to 
constitute successive cosmic or universal 'nows'. These hypersurfaces then need to be 
related to the presence of matter... " (ibid., p. 40, Maxwell's emphasis). 
Clearly, if general relativity could be made compatible with quantum 
mechanics, and if the resulting theory implied an objectively distinguished present 
metaphysics, this would lend greater support to an objectively distinguished present 
metaphysics than special relativity does to a static block universe metaphysics. 
However, general relativity and quantum mechanics have not been unified as yet, and as 
we will see in the next chapter, general relativity on its own is as potentially 
problematic as special relativity for an advocate of an objectively distinguished present 
metaphysics. Indeed, there is no basis for assuming that the union of general relativity 
58 1 will not consider Maxwell's propensity version of quantum mechanics in detail. However, Maxwell's 
theory resembles, in a number of salient respects, the spontaneous localization theory which is described in 
chapter 7, section 2, so the description there provides the basic import of Maxwell's thinking. 
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with quantum mechanics would necessarily imply an objectively distinguished present 
metaphysics rather than a static block universe metaphysics. To that extent, Maxwell's 
assumption that general relativity must be made compatible with probabilism, rather 
than, say, making quantum mechanics compatible with a static block universe, could be 
seen as presupposing an objectively distinguished present metaphysics without 
justification. However, the importance of Maxwell's paper is not its defence of an 
objectively distinguished present metaphysics, but its illustration that theories of 
physics other than special relativity may imply temporal metaphysics which conflict 
with the static block universe temporal metaphysics that some philosophers have taken 
to be implied by special relativity. 
6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have considered the argument that special relativity implies a static 
block universe metaphysics, in particular the argument in the form given by Putnam 
(1967). 1 have illustrated, by means of truth values, that a static block universe is a 
determinate universe, but not necessarily a deterministic universe. I have also shown 
that a number of problems exist for the argument from special relativity, stemming in 
particular from the assumption that if 1-now am simultaneous with a thing, that thing is 
real. The definition of simultaneity within special relativity was seen to be 
conventional, the possibility that simultaneity might be defined by non-relativistic 
means was considered, and the assumption that if I am simultaneous with some thing, I 
am waff anted in attributing reality to that thing was challenged. These considerations 
led us to the observation that the equation between simultaneity and reality is a 
metaphysical assumption, the employment of which is essential to the argument that a 
static block universe metaphysics is implied by special relativity. It was indicated that 
special relativity is of limited application to the universe we actually inhabit, and it was 
also pointed out that other theories of physics may be interpreted as implying an 
objectively distinguished present temporal metaphysics, which conflicts with the static 
block universe metaphysics apparently implied by special relativity. 
Markosian (2004) succinctly expresses the problems which abound in assessing 
the implications of special relativity for temporal metaphysics. He identifies two 
versions of special relativity, STR+ and STR-. He describes STR+ as a "philosophically 
robust version of STR" which implies that "there is no such relation as absolute 
simultaneity" and STR- as a "philosophically austere version of STR" which does not 
imply that "there is no such relation as absolute simultaneity". 
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Even if we do interpret special relativity as necessitating a static block universe 
metaphysics, we must acknowledge that special relativity is only one of at least four 
distinct theories of modem physics (special relativity, general relativity, 
thermodynamics, and quantum mechanics), each of which may be interpreted as 
implying a temporal metaphysics. So if we are justified in basing our temporal 
metaphysics on physics, we are only justified in basing our temporal metaphysics on a 
consideration of all of these theories, unless we can demonstrate that one of them takes 
precedence over the others. 
3 
General Relativity And 
Existential Change 
I Introduction 
We saw in the previous chapter that some philosophers have argued that special 
relativity Implies a static block universe metaphysics of time. It is also possible to argue 
for such a metaphysics on the basis of general relativity. In his paper "A Remark About 
The Relationship Between Relativity Theory And Idealistic Philosophy" (Godel 1949a), 
the logician Kurt Godel demonstrates that Einstein's field equations, the equations 
which form the basis of general relativity, can be interpreted as implying a static block 
universe metaphysics. The argument is different from the argument on the basis of 
special relativity, though as we shall see some of the underlying assumptions are the 
same. In particular, the form of Godel's argument implies that there is only one 
metaphysics of time compatible with general relativity, and that the metaphysics 
implied by general relativity is to take precedence over any other metaphysics, on the 
grounds that general relativity itself is not dependent upon metaphysical assumptions. 
These two assumptions exactly parallel assumptions made by Putnam, and as before, 
they can be challenged. 
I will begin by considering Godel's concept of change in detail, since this will 
serve to clarify a number of aspects of his argument. I will then consider why, although 
Godel considers an argument for a static block universe metaphysics of time based upon 
special relativity, an argument similar to the one which Putnam employs, he rejects it as 
a convincing argument. As we will see, Godel turns instead to general relativity in 
formulating his argument for a static block universe metaphysics. I will therefore go on 
to analyze the structure of his argument based upon general relativity. 
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in the course of this analysis, I will examine why G6del considers that there are 
certain universes which can be modelled on the basis of Einstein's field equations 
which can only be appropriately described in terms of a static block universe temporal, 
metaphysics. 
I conclude the chapter with an assessment of whether Godel's argument for a 
static block universe metaphysics is more convincing than Putnam's, given the 
problems which we have already observed to exist for the argument on the basis of 
special relativity. 
2 Gddel's Argument For The Equivalent Existential Status Of Things 
In essence, Godel takes the mathematical models which he constructs within general 
relativity to imply, or at least strongly suggest, that "no objective lapse of time can 
exist" (Godel 1949a, p. 562). We need to consider what he means by an "objective lapse 
of time", why he considers that general relativity implies that such a lapse cannot exist, 
and whether this claim is equivalent to the claim that things in the past, present and 
future of an observer have the same existential status. Prior to this analysis, it should be 
noted that 1949a and its preceding drafts represent G6del's one serious foray away from 
mathematics into the philosophy of time', and as such some might question the paper's 
virtue in philosophical terms. G6del certainly lacked any extensive philosophical 
training and this in part gives rise to the "enigmatic" quality of his terminology. 
Nonetheless, I would suggest that the terms in which he expresses the argument of 
1949a evince sustained careful thought about the concept of time, and I therefore 
consider his argument worthy of detailed philosophical analysis. 
(a) GOdel's Concept Of Change 
Godel gives a relatively clear, but very concise, account in 1949a of what he takes 
"change" to consist in. 
"Change becomes possible only through the lapse of time. The existence of an 
objective lapse of time, however, means (or, at least, is equivalent to the fact) 
that reality consists of an infinity of layers of 'now' which come into existence 
successively. " (Godel 1949a, p. 558) 
I According to Wang (1995), however, Godel remained intrigued by the problems associated with the 
concept of time well into the 1970's, without venturing to write again on the subject. 
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He adds a limited amount of clarification in a footnote to the passage quoted above 
where he refers to "the idea of an objective lapse of time (whose essence is that only the 
present really exists)" and in the subsequent footnote where he refers to "the lapse of 
time in the ordinary sense, which means a change in the existing". 
An immediate problem with Godel's statement is in what he takes a "layer of 
'now"' to consist. He appears to intend by this a smooth global spacelike hypersurface, 
to employ the terminology of general relativity, which I will refer to as a time slice for 
convenience. In the context of special relativity the typical time slice is a simultaneity 
hyperplane, the term used in the previous chapter. However, the term "simultaneity 
hyperplane" has no invariant meaning in general relativity so in the context of general 
relativity I shall speak of time slices. As we will see, it will also be convenient to equate 
time slices with moments of time. 2 
Godel is going to demonstrate that a layer of "now" cannot be defined within at 
least some universes which obey the laws of general relativity. However, it seems 
apparent that a layer of "now", where it can be defined, consists of the moment of time 
which all observers, regardless of their spatial location, agree upon as the present. 
Godel also states that "Change becomes possible only through the lapse of 
time", suggesting that he does not equate change with the lapse of time. He appears to 
be distinguishing change from the lapse of time given his statement that change 
becomes possible only if time lapses, and I will examine below how we might 
understand this distinction. Godel goes on to claim that, for time to be said to lapse, it 
must be the case that "reality consists of an infinity of layers of 'now' which come into 
existence successively". Godel is here depicting his version of an objectively 
distinguished present metaphysics, the metaphysics which he intends to disprove. He is 
essentially depicting a presentist metaphysics, as is evident when he equates "an 
objective lapse of time" with the claim that "only the present really exists". 
The claim that "Change becomes possible only through the lapse of time" makes 
most sense if we take "change" to refer to change in physical objects. One possible 
reconstruction of the model which Godel is envisaging is then as follows. For an object 
2 The possibility of dividing time into moments, at least nominally, is one which I shall assume. We do, of 
course, divide time up into seconds, minutes, hours, days, weeks, months, years and so on. These latter, it 
might be observed, all derive from the orbital velocity of the planet which humans inhabit, the Earth, 
around the star nearest to that planet, the Sun. The question arises as to whether there is something 
intrinsic about the duration of a moment which distinguishes it from these other possible divisions of time, 
all of which appear to be dependent upon the location of humans in the universe. Another way of putting 
this would be to ask whether time slices have an intrinsic temporal "thickness". I will not attempt to 
answer this question here. 
General Relativity And Existential Change 89 
to change in the sense Godel appears to require, it must be the case that the whole object 
has some property x at some moment of time tI, and that the whole object lacks property 
x at some other moment of time tl±At, where At is some short duration of time. 3 In this 
case, the object can be said to have changed. A presentist metaphysics is compatible 
with physical object change conceived of in this way since this type of metaphysics 
requires that only the present moment exiStS. 4 This requirement implies that physical 
objects must exist in their entirety in the present moment. Therefore, if a physical object 
has a property at all, the whole object has that property, and if it subsequently lacks that 
property, it is the whole object which lacks that property. Therefore, it has undergone 
change in the sense Godel appears to intend. 
This interpretation of change makes sense of Godel's statement that change 
"becomes possible" only through the lapse of time. The requirements that only the 
present moment exists and that this moment passes out of existence to be replaced by 
the next present moment must be met if objects, necessarily wholly existent in the only 
existing moment, the present, are to be considered genuinely to have changed. But it is 
the passing into and out of existence of the present moment, the "layer of 'now"', which 
Godel is referring to when he speaks of the lapse of time, rather than the change in the 
physical objects existing at that moment. The distinction can be illustrated if we 
consider the case where a physical object changes none of its non-temporal properties 
between two consecutive moments of time, but nonetheless changes simply by virtue of 
the fact that it first existed at one moment but now exists at a different moment. 5 
In contrast, if we consider the concept of a physical object in a static block 
universe metaphysics, we can see why change, in Godel's terms, does not occur in a 
universe which conforms to this metaphysics. In a static block universe, a physical 
object is a four-dimensional entity extended through time as well as through space. 
Therefore, if the object has some property x at some moment t1, and lacks that property 
x at some other moment 11±At, it is simply the case that the temporal part of the object 
located at the moment t, has the property x and the temporal part of the object located at 
the moment 11±At lacks the property x. Taken as a whole the object has two properties, 
x(111) and --, x(11±At). If one part of an object has one property and another part of the 
3 The moment tI±A/ is therefore some moment earlier or later than the moment /I. 
41 shall leave aside for now the issue of whether or not it is coherent to conceive of non-present moments 
as real although non-existent, 
5 It may be that the non-temporal properties of an object, for example, the positions of the atoms 
composing the object, always change from moment to moment anyway. The theoretical situation in which 
no such changes occur is considered to illustrate the distinction to which, I believe, Godel is alluding. 
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same object has another property, this does not amount to change in Godel's terms. It 
must be the case that the whole object has a property at some moment, and the whole 
object lacks that property at some other moment, for the object to be said to have 
changed. We can see therefore that physical objects as conceived of in a static block 
universe metaphysics never undergo change in this sense, since they are complete four- 
dimensional entities as opposed to three-dimensional entities in this conception. 6 
The foregoing analysis suggests that change in physical objects in Godel's sense 
is only compatible with a presentist metaphysics, where to state that a physical object 
has changed is taken to mean that the whole physical object exists in one state at one 
time and in a different state at some other time. This, I would suggest, is the most 
coherent interpretation of what Godel intends by the term "change", given his 
explanation of what he means by the "lapse of time". We might of course observe that it 
is possible to formulate alternative concepts of change7, but it certainly appears to be 
the case that the concept of change we have just been examining is the one which makes 
most sense in the context of a presentist metaphysics. It will be convenient, therefore, to 
distinguish change in the sense in which Godel is using the term from other possible 
concepts of change. I shall henceforth refer to G6del's concept of change as non- 
incremental existential change, on the grounds that an object undergoes non- 
incremental existential change if it wholly exists at each moment. For brevity, I will 
refer to non-incremental existential change simply as existential change, unless it is 
being discussed in comparison to incremental existential change, which I take to be the 
type of change undergone by objects in a growing block universe. 
I am only going to consider non-incremental existential change in this chapter, 
since G6del's argument is specifically directed against presentism, the type of 
objectively distinguished present theory in which non-incremental existential change is 
envisaged to occur. It should be borne in mind, however, that G6del's argument, if 
sound, would count against growing block universe and growing determinacy theories 
as well. 
6 In a growing block universe theory, physical objects are growing four-dimensional entities. 
7 in a growing block universe theory, an object is extended through time and composed of temporal parts, 
as in a static block universe. However, the number of temporal parts of the object are continually 
increasing, as new moments of time come into existence, for as long as the object continues to exist. In a 
growing block universe, therefore, change in physical objects arises from accretion of temporal parts. 
A growing determinacy theory would give a different account of change to either a presentist or a 
growing block universe theory. It is the state of determinacy of physical objects which change in such a 
theory, rather than their state of existence. 
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(b) Necessary And Sufficient Conditions For Existential Change 
It seems apparent that for existential change as I have just defined it to occur, the 
restriction of existence to the present moment is necessary. It is therefore useful to 
consider whether this restriction is also sufficient for existential change. Consider a 
physical object wholly existing at the moment t1. Assuming that the physical object 
endures, does the whole existence of the object at some other moment tl±At amount to 
existential change? 
(i) A Presentist Account Of Existential Change 
Consider a universe containing just one physical object. If the present moment of time is 
conceived of in presentist terms, then we can envisage that the present moment in our 
one object universe could go out of existence, and a new present moment could come 
into existence, even if the object did not change any of its non-temporal properties from 
the one moment to the next. We can then ask, does the object wholly existing at one 
present moment and its wholly existing at another present moment amount to the 
object's having undergone existential change? 
Observe first of all that one present moment must be intrinsically different from 
another present moment, otherwise it would be the same moment. 8 Since, therefore, 
there must be an intrinsic difference between moments, we can index the existence of 
an object both to the moment in which it is currently wholly existing and also to the 
moment in which it first existed. That is, it is legitimate to attribute the two properties 
of location in time (Loc)9 and of age (Age) to a physical object in a presentist model. 
Consider the moment t, at which a physical object P comes into existence. We 
can attribute at least two temporal properties to P. 
(Loc) P wholly exists at tj. 
(Age) P has wholly existed at 0 moments prior to tj. 
At the next moment, t2, P has two temporal properties again. 
8 Of course, a physical object, conceived of as wholly existing at a particular moment, could not be in a 
different state now to a state it was in previously unless it now existed in a different moment to the 
moment in which it had existed. Thus a change in the non-temporal properties of a physical object certainly 
indicales a change in moments. However, the moments would be different even if the physical object had 
not changed any of its non-temporal properties. 
91 shall use bracketed three letter abbreviations, with an additional one letter subscript where appropriate, 
to refer to the various temporal properties. 
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(Loc) P wholly exists at 12. 
(Age) P has wholly existed at I moment prior to t2- 
Clearly, P at 12 has at least two different properties to the properties it had at t1, and 
since it wholly exists at each moment, it has undergone existential change. In general, 
for as long as a physical object exists, it is always possible to ascribe a location in time 
and an age to that object. The property of location in time has the general form: 
(Loc) P wholly exists at f, 
The variable t, denotes the moment then present. The property of age has the general 
form-. 
(Age) P has wholly existed at(n-1) moments prior tot, 
I am assuming that n is a non-negative integer, which implies that moments are discrete. 
This is a convenient simplification at this stage of the analysis, but even if a more 
complex concept of a moment turned out to be required, the main point to observe here 
is that a physical object will always have at least two properties which change between 
moments in the presentist view. 
Therefore, we can conclude that restricting the existence of a physical object to 
the present moment is sufficient for existential change of that object to occur. The 
whole existence of the object at the moment t, and again at some other moment tl±At 
implies that at least two of the properties which the object has at tl±At, its location in 
time and its age, have changed from what they were at ti. This is sufficient for the 
object to be deemed to have undergone existential change. 
(H) My Existential Change Does Not Occur In A Static Block Universe 
It is interesting to observe the effect of not restricting the existence of a physical object 
to the present moment, the situation envisaged in a static block universe. If we consider 
a static block universe model for purposes of comparison with a presentist model, we 
can observe that the properties of location in time and of the age of a physical object 
have to be fon-nulated differently. Rather than locating the whole object at a particular 
moment, as in a presentist account, we are required to locate a temporal part of the 
object at a moment, recalling that in the static block universe model an object is a four- 
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dimensional rather than a three-dimensional entity, and is therefore extended through 
time as well as in space. The property of location in time of a temporal part (Loc P) is 
therefore stated in the form: 
(Locp) Temporal part p, of the physical object P exists at t,. 
The variable n is a non-negative integer as previously. If we wish to state the temporal 
location of the object P as a whole, (Loc,, ), we need to state it in the form: 
(Loc, ) P exists at the range of moments from t, to t,. 
The variable _- denotes the number of moments which the four-dimensional object 
occupies. 10 The duration (Dur) of P is therefore stated in the form: 
(Dur) P exists for z moments. 
The variable,: is as just defined. We can talk about the age of the object at a particular 
moment within the range tj to t, stating its age in the fonn,. 
(Age) There are (n-1) temporal parts of P existing prior to moment t,. 
This assumes that a direction through time is defined such that it is clear which 
moments are taken to be prior to the moment t,. II 
It should be evident that neither the location in time nor the age of a physical 
object in a static block universe, as these properties have just been defined, are subject 
to change. For example, if a four-dimensional object occupies the range of moments 
from ti to ti(), ooo, this is the case from the point of view of any moment in the universe. 
Consider the property (Locw) of the object. 
(Loc, ) P exists at the range of moments from tj to tio, ooo. 
Clearly, (Loc,, ) does not change. Similarly, we can see that (Age), relative to any 
10 The designation /I is chosen to denote the first moment at which the object exists. The subscript "I" 
should not, however, be taken to imply that this is necessarily the first moment in the universe as a whole. 
III examine the direction of time in detail in chapter 5. 
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particular moment, is unchanging. If there are 4,999 temporal parts of the object 
existing at moments prior to moment to t5,000, this is the case from the point of view of 
any moment. 
(Age) There are 4,999 temporal parts of P existing prior to moment 15.000 
The unchanging nature of location in time and age in a static block universe can be seen 
to arise from the fact that a physical object in such a universe is not restricted in its 
existence to a single moment, but is rather envisaged as existing across a range of 
moments. It does not appear that location in time or age could be defined in such a way 
as to permit change whilst remaining compatible with this aspect of a block universe 
metaphysics. As we might expect, therefore, the attribution of a location in time and an 
age to a physical object in a static block universe will not be sufficient conditions for 
the object to be considered to undergo existential change. This conclusion emphasizes 
the close connection between the restriction of the existence of a physical object to the 
present moment and the ability of that object to undergo existential change. 
Gddel's Examination Of The Argument From Special Relativity 
It is Gbdel's intention in 1949a to "deny the objectivity of change" (p. 558), thereby, as 
he interprets the situation, aligning himself with "Parmenides, Kant, and the modem 
idealists"12 (p. 558). "Objective" change for Godel, it seems apparent, is what I have 
termed existential change, that is, an actual change in the state in which a whole 
physical object exists from moment to moment, rather than a difference between the 
temporal parts of a temporally extended object in a static block universe. 13 The 
alternative to assuming that existential change occurs, according to Godel, is to 
"consider change as an illusion or an appearance due to our special mode of perception" 
(G6del 1949a, p. 558). If we do inhabit a static block universe, then we are mistaken if 
we interpret our perception of the difference between the temporal parts of an object as 
12 It is not clear that Gbdel is in fact as closely aligned with these other philosophers as he takes himself to 
be. Godel's argument, as we will see, implies that our experience of existential change is not correlated to 
any underlying physical conditions of the universe, an implication which might be interpreted as supporting 
the idealist claim that we need to distinguish between appearance and reality. However, Gbdel also appears 
to be assuming that we can come to know the true nature of reality by examining mathematical models 
derived from theories of physics. An idealist such as Kant would deny that we can come to know the true 
nature of reality, "das Ding an sich selbst" ("the thing in itself') (Kant 1787, p. 45), by any means. 
13 it could of course be argued that "objective" change could take the form of incremental existential 
change, as in a growing block universe, or change in determinacy, as in a growing detern-tinacy. G6del 
does not consider these alternatives. 
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evidence of existential change. 
How could the perception of different temporal parts of a four-dimensional 
object give rise to the illusion of existential change? One possible answer is that it is 
"our special mode of perception", as Godel calls it, which gives rise to the appearance 
of existential change, but the appearance masks the reality. Since the issue does not 
appear to be immediately resolvable, I will leave it to one side and concentrate on how 
Godel sets about attempting to demonstrate that we do in fact inhabit a block universe. 
As noted in the preceding chapter14, Godel was aware of the argument for a 
static block universe metaphysics on the basis of special relativity. We examined in 
detail in that chapter why it is that a privileged time SliCe15, one of Godel's "layers of 
'now"', cannot be defined on some interpretations of special relativity, and we saw how 
the failure to define such a time slice leads to the implication that things which one 
observer defines to be in the past or future have the same existential status as things 
which that observer defines to be in the present. In 1949a, G6deI rehearses this 
argument, expressing it in the following manner. 
"[11f simultaneity is something relative in the sense just explained, reality cannot 
be split up into such layers [of 'now'] in an objectively determined way. Each 
observer has his own set of 'nows', and none of these various systems of layers 
can claim the prerogative of representing the objective lapse of time. " (Godel 
1949a, p. 558) 
G6del is here setting out the structure of the argument on the basis of special relativity. 
If a privileged time slice cannot be defined in a universe, then the presentist claim that 
only the present moment, a single layer of 'now', exists appears incoherent, given that it 
is not clear in such a universe which time slice corresponds to the present moment. 
Special relativity implies that simultaneity is relative to an observer, and therefore a 
privileged time slice, agreed upon as such by all observers, cannot be defined in a 
universe which is adequately described by special relativity. 
However, G6del does not consider that the argument from special relativity is 
sufficient to show that a presentist metaphysics is inapplicable to our universe, since he 
14 See chapter 2, section 4 (e). 
15 A time slice is privileged if it is distinguished in some way from other possible time slices which might 
be defined. For example, a time slice might be considered privileged if it is defined by an observer whose 
motion follows the mean motion of matter in the universe. 
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does not consider that the type of universe which we inhabit is adequately described by 
special relativity. He points out that special relativity only applies to a particular range 
of possible 16 universes, that range of universes which are empty of matter. 
"[T]he complete equivalence of all observers moving with different (but 
uniform) velocities ... subsists only 
in the abstract space-time scheme of special 
relativity theory and in certain empty worlds of general relativity theory. " (Godel 
1949a, p. 559) 
That is, special relativity only adequately describes a range of possible universes into 
which the type of universe we inhabit, one containing matter, does not obviously fall. 
Having acknowledged the argument from special relativity, therefore, Godel has 
effectively dismissed it. Nonetheless, the structure of the argument which he is going to 
pursue is similar to that employed in the argument on the basis of special relativity, 
namely that a pTesentist metaphysics can-not be coherently formulated for a universe in 
which a privileged time slice cannot be defined. However, as we will see, G6del's 
strategy will involve modelling a universe in which no time slices, understood here 
specifically as global time slices, can be defined at all. In this situation, the possibility 
of defining a time slice as the physical instantiation of the present moment is ruled 
OUt. 17 
Can Presentism Be Reconciled With General Relativity? 
Godel has just rejected any argument against presentism based on special relativity. 
Instead he is going to formulate his argument against presentism on the basis of general 
relativity. One of the features of universes described by general relativity, as we have 
already seen, is that they contain matter. However, this very feature presents Godel with 
the most immediate obstacle to the formulation of his argument. Having just dismissed 
the argument based on special relativity, Godel points out that as soon as matter is 
16 When I speak of a universe being "possible" in this sense, I mean one which conforms to the particular 
constraints of the physical theory. Special relativity is a set of mathematical equations. A whole range of 
different universes are definable in accord with these equations, each one therefore a "possible" universe. 
Note that Godel uses the term "world" where I use the term "universe"- 
17 Neither a growing block universe nor a growing determinacy metaphysics can be formulated for a 
universe in which global time slices cannot beýdefin4 Thus, although Godel directs his argument against 
presentism, the same argument would also preclude the other two types of objectively distinguished 
present theory if it turned out to be sound. I will continue to focus upon presentism in the analysis of 
G6del's argument, since this is the only type of objectively distinguished present theory which Gbdel 
considers. 
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included in the model of a universe, the possibility of defining a privileged time slice 
reemerges, precisely the opposite of what he requires if he is to successfully argue 
against presentism. 
"The existence of matter, however, as well as the particular kind of curvature of 
space-time produced by it, largely destroys the equivalence of different observers 
and distinguishes some of them conspicuously from the rest, namely, those 
which follow in their motion the mean motion of matter. " (Godel 1949a, p. 559) 
All those observers whose motion follows the mean motion of matter in the universe as 
a whole, let us call them mean mot ion observers, will be able to define a time slice. It is 
clear from the analysis of special relativity which was conducted in the previous chapter 
that all mean motion observers, since they are all travelling with the same velocity, will 
define the same time slice. The time slice which all mean motion observers define as 
their present moment could then be considered to be the presentist's present moment, 
the only existing moment. It would no longer be necessary to award equal existential 
status to the different time slices defined by observers moving at velocities other than 
that followed by the bulk of matter in the universe. Let us call this latter type of 
observers non-mean motion observers. Any differences in the observations made by 
non-mean motion observers when compared with observations made by mean motion 
observers might reasonably be attributed to the physical effects upon non-mean motion 
observers resulting from their moving at velocities different to the velocity of the bulk 
of matter in the universe. 
Therefore, the existence of matter in a universe modelled according to the 
constraints of general relativity actually serves to restore the privileged inertial frame 
which was absent from universes modelled according to special relativity. The 
privileged inertial frame is that inertial frame which is defined according to the mean 
motion of the matter in the universe. The time slice defined by any mean motion 
observers as their present moment, that is as the present moment within the privileged 
inertial frame, can then be interpreted as the only existing moment in the universe, 
thereby rendering such a universe compatible with a presentist metaphysics. 
"Now in all cosmological solutions of the gravitational equations (i. e., in all 
possible universes) known at present the local times of all these [mean motion] 
observers fit together into one world time, so that apparently it becomes possible 
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to consider this time as the "true" one, which lapses objectively, whereas the 
discrepancies of the measuring results of other observers from this time may be 
conceived as due to the influence which a motion relative to the mean state of 
motion of matter has on the measuring processes and physical processes in 
general. " (G6del 1949a, p. 559) 
In this passage, Godel refers to the gravitational equations. These are the equations 
which mathematically express the theory of general relativity. Until the late 1940s when 
Godel was writing, all the solutions of these equations which had been formulated 
permitted a privileged inertial frame, and hence a privileged time slice, to be defined in 
relation to the mean motion of matter in a universe, a universe that is described by each 
particular solution to the equations. All such solutions, therefore, are compatible with a 
presentist metaphysics"' which requires that a privileged time slice be definable. 
Clearly, if every possible solution to the gravitational equations permitted such a time 
slice to be defined, general relativity would be of little use to anyone wishing to argue 
that a static block universe, as opposed to a presentist, metaphysics is the correct 
description of the universe which we inhabit. 
However, the reason that Godel is drawing upon general relativity with the 
purpose of arguing against presentism is that shortly before writing 1949a, he had 
discovered some solutions to the gravitational equations which model universes which 
do not admit any foliation at all by time slices. The next step in the analysis of Godel's 
argument, therefore, will consist in exploring G6del's solutions to the gravitational 
equations, in order to understand why they describe a range of universes for which, 
apparently, no presentist metaphysics can be coherently formulated. A crucial question, 
however, one which Godel only addresses in passing at the end of his paper, is whether 
the universe which we inhabit corresponds to any of the universes modelled by his 
solutions to the gravitational equations, and if not, what relevance his results have for 
our universe. 
In this regard, it is worth observing that G6del's reason for rejecting the 
argument from special relativity, the recognition that the range of universes which 
special relativity describes is not a range in which our universe is obviously located, 
could re-emerge as a reason for rejecting G6del's own argument. As we have already 
noted, it appears to be the case that some solutions to the gravitational equations, those 
formulated before G6del addressed the issue, model universes which are compatible 
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with an objectively distinguished present metaphysics, whilst some, in particular those 
formulated by G6del himself, do not. It might turn out therefore that the set of all 
possible solutions to the gravitational equations, taken as a whole, gives us no clear 
indication as to whether an objectively distinguished present or a static block universe 
metaphysics is the correct description of our universe. In that case we will need to find 
other criteria for selecting a particular subset of the solutions to the gravitational 
equations, before attempting to deduce from those solutions the appropriate temporal 
metaphysics for the universe we inhabit. If it turns out that the range of universes which 
are described by Godel's solutions to the gravitational equations do not correspond to 
certain features of our universe, then this might be considered a good reason to conclude 
that these solutions are not an adequate description of our universe, just as G6del 
concludes that special relativity is not an adequate description. I will leave these 
considerations to one side for now, however, in order to examine how G6del argues on 
the basis of general relativity towards the conclusion that we inhabit a block universe. 
Gbdel's Argument Against Presentism On The Basis Of General Relativity 
The basis of the argument we are about to examine, as has already been suggested, is 
that if the spatio-temporal structure of a universe is such as to preclude the foliation of 
that universe by global time slices, then a presentist metaphysics is not an appropriate 
metaphysics for that universe, given that a presentist requires identification of a global 
time slice as the physical correlate of what we experience as the present moment. We 
need to understand, therefore, on what basis Godel considers that general relativity 
implies a spatio-temporal structure which is incompatible with presentism. 
Prompted by the request to write a paper for a volume'9 which would be 
dedicated to Einstein, Godel had begun to examine the gravitational equations of 
general relativity. The results of this examination were set forth by G6del in the paper 
"An Example Of A New Type Of Cosmological Solutions Of Einstein's Field Equations 
Of Gravitation" (G6del 1949) which he published in the same year as he made his 
contribution to the Einstein volume. Whilst in the contribution to the Schilpp volume, 
usually referred to as Godel 1949a, G6del endeavours to adopt a broadly philosophical 
approach to his subject matter, his other published paper, G6del 1949, consists of a 
description in mathematical terms of his new solutions to Einstein's gravitational 
equations. The solutions which Godel describes in Godel 1949 model universes which 
18 Or indeed either of the other two objectively distinguished present metaphysics 
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rotate20 in such a way as to embody a space-time structure in which no foliation by time 
slices, that is, smooth global spacelike hypersurfaces, is admitted. Specifically, it is the 
existence of space-time structures termed closed time-like curves in Godelian universes 
which rule out the possibility of foliating these universes by a sequence of time sliceS. 21 
I examine closed time-like curves in detail in the next section. There is, of course, no 
possibility in such universes of defining a privileged time slice, since no global time 
slices at all can be defined. This, of course, is precisely what G6del requires if he is to 
argue against presentism. 
We saw in the previous section that the existence of matter in a universe 
modelled according to the constraints of general relativity serves to restore the 
privileged inertial frame which was absent from universes modelled according to 
special relativity, and that the time slice defined by any mean motion observer as their 
present moment, that is, as the present moment within the privileged inertial frame, can 
then be interpreted as the only existing moment in the universe, thereby rendering such 
a universe compatible with a presentist metaphysics. However, in Godel 1949a, Godel 
indicates that it is not possible to define a privileged inertial frame in G6delian 
universes, even though such universes are modelled according to the constraints of 
general relativity. 
"There exist cosmological solutions of another kind than those known at present, 
to which the aforementioned procedure of defining an absolute time is not 
applicable, because the local times of the special observers used above cannot be 
fitted together into one world time. " (Godel 1949a, p. 560) 
The cosmological solutions to which Godel refers here are the solutions to the 
gravitational equations which G6del had discovered and disclosed in G6del 1949. The 
', special observers" to which G6del refers are those observers "[following] in their 
motion the mean motion of matter" (Godel 1949a, p. 559), which I have termed mean 
motion observers. 
19 Confer Schilpp 1949. 
20 1 shall henceforth refer to the rotating universes modelled by Godel's solutions to the gravitational 
equations as G6dehan universes. Godel went on to outline in his paper "Rotating Universes In General 
Relativity" (Godel 1952) additional solutions to the gravitational equations in which the universes modeled 
expand as well as rotate. These may be referred to as GWelian expanding universes therefore. The 
original solutions modeled non-expanding universes, and these may be referred to as GWehan non- 
expanding universes, in cases where the distinction is significant. 
21 Confer Earman 1986 and Earman 1995. 
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Godel gives a detailed explanation of why a privileged inertial frame cannot be 
defined in a Godelian universe in G6del 1949, his explanation there being couched in 
terms of the mathematics of general relativity. Rather than presenting the mathematical 
model which he had constructed in G6del 1949 again, G6del merely alludes to his 
mathematical results in G6del 1949a. 
"[T]he compass of inertia [in universes defined according to Godel's new 
solutions to the gravitational equations] everywhere rotates [in the same 
direction] relative to matter, which in our world would mean that it rotates 
relative to the totality of galactic systems. " (G6deI 1949a, footnote 10) 
In such a universe, mean motion observers, those observers following in their motion 
the mean motion of matter in the universe, are no longer able, because of the space-time 
structure of the universe, to define global time slices. Furthermore, G6del emphasizes 
that, owing to the symmetry of the universes modelled by his new solutions to the 
gravitational equations, no particular inertial frame is privileged globally, that is, 
throughout the universe, but only locally, In relation to particular systems of matter 
within the universe. 
"[T]hese worlds possess such properties of symmetry that for each possible 
concept of simultaneity and succession there exist others which cannot be 
distinguished from it by any intrinsic properties but only by reference to 
individual objects, such as, e. g., a particular galactic system. " (G6del 1949a, 
p. 560) 
Thus the mean motion of matter in a Godelian universe could no longer be used as the 
basis for defining a privileged time slice, although in fact no global time slices can be 
defined anyway. 
For a presentist metaphysics, or indeed any objectively distinguished present 
metaphysics, to be applicable to a universe, it must be possible to identify a time slice 
distinguished by some global, rather than purely local, criteria from all other time slices 
which might be defined. This privileged time slice constitutes the only existing moment 
in the universe for a presentist, and thus all other time slices must be purely 
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hypothetical, capable of being defined in theory but not existing in actuality. 22 Godel's 
argument is that in the rotating universes which he has modelled, no global time slices 
at all can be defined. 
Godel therefore argues in 1949a that a presentist (and by implication any type of 
objectively distinguished present theorist) has no means of selecting a privileged global 
time slice to serve as the only existing moment in a G6delian universe, since no global 
time slices at all can be defined in this type of rotating universe. 
(/) Closed Time-Like Curves 
As already indicated, it is the existence of closed time-like curves in G6dellan universes 
which preclude the possibility of foliating those universes by a sequence of global time 
slices, G6del refers to closed time-like curves in 1949a in the course of examining the 
"temporal conditions" in the rotating universes which his solutions to the gravitational 
equations model. 
(i) The Concept Of A Time-Like Curve 
In Gbdelian universes, it is the structure of space-time brought about by the rotation of 
those universes which gives rise to what G6deI terms closed time-like curves. Savitt 
speaks of a time-like curve as representing a "possible life history" (Savitt 1994, p. 464). 
In other words, in the four-dimensional manifold of a static block universe, a time-like 
curve is a curve along which the temporal parts of a four-dimensional object could be 
located. 
Just as the spatial parts of a metal bar are located at different locations in space, 
so the temporal parts of that metal bar are located at different locations in time. The 
first temporal part is located at the moment the bar "comes into" existence, the last 
temporal part is located at the moment the bar "goes out of' existenCe23, and the 
intervening temporal parts of the bar are located at the intervening moments. The set of 
moments occupied by the bar, its "life history", are the time-like curve of the bar. 
22 A growing block universe theorist allows that past as well as present time slices exist, whilst a growing 
determinacy theorist allows that past, present and future time slices exist, varying only in their state of 
determinacy. Both types of theorist nonetheless require that we be able to identify a privileged global time 
slice to count as the physical correlate of the present moment. 
23 Note that the bar "comes into" and "goes out of' existence only from the point of view of an observer 
located in time. 
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(H) Open And Closed Time-Like Curves 
The curvature of space-time in any universe described by the gravitational equations of 
general relativity depends upon the distribution and motion of matter in that universe. 
The behaviour of matter in the universes described by G6del's solutions to the 
gravitational equations, in particular the rotation of matter in those universes, gives rise 
to a space-time structure in which time-like curves exist in a closed form. 
As noted above, a time-like curve is a contiguous series of temporal locations 
along which the temporal parts of a four-dimensional object could be located. 
Ordinarily, we might suppose that a time-like curve would be something like the 
temporal equivalent of a line in space, at least to the extent that it would possess the 
essential topological feature of a line, namely that for any two points on the curve there 
would only exist one route between them along the curve. In all the solutions to the 
gravitational equations of general relativity which had been formulated prior to Godel, 
all possible time-like curves appear to have conformed to this topology. However, 
G6del had discovered that in the rotating universes modelled by his new solutions to the 
gravitational equations, the structure of space-time is such as to embody closed time- 
like curves, that is, curves which loop back on themselves. For any two points on a 
closed curve, there exist two routes between the points along the curve. Godel 
announced his discovery of the possibility of such curves in G6del 1949. 
"In particular, if P, Q are any two points on a world line of matter, and P 
precedes Q on this line, there exists a time-like line connecting P and Q on 
which Q precedes P. " (Godel 1949, p. 447) 
On a time-like curve topologically equivalent to a line in space, what we might term an 
open time-like curve, upon which some temporal ordering is assumed24, if P precedes Q 
on this curve it clearly cannot be the case that Q precedes P. It could only be the case 
that P precedes Q and that Q precedes P if the curve is closed, that is, if it is 
topologically equivalent to a loop in space. This can be illustrated as follows, where the 
temporal dimension is depicted spatially, and one of the spatial dimensions is 
suppressed. 
24 The basis on which to assume a temporal ordering along a time-like curve is an issue to which I will 
return in chapters 5 and 6. 









Fig. 3.1 (a) An open time-like curve on which one route exists between P and Q. (b) A closed time-like 
curve on which two routes exist between P and Q. 
However, given that we will see that there are problems defining the direction of time 
around a closed time-like curve, it is useful to have a conception of a closed time-like 
curve which does not invoke direction. The topology of a closed time-like curve can be 




Fig. 3.2. The topology of a closed time-like curve 
can be defined in terms of pair separation. Diagram 
copied from Van Fraassen 1970, p. 67. 
"But what ordering relation is more basic than before or between? The answer 
is: the relation of pair separation. On the above circle, we can say that the pair 
of points (A; C) separates the pair (B; D). It is clear intuitively that if you wish to 
go along the circle from B to D, you must pass through either A or C. " (Van 
Fraassen 1970, p. 68) 
25 The possibility of employing the pair separation relation in this context was pointed out to me by Robin 
Le Poidevin. 
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Any closed time-like curve on which four points can be defined is closed if it conforms 
to the definition of pair separation given above. 26 
We should note that, in a universe which conformed to a presentist metaphysics, 
only one point on a time-] ike curve, the part located at the present moment, would exist. 
in a static block universe, all the points on a time-like curve exist. Hence the diagrams 
above are more appropriate as representations of time-like curves in a static block 
universe than as depictions of the state of affairs in a presentist universe, where the 
concept of a time-like curve is necessarily a hypothetical one. 
(A, ) Are GOdeflan Universes Physically Possible? co/ 
I* 
It is the existence of closed time-like curves in G6delian universes which rule out the 
foliation of those universes by a sequence of global time slices. It is impossible to define 
a global time slice at any point on a closed time-like curve since necessarily the curve 
would reintersect a global time slice, and this is not permitted. 
"GWel's cosmological model is a dust filled universe ... The G6deI manifold M 
is the standard W. That implies that the space-time is temporally orientable ... 
The space-time trajectory of each dust speck is a timelike geodesics, and each 
such world line is open, i. e. topologically a real line. And yet, through each event 
in the space-time, there is a closed, future-directed, timelike curve. It follows 
that the G6deI model does not contain a single global time slice' Assume for 
purposes of contradiction that such a slice S exists. S would be two-sided, for by 
definition S is spacelike and the everywhere defined, continuous, and timelike 
vector field which gives the temporal orientation is non-tangent to S. Pick any 
point x on S. There is a future directed timelike curve which departs ftom S in 
the future direction from side I and returns to S from side 2. Such a curve cannot 
get around to side 2 by intersecting S from side 1, for then temporal orientability 
would be contradicted. Nor can it get to side 2 by going round an 'edge' of S 
since S is a global time slice. And finally it cannot get to side 2 by travelling 
around a 'doughnut hole' in the space-time since the standard R4 does not have 
any such holes. " (Earman 1986, p. 172) 
26 The pair separation described by Van Fraassen is sometimes termed event pair separation. I have 
avoided this term in the context of closed time-like curves since describing a point on such a curve as an 
event may have philosophical implications which can be avoided, given that the concept of a pair is 
sufficient to define the topology of a closed time-like curve. 
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As we have seen, it is not possible to give an objectively distinguished present account 
of a universe which cannot be appropriately foliated by time slices. However, it is 
precisely the existence of closed time-like curves in Gddelian universes which lead 
Hawking and Ellis to doubt the physical possibility of such universes. 
"The existence of closed timelike curves in [Godel's] solution implies that there 
are no imbedded three-dimensional surfaces without boundary in [the manifold] 
. 
AI which are spacelike everywhere. For a closed timelike curve which crossed 
such a surface would cross it an odd number of times. This would mean that the 
curve could not be continuously deformed to zero, since a continuous 
deformation can change the number of crossings only by an even number. This 
would contradict the fact that M is simply connected, being homemorphic to 
4ý R. (Hawking and Ellis 1973, p. 170) 
There are, therefore, at least two ways of interpreting Godel's results, which I will now 
examine. 
(i) Interpreting Gildelian Universes As Physically Possible 
Given that the space-time structure of G6delian universes precludes the possibility of 
foliating those universes by a sequence of global time slices, it is evidently not possible 
to give an objectively distinguished present account of a Godelian universe. We might 
conclude from this, as G6del does, that this throws doubt upon whether it is possible to 
give an objectively distinguished present account of our universe, since our universe 
conforms to the same gravitational equations which G6deI uses to model the G6delian 
universes. 
It would appear that we need to interpret G6delian universes as physically 
possible, in order to consider that the impossibility of giving an objectively 
distinguished present account of those universes has any relevance for what temporal 
metaphysics we are entitled to apply to our own universe. In the next chapter, I will 
consider Savitt's examination of the modal step which G6del is required to inake in 
extrapolating from G6dellan universes to our universe. As we will see, Savitt assumes 
that Godelian universes are physically possible, and then goes on to question what 
relevance the implied temporal metaphysics of those universes has for our universe. 
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(ii) Interpreting G6delian Universes As Physically Impossible 
G6dellan universes are mathematical models which conform to the gravitational 
equations of general relativity. It is open to question whether all universes which can be 
modelled on the basis of the gravitational equations are physically possible, and 
Hawking and Ellis imply that the very fact that G6delian universes do not admit 
foliation by a sequence of global time slices is evidence of their non-physicality. There 
is therefore a question of precedence here in relation to our theories of physics. 
Godel seems essentially to be assuming that any universe which conforms to the 
gravitational equations must be physically possible, whilst Hawking and Ellis Imply that 
conforming to the gravitational equations per se does not guarantee physicality. If a 
universe which conforms to the gravitational equations conflicts with other theories of 
physics then we are entitled to question whether that universe is physically possible. 
A defender of an objectiVely distinguished present temporal metaphysics can 
argue that the possibility of modelling universes which cannot be described in 
objectively distinguished present terms in no way rules out an objectively distinguished 
present description of our universe, if the universes which do not admit such a 
description are not in fact physically possible. 
To some extent, it is going to be a matter of opinion whether one considers that 
conformity to the gravitational equations is sufficient to warrant the assumption that a 
particular universe is physically possible. I will do no more than indicate here that if the 
Godelian universes are not physically possible, then the fact that such universes can 
only be described in terms of a static block universe metaphysics does not impact upon 
the question of what is the correct description of the temporal metaphysics of our 
universe. 27 In the next chapter, however, I will assume that Godelian universes are 
physically possible, in order to consider whether, in that case, G6del is entitled to draw 
any conclusions about the temporal metaphysics Of Our Universe on the basis of the 
temporal metaphysics of the Godellan universes. 
3 Conclusion 
We have seen in this chapter that Godel argues against presentism on the basis of 
27 If Godelian universes are not physically possible, then our universe is certainly not a Godelian universe. 
If G6delian universes are physically possible, then it could be the case that our universe is a G6delian 
universe. In that case, if a G6delian universe is a static block universe, then our universe is a static block 
universe- G6del however does not appear to be assuming that our universe is a G6delian universe. I will 
therefore examine what implications the temporal metaphysics of a Godelian universe would have for our 
universe in the case where our universe is not a Godelian universe. 
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general relativity. In Godel 1949a he refers to Godellan universes which are modelled 
using the gravitational equations of general relativity and which do not admit foliation 
by a sequence of global time slices. Given that presentist and other objectively 
distinguished present accounts of temporal metaphysics require that a sequence of 
global time slices be identifiable in a universe, Godelian universes can only be 
described in static block universe terms. Godel suggests that this result may imply that 
our universe should also only be described in static block universe terms, since our 
universe conforms to the same gravitational equations which Godel uses to model the 
Godelian universes. 
I have pointed out, however, that there might be other physical criteria which 
rule out the physical possibility of Godelian universes. If Godelian universes are not 
physically possible, then the fact that they can only be described In static block universe 
terms may be considered to have only limited relevance to the search for the correct 
description of the temporal metaphysics of our universe. 
In the next chapter I Will examine Savitt's analysis of GC)del's argument. Savitt 
accepts that Godelian universes can only be described in static block universe terms, but 
questions whether it is legitimate to extrapolate from this result to the conclusion that a 
static block universe account is the only one which can correctly be given of any 
universe modelled on the gravitational equations of general relativity, including our 
own. 
In chapter 5,1 will go on to consider Einstein's response to Godel 1949a. 
Einstein raises doubts about the possibility of reconciling Godel's results with 
thermodynamics, suggesting an alternative reply to G6del's argument against 
presentism to the one adopted by Savitt. Einstein's response indicates one possible set 
of those "other physical criteria" to which I have alluded in this chapter as possibly 
ruling out G6delian universes as physically realizable per se. 
4 
Einstein's Field Equations And 
The Modal Step 
I Introduction 
in his paper "The Replacement Of Time" (Savitt 1994), Savitt quotes Yourgrau's 
description of Godel's 1949a paper as "beautiful and enigmatic" (Yourgrau 199 1, P. I). 
Savitt points out that G6del's paper, which is only nine paragraphs long, suggests "a 
number of different lines of argument" (Savitt 1994, p. 464). Savitt therefore selects one 
possible line of argument suggested by the paper and sets about delineating the 
underlying structure of that argument. The line of argument which Savitt delineates is 
essentially the argument for a static block universe metaphysics on the basis of general 
relativity which we considered in the previous chapter. 
Savitt accepts that a presentist description' cannot be given of a Godelian 
universe for the reasons which we examined in the previous chapter. As we will see, 
Savitt goes on to question whether G6del's results are applicable to the type of universe 
we actually inhabit, but I will begin by outlining Savitt's explication of G6del's 
argument. 
Savitt posits four premises on the basis of which G6del can conclude that an 
objective lapse of time, what I have called existential change', does not occur in 
G6delian universes. Savitt then suggests that G6del can only move from the claim that 
existential change does not occur in G6dellan universes to the claim that existential 
Savitt, like Godel, only acknowledges presentism amongst the possible physically distinguished present 
theories of temporal metaphysics. Savitt's argument, which constitutes a counter-argument to Godel's 
argument, could in fact be employed by a growing block universe theorist or a variable determinacy 
universe theorist. Since Savitt focuses upon presentism, however, I shall mostly relate Savitt's argument to 
presentism, 
2 Confer my analysis of existential change in chapter 3, sections 2 (b) (i) and (ii). 
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change does not occur in our universe by means of what Savitt terms "the modal step". 
I begin by analyzing the premises which Savitt takes to be implied by Godel's 
argument, then examine the use and significance of the modal step. I consider what 
factors might prohibit the modal step, and whether therefore a present] st might cite such 
factors in defence of presentism. 
2 Savitt's Analysis Of Gddel's Argument 
Savitt states the argument which he takes Godel to be making as follows: 
"(Al) The existence of an infinity of layers of 'now' is a necessary condition for the 
existence of an objective lapse of time in any spacetime. 
"(A2) A layer of 'now' (in a model of GTR) is a global time slice. 
"(A3) There are no global time slices in M. 
"(A4) There are no layers of 'now' in M. 
"(A) There is no objective lapse of time in M. " (Savitt 1994, p. 465)3 
Although Savitt's restatement of Godel's argument helps to clarify the steps in 
that argument, there is a slight problem with statement (Al) in Savitt's version of the 
argument. (Al) appears to be a subtle rewriting of G6del's original formulation, as 
becomes apparent when we compare it with Godel's original statement which reads as 
follows. 
"Change becomes possible only through the lapse of time. The existence of an 
objective lapse of time, however, means (or, at least, is equivalent to the fact) 
that reality consists of an infinity of layers of 'now' which come into existence 
successively. " (Godel 1949a, p. 558) 
3A few notes on terminology. I sometimes refer to what Savitt, following Godel, calls a "layer of 'now"' 
as a smooth global spacelike hypersurface or a time slice or a global time slice or a moment. Savitt uses 
"GTR" to refer to the general theory of relativity and he uses "M' to refer to the four-dimensional, 
differentiahle, temporally orientable manifold modeled by Godel's solutions to Einstein's field equations. 
A manifold is "essentially a continuous space which looks locally like Euclidean [uncurved] space" (Schutz 
1990, p. 15 1). 
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Note that Godel speaks, somewhat confusingly, about the "existence" of an 
objective lapse of time. By his first use of "existence" in this passage I take him to mean 
the occurrence of an objective lapse of time, that is, the occurrence of what I have 
called existential change. He is then saying that in order for existential change to occur, 
reality must consist of an infinity of layers of "now". However, these layers must come 
into existence successively. 4 G6del could almost be read here as describing a growing 
block universe in which each layer of "now" remains in existence once it has come into 
existence, in which case reality would consist of the present layer of "now" plus all past 
layers of "now". Given that he describes these layers of "now" as coming into existence, 
the implication is that future layers of "now", which have not yet come into existence, 
should not be included as components of reality. 
Interpreting Godel as describing a growing block universe here would, however, 
conflict with the footnote in which he speaks of "the idea of an objective lapse of time 
(whose essence is that only the present really exists)". A temporal metaphysics in which 
only the present really exists is a presentist metaphysics, and thus Godel appears to be 
assuming that after a layer of "now" comes into existence it passes out of existence 
again, rather than accumulating to forin a growing four-dimensional block. 
It is perhaps not surprising, given that G6del is arguing against an objectively 
distinguished present metaphysics in favour of a static block universe metaphysics, that 
his formulation of the objectively distinguished present position lacks clarity. However, 
what is clear from his description is that layers of "now" would need to "come into 
existence". and that it is that laver of "now" which is coming into existence which 
constitutes the present moment. 
The problem with Savitt's statement (Al), which is supposed to represent a 
premise of Godel's argument, is that it seems to imply that all layers of "now" must 
exist in order for existential change to occur. I contest however that the existence of all 
layers of "now" would precisely rule out an objective lapse of time, that is, existential 
change. Consider any two arbitrary "layers of 'now"', temporal slices, and an arbitrary 
physical obJeCt. 5 If both temporal slices exist, and if the same object exists in both 
slices, then the object is composed of at least two temporal parts, neither of which 
changes relative to each other, and we in fact find ourselves in a block universe of some 
kind, rather than one modelled according to presentism. 
4 Godel appears to be drawing a distinction between reality and existence in this passage. Confer my 
discussion of the distinction between "being real" and "existing" in chapter 2, section 2. 
5 The inclusion of a physical object is not strictly necessary, but serves to clarify the problem with Savitt's 
formulation of Godel's argument, 
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If Savitt intends by his use, in (AI), of the phrase "an infinity of layers of 'now"' 
to refer only to those layers of "now" which have come into existence, that is, those 
layers of "now" which are past relative to the present layer of "now", then SavItt 
appears to be envisaging a growing block universe metaphysics of the following kind. 
The layer of "now" which is coming into existence constitutes the present moment, but 
this layer of "now" does not pass out of existence after it has come into existence. 
Reality therefore is cumulative, consisting of all those layers of "now" which have come 
into existence. An object, although composed of temporal parts, one temporal part being 
located in each layer of "now" in which the object exists, would undergo incremental 
existential change since additional temporal parts are being added to the object. If 
however a layer of "now" comes into existence not containing a temporal part of the 
object, then the end of the object's duration, that is, the end of the sequence of layers of 
"now" containing temporal parts of the object, has been reached. 
If Savitt is assuming the growing block universe metaphysics just sketched in 
which layers of "now" come into but do not pass out of existence, however, I would 
suggest that (A 1) should be reformulated as follows. 
(Al *) The existence of a single present layer of 'now' and an infinity of past layers of 
ýnow' is a necessary condition for the existence of an objective lapse of time in 
any space-time. 6 
We may wish to question the coherence of the concept of a "past layer of 
now"'. It is not exactly clear what would distinguish any particular past layer of "now" 
from the present layer of "now" if both are deemed to exist. A possible distinction 
would be to claim that past layers of "now" exist fully, whilst the present layer of "now" 
is that layer of "now" which is coming into existence. On this view, a layer of "now" 
would cease to be the present layer of "now" when it had fully come into existence. If 
we adopt this approach, we may wish to equate "being real" and "existing'17. Reality 
would consist of all those layers of "now" which exist, the past layers of "now", whilst 
the present layer of "now" is that layer of "now" which is becoming real, that is, coming 
61 shall leave aside the question of whether in fact an infinity of layers of "now" would be necessary, or 
whether simply a finite (but probably very large) number would suffice. The question depends upon 
whether the universe is deemed to have a first moment of time, and whether moments are taken to be 
instants, that is, durationless, or intervals, that is, of finite duration. If there is a first moment of time in the 
universe, and each moment is an interval, then there are only a finite number of layers of "now", even 
though new layers of "now" are continually being added. 
71 indicated in chapter 2, section 2, that a presentist might want to distinguish "being real" from 
"existing". A growing block universe theory does not appear to require such a distinction. 
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into existence. Past layers of "now" therefore are real and exist, the present layer of 
4'now" is becoming real, whilst future moments are not real since they do not exist. 
Although the way in which G6del describes his version of an objectively 
distinguished present theory is somewhat ambiguous, and this I take it is what leads 
Savitt to formulate (Al) in the way he does, G6del does nevertheless appear to be 
describing presentism. The metaphysics envisaged by a presentist is one in which the 
present layer of "now" passes out of existence after it has passed into existence. In a 
presentist metaphysics, therefore, past moments do not exist. As suggested previously, 
they could perhaps be distinguished from future moments by being deemed to be real 
although not existing, whilst future moments neither exist, nor are they real. 8 If G6deI is 
indeed describing a presentist metaphysics, then Savitt's statement (Al) is even more 
misleading as a requirement of such a metaphysics, and I would suggest the following 
replacement. 
(A I* *)The existence of no more than and no less than one layer of 'now' is a necessary 
condition for the existence of an objective lapse of time in any spacetime. 
In spite of these proposed revisions to (Al), the choice between (Al*) and 
(Al**) depending upon whether one takes Godel to be describing a growing block 
universe metaphysics or a presentist metaphysics, the rest of Savitt's argument follows 
as Savitt states it. 
As we saw in the previous chapter, a Godelian universe cannot be foliated by a 
sequence of global time slices, and this is expressed by Savitt in (A3). As a 
is not possible to distinguished present account of a consequence, it I give an objecti II 
G6delian universe, since such an account requires that we be able to identify time slices, 
and specifically that we be able to identify a particular time slice to count as the 
physical correlate of what we experience as the present moment. However, as Savitt 
points out, in order for Godel to draw the conclusion that it is not possible to give an 
objectively distinguished present account of our universe, he must either argue that we 
inhabit a Godelian universe, or take what Savitt terms the "modal step" (Savitt 1994, 
p. 465). 
8 It is in presentism, therefore that a distinction between "being real" and "existing" appears to be a useful 
one, providing as it does a possible means of distinguishing between past, present and future moments. 
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3 The Modal Step 
Godel was not apparently prepared to assert that we do inhabit a Godelian universe. 
When he began writing 1949a, he had only discovered solutions to Einstein's field 
equations9 which modeled non-expanding, rotating universes containing closed time- 
like curves, although he mentions in footnote 14 to 1949a that he has just discovered 
that there are solutions for "every value of the cosmological constant". This implies that 
solutions exist which model expanding rotating universes. Observational data suggests 
that we inhabit an expanding universe, hence G6del's initial, non-expanding solutions 
do not model the type of universe we inhabit. His later, expanding solutions could 
potentially model the type of universe we inhabit, provided that we inhabit a rotating 
universe. 10 
However, G6del implies that it does not matter whether we actually inhabit a 
Godelian universe or not, that is, a universe containing closed time-like curves. He 
suggests that the possibility of closed time-like curves in some of the universes 
modelled by Einstein's field equations, and the concomitant impossibility of foliating 
such universes by a sequence of global time slices, implies that a static block universe 
metaphysics is the only metaphysics applicable to all the universes modelled by 
Einstein's field equations. His reasoning is apparently as follows. Universes containing 
closed time-like curves can be modelled on the basis of Einstein's field equations. Such 
universes can only be meaningfully described in static block universe terms. Therefore, 
all universes which can be modelled on the basis of Einstein's field equations, including 
our own, should be described in static block universe terms, regardless of whether or not 
they actually contain closed time-like curves. The latter step in this argument is what 
Savitt terms the modal step. Savitt expresses this step as follows. 
(B) "Since there is no objective lapse of time in Godel's model, there is no objective 
lapse of time in our world either. " (Savitt 1994, p. 464) 
This is Savitt's interpretation of Godel's original statement. I will label Gbdel's 
statement as (B) for purposes of reference. 
91 have referred to Einstein's field equations as the gravitational equations in chapter 3. 
10 It is in practice difficult to assess whether our universe rotates. The period of rotation of a Godelian 
universe would be one rotation every 70 billion years, according to Gribbin 1992, p. 215. Even if our 
universe rotates at the speed necessary for the formation of closed time-like curves, this rotation has not 
yet been established. 
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"The mere compatibility with the laws of nature of worlds in which there is no 
distinguished absolute time, and [in which], therefore, no objective lapse of time 
can exist, throws some light on the meaning of time also in those worlds in 
which an absolute time can be defined. " (Godel 1949a, p. 562) 
Savitt seems to state G6del's position rather more definitely than G6del himself 
does. In order to assess Godel's argument, either in the highly compressed form 
provided by G6del himself, or in the form of Savitt's interpretation, it is useful to 
recognize that there is a crucial assumption contained in the underlying argument. 
A proponent of the modal step is required to decide whether a temporal 
metaphysics is necessarily true, that is, true of all physically" possible universes if it is 
true of one physically possible universe. It can be argued that if one possible universe 
can only be described in, for example, static block universe terms then it must be the 
case that all possible universes, including our own actually existing universe, can only 
be described in static block universe terms. This assumption, that it cannot simply be a 
contingent matter as to whether a universe is either a static block universe or a universe 
in which the present moment is objectively distinguished, must underlie G6del's 
recourse to the modal step. 
There are at least two possible responses to this assumption. Firstly, the fact that 
a static block universe may be physically possible does not, prima facie, seem to carry 
the implication that all possible universes must therefore be static block universes. Why 
should it not be the case that some physically possible universes are static block 
universes whilst other physically possible universes conform to some version of an 
objectively distinguished present theory? The question here seems to be the degree of 
necessity one is prepared to allocate to one's temporal metaphysics. 
It may be that the contrast between a static block universe and a universe in 
which only the present moment exists is so great that it is difficult to believe that if one 
physically possible universe can only be described in terms of a static block universe 
metaphysics, another physically possible universe could still be described in terms of a 
presentist metaphysics. However, the contrast between a static block universe and a 
growing deter-minacy universe is not so greatl and the fact that one physically possible 
universe is a static block universe does not seem to rule out the possibility that another 
II It is clearly the case that both static block universes and physically distinguished present universes are 
logically possible, We will therefore be concerned with physically possible universes, in relation to the 
question of necessity. 
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physically possible universe should be a growing determinacy universe. The only 
difference between the universes would be that, whereas the determinacy of moments of 
time does not vary in the static block universe, it does vary in the growing determinacy 
universe. It is not, therefore, self evident that establishing the temporal metaphysics of 
one physically possible universe makes it necessary that all physically possible 
universes should conform to the same temporal metaphysics. The degree of necessity 
will, I believe, depend upon just how different one takes one's available temporal 
metaphysics to be. 
Nonetheless, we should still observe that, if it is considered that a temporal 
metaphysics must be necessarily true, that is, true of all possible universes if it is true of 
one possible universe, then a defender of an objectively distinguished present temporal 
metaphysics is required to argue that G6delian universes cannot be physically possible 
since they are only describable in static block universe terms. 
As we saw in the previous chapter, G6del demonstrates that G6delian universes 
are only describable as static block universes. If we combine this result with the 
assumption that the temporal metaphysics of one physically possible universe is 
necessarily the temporal metaphysics of all possible universes, and the assumption that 
G6dellan universes are physically possible, we arrive at the conclusion that it is 
necessarily the case that we ourselves inhabit a static block universe. 
G6del allows the defender of a presentist (or some other objectively 
distinguished present) metaphysics a response to this claim. The presentist, according to 
Godel, can assert that existential change occurs, but only if the presentist is prepared to 
claim that whether or not such change occurs "depends on the particular way in which 
matter and its motion are arranged in the world" (Godel 1949a, p. 562). This would 
clearly conflict with the assumption that the static block universe metaphysics of some 
physically possible universes, the Godelian universes, is necessarily the temporal 
metaphysics of all physically possible universes, always assuming that the Godelian 
universes are in fact physically possible. Given that Godel evidently assumes that 
Godelian universes are physically possible, he is dismissive of any attempt to defend an 
objectively distinguished present account of the temporal metaphysics of our universe 
on such contingent grounds as the arrangement and motion of matter in our universe. 
Although Godel appears to rely on the assumption that if a temporal metaphysics 
is true of one physically possible universe, it must be true of all physically possible 
universes, it is possible to reconstruct a slightly different, although closely related 
argument which does not rely on the assumption that a temporal metaphysics is 
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necessarily true or necessarily false of all possible universes. We can, I propose, 
reconstruct the following line of reasoning. 12 First of all, I shall suggest what I take 
Godel to mean by "laws of nature", the term which he uses in his statement (B'), and 
the relation between laws of nature and contingent features of a universe. 13 
(LI) A law of nature relates a property of a constituent or constituents of a universe to 
another property of a constituent or constituents of a universe. 14 
(L2) Contingent properties of a universe do not alter the relationship between the 
properties of constituents of a universe, where that relationship is described by a 
law of nature. 
A simple example, unrelated to Godel's argument, may serve to clarify these 
premises. Consider the posited law of nature, "All metals expand when heated". 15 This 
law relates the property "is a metal" to the property "expands when heated". So if 
constituent X of a universe is a metal, then constituent X expands when heated. (LI) 
attempts to summarize the fact that a law of nature describes a relationship between 
properties of constituents of a universe. I speak of a "constituenf' in order to keep the 
definition of a law as general as possible. 
Suppose now that constituent X of a universe, which has the property "is a 
metal". also has the property "is cylindrical". If the shape of X is a contingent property, 
then (L2) implies that the cylindrical shape of X Will not alter the fact that X expands 
when heated. Notice that this analysis may imply that laws of nature should be 
interpreted as expressing relationships between non-contingent, that is, necessary, 
properties of a constituent of a universe. I will not attempt to establish whether this 
interpretation is valid for all laws of nature, but will refer back to this possible 
interpretation in the course of the analysis of G6del's argument. 
We can now analyze how precisely Godel's concept of a law of nature impacts 
12 1 am not suggesting that Gbdel necessarily followed this line of reasoning in drawing his conclusion. 
Nonetheless, the line of reasoning proposed serves to make sense of his conclusion. 
13 1 shall label the steps in the proposed argument (LI), (1-2) and so on. I use an 'T" prefix since the 
argument depends upon Godel's concept of a law of nature. 
14 (LI) is formulated so as to accommodate laws of the form (Vx)(3y)(Fx -4 Gy), for example, as well as 
simpler laws of the form (Vx)(Fx --> Gx). 
15 1 will leave aside epistemological questions, such as whether we can be certain that a generalization 
which supposedly applies to all possible instances of heating metals, both observed and unobserved, is true 
in some correspondence sense of the word "true", and if we cannot be certain, as appears to be the case, 
what it then means to call such a generalization a law. 
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upon his interpretation of Einstein's field equations. I attribute the following 
assumptions to G6del. 
(U) Einstein's field equations are "laws of nature". 
(L4) (LI) and (U) together imply that Einstein's field equations relate a property of a 
constituent of a universe described by the field equations to another property of 
that same constituent. 
(L5) (L2) and (1,3) together imply that the relationship described by Einstein's field 
equations is not determined by contingent properties of a universe described by 
the field equations. 
(L6) The amount, distribution and motion of matter in a universe described by 
Einstein's field equations are contingent properties of such a universe. 
(L7) (L5) and (L6) together imply that the relationship described by Einstein's field 
equations is not determined by the amount, distribution and motion of matter in 
a universe described by the field equations. 
Let us consider in turn each component of the argument which I am attributing 
to G6del. I conclude that G6del holds (U) since I take it that he is obliquely referring to 
Einstein's field equations when he uses the term "laws of nature" in (B'). (L4) and (L5) 
then follow ftom the interpretation of laws of nature which I attribute to G6del in (LI) 
and (L2). I deduce (L6) from Godel's claim that a presentist can only assert that 
existential change occurs if the presentist is prepared to claim that whether or not such 
change occurs "depends on the particular way in which matter and its motion are 
arranged in the world" (Godel 1949a, p. 562). I take this statement to imply that Godel 
considers the "way in which matter and its motion are arranged", what I have described 
as the amount, distribution and motion of matter, to be contingent properties of a 
universe. (1-7) then follows from (L5) and (L6). 
What we now need to consider is whether Godel is justified in conceiving of 
Einstein's field equations as laws of nature, and how his conception of the field 
equations relates to his application of the modal step. The first point to ascertain is 
whether the field equations conform to the description of a law of nature which I 
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suggest in (L 1). The field equations can be expressed mathematically as folloWS, 16 
I 
R, k--gjkR =TJk- Agk 2 
As such, the field equations express a relationship between the curvature of 
space-time (the manifold referred to in footnote 3, this chapter), its geometric 
properties, as denoted by the Ricci tensor Rik, where R is the scalar curvature, and the 
distribution and motion of matter and energy17 as denoted by the stress-energy tensor 
Tik. 18 1 have suggested in (L 1) that a law of nature relates a property of a constituent of a 
universe to another property of that same constituent. The field equations relate one 
property, the curvature of space-time, to another property, the distribution and motion of 
matter and energy. The question arises as to whether these are properties of the same 
constituent of a universe, and if so, what that constituent is. In fact, it appears that they 
are properties of regions of a universe, where a region is defined both spatially and 
temporally, such that if, for example, we knew the distribution and motion of matter and 
energy in that region, we would be able to calculate the curvature of space-time in that 
region. Since a region of a universe is undoubtedly a constituent part of that universe, 
the field equations appear to conform to the definition of a law of nature which I 
propose in (LI). Godel is therefore entitled to conceive of the field equations as laws of 
nature, at least if he conceives of a law of nature along the lines described in (L I). 
According to (L7), the relationship expressed by Einstein's field equations 
should not be affected by the distribution and motion of matter in a universe. We can 
see that, according to the field equations, as the distribution and motion of matter vary, 
so the curvature of space-time will vary. However, provided that the variation in 
curvature relative to the variation in the distribution and motion of matter conforms to 
the relationship expressed by the field equations, then the distribution and motion of 
matter cannot be said to have changed the relationship expressed by the field equations. 
Provided that this condition is met, the field equations can be said to satisfy (L7). 
I have attempted to reconstruct in (LI) to (L7) a set of assumptions which I 
believe G6del requires in order for him to argue that the possibility of the existence of 
16 This is only one possible representation of Einstein, s field equations, the representation which Godel 
himself used in G6del 1952. As Godel notes, he is assuming the use of measuring units which make c=l, 
87rk/C2=1 . An accessible 
discussion of Einstein's field equations can be found in Schutz 1990, chapter 8. 
17 Recall that matter can be converted into energy, and vice versa, in relativistic physics. 
18 The other components of the field equations, the metric gik and the cosmological constant A, are not 
essential to the analysis of Godel's argument. See Schutz 1990, chapter 8 for an account of them. 
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universes in which existential change does not occur "throws some light", as he puts it 
in (B'), on universes such as our own, where we might have concluded that existential 
change does occur. As we have seen, Savitt states rather more positively than G6del 
what light the possibility of the existence of universes in which existential change does 
not occur might be conceived of as throwing on our own universe, in his statement of 
the modal step. I will repeat Savitt's statement here for ease of reference. 
"Since there is no objective lapse of time in G6del's model, there is no objective 
lapse of time in our world either. " (Savitt 1994, p. 464) 
A line of reasoning which leads to the formulation of the modal step as given by 
Savitt can be reconstructed as follows. 19 
(B'I) Gbdelian universes conform to Einstein's field equations. 
(B'2) In Godelian universes, there is no objective lapse of time. 
(B'3) It is because G6delian universes conform to Einstein's field equations that no 
objective lapse of time occurs in them. 
(B'4) Our world conforms to Einstein's field equations. 
(B'5) Since our world conforms to Einstein's field equations, there is no objective 
lapse of time in our world. 
Since the second half of (B5) follows from (B'2), by means of (B'3) and (B'4), 
we can in effect state that "(B'2) implies the second half of (B5)", which amounts to 
Savitt's modal step, (B). I believe, as Savitt implies, that (B) is essentially the 
conclusion at which Godel was gesturing in his statement of (B'). I now want to 
consider why G6del requires (LI) to (L7) in order to arrive at (B'), and also to suggest 
19 Note that Savitt describes the actual line of reasoning which led him to his formulation of (B) (Savitt 
1994, p. 469). This is not the line of reasoning which I describe here. My aim however is not to assess the 
details of Savitt's argument, but rather to reconstruct the assumptions and line of reasoning which might 
have led Gode) to his statement of (W). As such, the line of reasoning which I describe here, and which I 
denote by the steps (B']), (B'2), and so on, encapsulates the main points of Savitt's actual line of 
reasoning. 
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that a further essential assumption is implicit in the statement (B'3). The most 
convenient way in which to perform this analysis of G6del's argument will be by 
considering how a defender of an objectively distinguished present theory might 
respond to the invocation of the modal step. I will consider the response which might be 
made by a presentist, since presentism is the type of objectively distinguished present 
theory at which G6del addresses his argument. In fact, exactly the same response as that 
made by a presentist could be made by a growing block universe theorist or a growing 
determinacy universe theorist, the only difference being that they would be defending 
somewhat different concepts of objective change. 
4 Presentist Responses To The Modal Step 
The modal step can be challenged in a variety of ways. Savitt suggests that a "blunt 
challenge" (Savitt 1994, p. 466) can be made. An opponent of the modal step, Savitt 
avers, is entitled to state the following. 
"[W]hile there is no objective lapse of time in the G6del model because of its 
peculiar topological structures, there is objectively lapsing time here in our 
differently abled world. " (Savitt 1994, p. 466) 
It might initially appear that a defender of the modal step wishing to respond to 
this claim could simply restate Godel's original complaint that the presentist can only 
cite contingent features of the universe we actually inhabit to justify the claim that time 
"lapses objectively", that is, that existential change occurs. 
The Godelian argument is as follows. Our universe could only be "differently 
abled" to Godelian universes in contingent ways. Nonetheless, the universe we inhabit 
conforms to the same field equations as those on the basis of which Gddellan universes 
can be modelled. Given that existential change is ruled out in G6delian universes, it 
should also be ruled out In any universes, including our own, which conform to the 
same field equations as those on the basis of which G6delian universes can be modelled. 
Notice that according to this argument, it is not being claimed that it is the 
presence of the distinctive feature of G6delian universes, closed time-like curves, in our 
universe which rules out existential change, unless our universe in fact contains closed 
time-like curves, which is not Gbdel's claim. If existential change is ruled out in our 
universe it must be because our universe, like G6delian universes, conforms to 
Einstein's field equations. It is important to note, therefore, that the Godelian claim is 
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that it is conformity to Einstein's field equations which precludes existential change in 
our universe, rather than the existence of those "peculiar topological structures" to 
which Einstein's field equations can give rise. The importance attached to Einstein's 
field equations embodies the assumption that if a temporal metaphysics is true of one 
physically possible universe, it must be true of all physically possible universes, that is, 
it must be necessarily true. The conformity of G6dellan universes to Einstein's field 
equations at once implies that they are physically possible, as far as Godel is concerned, 
and links them to our own universe which also conforms to Einstein's field equations. 
The modal step can indeed be justified if conformity to Einstein's field 
equations is construed as precluding existential change. In that case, existential change 
is ruled out in any universe which conforms to the field equations, including our own. 
However, the "blunt challenge" is not as blunt as it first appears in that case, since 
explicitly stated in the challenge is the claim that it is the existence of "peculiar 
topological structures" in the G6delian universes, rather than conformity to the field 
equations used to model such universes, which precludes existential change. 
If it is the existence of "peculiar topological structures" which rules out 
is more existential change, rather than conformity to Einstein's field equations, then it i 
difficult to justify the modal step. Crucially, the topological structures characteristic of 
Godellan universes, the closed time-like curves, appear to be contingent. The existence 
of closed time-like curves "depends on the particular way in which matter and its 
motion are arranged in the world" (Godel 1949a, p. 562) just as much as the non- 
existence of such structures. But it is precisely the arrangement and motion of matter 
which Godel identifies as a contingent feature of a universe. Therefore whether or not 
closed time-like curves exist would appear to depend upon a feature of universes, the 
arrangement and motion of matter within them, which G6del himself identifies as 
contingent. 
Let us consider again what Godel has actually shown us. He has shown that 
some of the universes which can be modelled on the basis of Einstein's field equations 
contain closed time-like curves. It is apparent, however, that not all universes which can 
be modelled on the basis of the field equations contain such structures. So whilst closed 
time-like curves do rule out existential change, since they preclude the possibility of 
foliating a universe into a sequence of global time slices, this in itself is not sufficient to 
demonstrate that existential change is ruled out in all the universes which can be 
modelled on the basis of Einstein's field equations. We are not entitled to conclude that 
existential change is ruled out in all those universes which do not contain closed time- 
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like curves, unless we make the more substantial claim that existential change is 
precluded in any universe which conforms to Einstein's field equations, simply because 
that universe does conform to the field equations. This would amount to the claim that 
Einstein's field equations themselves preclude existential change. 
In order to take the modal step which Savitt describes, therefore, a G6delian has 
to assume that Einstein's field equations themselves rule out a presentist metaphysics, 
rather than the topological structures to which they give rise in G6dellan universes. 
Godel seems in effect to be arguing that his G6delian universes simply make explicit 
what is already implicit in Einstein's field equations, namely that the field equations are 
incompatible with presentism. It is certainly possible to interpret the field equations in 
this way. An advocate of a static block universe metaphysics might argue, for example, 
that the temporal dimension is effectively interchangeable with the three spatial 
dimensions in the type of universes which the field equations model, that this 
interchangeability is perfectly consistent with a static block universe metaphysics, but 
inexplicable in presentist terms, and that G6delian universes merely illustrate, in the 
form of closed time-like curves, one rather dramatic consequence of this 
interchangeability. 
However, a counter-aygument to the G6dellan line presents itself at this point. A 
defender of presentism can retort that the field equations appear to be neutral in respect 
to the type of temporal metaphysics which they permit. They can certainly be used to 
model G6delian universes which contain structures which rule out the possibility of 
existential change. They can also be used, however, to model universes which do not 
contain such structures and which may therefore be compatible in principle with 
existential change. This line of argument embodies the claim that Einstein's field 
equations are not intrinsically incompatible with a presentist metaphysics, even though 
some of the universes which can be modelled on the basis of the equations may be. 
Once again, we are returned to the question of whether, if one physically possible 
universe can only be described in terms of a static block metaphysics, then necessarily 
all physically possible universes should be described in such terms. 
The defender of presentism can continue by pointing out that no topological 
structures have been shown to exist in our universe which are incompatible with 
presentism, at least as yet, so that a presentist metaphysics cannot be ruled out as the 
correct account of our universe, even though our universe conforms to Einstein's field 
equations. 
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We can, on reflection, observe that (B3)20 embodies the assumption that it is 
Einstein's field equations themselves which preclude existential change, rather than 
some of the topological structures to which the field equations give rise. As we have 
seen, this assumption is open to question. 
I contend that Gbdel's implicit assumption of (B'3) arises out of his conception 
of Einstein's field equations as laws of nature. (LI) to (L7) are the assumptions which 
underline his conception of the field equations as laws of nature, and (L2), (L5), (L6) 
and (L7) in particular explain his belief that the presentist would have to cite contingent 
facts about the distribution and motion of matter in a universe to justify the claim that 
existential change occurs. The fact which Godel does not appear to have considered is 
that those topological structures which preclude existential change, the closed time-like 
curves, are themselves contingent. It is only by assuming, as Godel apparently does, that 
existential change is precluded in any universe modelled on the basis of Einstein's field 
equations, whether or not that universe contains closed time-like curves, that the modal 
step can be justified. This amounts to the assumption that it is the field equations 
themselves which preclude existential change, rather than some of the topological 
structures to which they give rise. This assumption is nowhere justified by Godel, and is 
thus open to challenge by a defender of presentism. 
5 Einstein's Field Equations As The Source Of Temporal Metaphysics 
We have seen in this chapter that, although G6delian universes can only be described in 
static block universe terms, a number of additional assumptions are required in order to 
draw the conclusion towards which Godel points us, namely that our universe can only 
be described in static block universe terms. Assuming that our universe is not a 
G6delian universe2l, G6del needs to assume that if a temporal metaphysics is true of one 
physically possible Universe, then it is necessarily true, that is, it is true of all physically 
possible universes. He needs to assume in addition that Godelian universes are 
physically possible. 
It is in fact possible to reach the conclusion that our universe can only be 
described in static block universe terms without assuming that a temporal metaphysics 
true of one physically possible universe is necessarily true of all physically possible 
20 Recall that (B'3) consisted of the following statement. "It is because Godelian universes conform to 
Einstein's field equations that no objective lapse of time occurs in them. " 
21 If our universe is a G6delian universe, then a physically distinguished present account cannot be given of 
our universe. In that case, no additional assumptions are required in relation to our universe. Godel 
nowhere claims, however, that our universe is a G6delian universe. 
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universes. Godel could assume that Einstein's field equations themselves preclude 
existential change, rather than the structures to which they give rise. In that case it is 
possible to argue that it is the conformity of our universe to the field equations which 
precludes existential change. It is however difficult to motivate this assumption. 
If we assume that the temporal metaphysics true of one physically possible 
universe is not necessarily true of all physically possible universes, then the physical 
possibility of Godelian universes does not pose a serious problem for advocates of an 
objectively distinguished present account of our own universe. It seems that we could 
concede that there are possible worlds in which time does not flow, and perhaps even 
concede that "flowing" and "static" worlds could conform to the same field equations, 
without having to concede that "flowing" worlds are impossible. In that case, Godel 
would have to show that our universe was in fact a Godelian universe, in order to claim 
that our universe was a static block universe. 
If however it is considered that, in the case where we are constrained to accept a 
static block universe temporal metaphysics as the description of a physically possible 
universe, we are thereby constrained to accept the same temporal metaphysics as the 
description of any physically possible universe, then the physical possibility of Godelian 
universes would appear to rule out the possibility of describing our own universe in 
anything other than static block universe terms. The question therefore arises as to 
whether Godelian universes are in fact physically possible. 
I will begin the next chapter, therefore, by examining Einstein's thoughts on the 
physical possibility of closed time-like curves in the Godelian universes modelled on the 
basis of Einstein's field equations. 
5 
Thermodynamics And 
The Direction Of Time 
I Introduction 
We saw in the previous chapter that an advocate of a static block universe temporal 
metaphysics can argue, on the basis of the claim that a physically distinguished present 
metaphysics is not a coherent description of Godelian universes, that a physically 
distinguished present metaphysics is not a coherent description of our universe. Such a 
theorist is described by Savitt as taking what he terms the modal step. 
We saw that the modal step can be motivated if we assume the following. 
All physically possible universes must be described in terms of the same 
temporal metaphysics. Therefore, if it turns out that one physically possible 
universe can only be described in terms of one particular temporal metaphysics, 
then all other physically possible universes must be described in terms of that 
metaphysics. In other words, a temporal metaphysics is necessarily true or 
necessarily false, true in all possible universes or false in all possible universes. 
(ii) Godellan universes are physically possible universes. 
If we combine these two assumptions with the observation that Godelian 
universes can only be described in terms of a static block universe temporal 
metaphysics, then we arrive at the conclusion that our own universe must also be a static 
block universe. 
I considered in the previous chapter whether it might be possible to challenge 
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assumption (i), depending upon what one assumes would constrain time to have a 
particular physical reallsation in different physically possible universes. However, I 
shall for now assume that (1) is the case, and therefore consider whether we have to 
accept assumption (11). 
Evidence that we should perhaps not accept assumption (ii) arises out of a short 
response to G6del 1949a made by Einstein, in which Einstein in effect questions 
whether entropy could vary in a Godelian universe in the way it would have to in order 
for that universe to conform to the second law of thermodynamics. As we will see, it 
does not appear that Godelian universes can conform to the second law, and this leads 
me to question therefore whether it is legitimate to treat Godelian universes as 
physically possible. I Will go on to examine the larger question which Einstein's 
response to Godel suggests, namely whether in general a G6dellan universe would have 
to conform to all the laws of physics in order for it to be physically possible. 
I will then demonstrate that, if we assume that the second law of 
then-nodynarnics applies to the universe as a whole, it is possible to give an objectively 
distinguished present account of any universe which conforms to the second law of 
thermodynamics. 
2 Einstein's Response To G6del's Rotating Universes 
G6dcI was prompted to write 1949a when he was asked for a contribution to a volume' 
of collected papers in honour of Einstein. Fortunately Einstein was given the 
opportunity to reply to the various papers written in his honour, and amongst his replies 
was a brief response to G6del 1949a, which I will refer to as Einstein 1949.2 
(a) A Method Of Establishing The Temporal Orientation Of A Time-Like Curve 
In his reply to G6del's paper, Einstein invites us to consider the situation depicted in 
figure 5.1. This figure, which reproduces the diagram employed by Einstein, shows the 
light cones associated with an arbitrary space-tjMe3 point P. A time-like curve4 is shown 
passing through P, on which the space-time points A and B, also arbitrary, are located, 
separated by P. Einstein asks, in relation to this situation, whether it is possible to 
assign a direction to the time-like curve passing through P, enabling us to specify, for 
I Schilpp 1949. 
2 Confer Schilpp 1949, pp. 697-689. 
3 Einstein refers to a space-time point as a "world-point". 
4 Einstein refers to a curve as a "world-line7'. 
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example, that B is before P and that A is after P. 
"Does it make any sense to provide the world-line with an arrow, and to assert 
that B is before P, A after PT' (Einstein 1949, p. 687) 
Fig. 5.1 Light cones, shown as solid lines, belonging to a space-time point P, and a 
time-like curve, shown as a dotted line, passing through P. The space-time point P 
separates two other space-time points B and A. The up arrow to the fight of P 
indicates a postulated direction of time. Reproduced from Einstein 1949, p. 687. 
Einstein is alluding in this question to a feature of the general theory of relativity 
which, he reveals, had disturbed him even whilst he was constructing the theory. 
Einstein is unsure whether the general theory of relativity embodies within it any 
mechanism for establishing a direction of time. 
"Is what remains of temporal connection between world-points in the theory of 
relativity an asymmetrical relation, or would one be just as much justified, from 
the physical point of view, to indicate the arrow in the opposite direction and to 
assert that A is before P, B after PT' (Ibid. ) 
Einstein goes on to imply that if one wishes to assign a temporal orientation to a 
time-like curve, one must import some mechanism for establishing such a temporal 
orientation from another branch of physics. He proposes a method of assigning a 
temporal orientation to a time-like curve which involves the sending of what Einstein 
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terms a "signal". 5 He suggests that if a signal can be sent from B to A, but not from A to 
B, this implies that B is before A. The arrow Indicating a temporal progression from 
earlier (the tail of the arrow) to later (the head of the arrow) is then as illustrated in 
figure 5.1. Furthermore, if the signal can only be sent in one direction the time-like 
curve has to be assigned the orientation indicated by the arrow. 
"If it is possible to send (to telegraph) a signal (also passing by in the close 
proximity of P) from B to A, but not from A to B, then the one-sided 
(asymmetrical) character of time is secured, i. e., there exists no free choice for 
the direction of the arrow. " (Ibid. ) 
If we find, therefore, that we can only send signals in one direction along time- 
like curves, we are provided with a method of assigning a temporal orientation to such 
curves. We need to ask, therefore, whether in fact there is any restriction upon the 
direction in which can we send signals along time-like curves. What is to stop us, for 
example, in the situation we are considering, from sending a signal from A to B? 
Einstein implies that there is nothing in general relativity itself which indicates any 
restriction upon the direction in which signals can be sent along time-like curves. It is 
only if we look outside of relativity theory, Einstein suggests to thermodynamics, that 
we find constraints upon the direction in which we can send signals. As Einstein points 
out, in terms of thermodynamics, the sending of a signal is an irreversible process. 
JT]he sending of a signal is, in the sense of thermodynamics, an irreversible 
process, a process which is connected with the growth of entropy. " (Einstein 
1949, pp. 687-688) 
We need to consider why, precisely, this is the case, by considering the second 
law of thermodynamics, the law which specifically relates to entropy. Before doing so, 
let us establish the significance of Einstein's comment in the context in which he makes 
it. Let us assume for now that the sending of a signal is indeed irreversible. In that case, 
5 Einstein does not elaborate upon what he means by a signal, although he does qualify the "sending" of 
the signal as its "telegraphing". He may be envisaging the transmission and reception of a pulse of 
electromagnetic energy, but presumably any means of transmitting and receiving a signal of any kind would 
suffice. Use of the word "signal" does however imply that the act of transmitting is intentional- Thus 
detecting electromagnetic radiation from a star would not constitute detecting a signal, whilst detecting 
electromagnetic radiation from a radio station would. 
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if we know that a signal was sent from some space-time point B and received at some 
space-time point A, where B and A are located on the same time-like curve, then we can 
conclude that B is before A, and thus that the time-like curve has a temporal orientation. 
Clearly, in the case described, a signal could not be sent from A and received at B, since 
this would amount to reversing a process, the sending of a signal, which the second law 
of thermodynamics implies is irreversible. Einstein is therefore proposing a method of 
establishing the temporal orientation of a time-like curve based upon signalling, a 
method that is which relies upon thermodynamics rather than upon relativity theory. 
(b) Entropy And The Second Law Of Thermodynamics 
Let us now consider why the second law of thermodynamics implies that the sending of 
a signal is an irreversible process. As Coveney and Highfield (1990) note, there are a 
variety of different ways of formulating the second law. 
"The American philosopher David HU116 has recently pointed out that physicists 
can readily compile a list of 20 or more different formulations of the Second 
Law. " (Coveney and Highfield 1990, p. 148) 
A forinulation of the second law of thermodynamics which will serve to 
illuminate Einstein's reference to the law in his response to G6del is as follows. 
"The only changes that are possible for an isolated' system are those in which 
the entropy of the system either increases or remains the same. Changes in which 
the entropy decreases will not happen. " (Halliday and Resnick 1988, p. 525) 
Just as there are various formulations of the second law of thermodynamics, so 




6 Confer Weber, Depew and Smith 1988, p-3- 
71 will discuss shortly the significance of the description of the system as "isolated". 
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It is stated in the second law of thermodynamics that the entropy of an isolated 
system will either increase or stay the same over time. In fact, entropy only remains the 
same if a physical process is reversible, and all the empirical evidence points to it being 
the case that no physical processes are truly reversible. Therefore the second law of 
thermodynamics tells us in effect that the entropy of an isolated system will always 
increase over time. 
The reason that the second law is formulated in terms of an isolated system, as 
opposed to a closed or open system, is that it is possible to lower the entropy of a closed 
or open system over time. 8 This is possible by transferring energy or matter from or to 
the spatial region surrounding the closed or open system, thereby increasing entropy in 
the surroundings by a greater amount than the amount by which entropy is decreased in 
the closed or open system. Therefore the second law only applies to isolated systems. 9 
It is in practice virtually impossible to construct a perfectly isolated system, and 
usually the concept of an isolated system is used as an idealization in thermodynamics. 
However, our universe appears to be the one actually existing example of a perfectly 
isolated system, assuming that we define a universe as everything that exists. If the 
universe is everything that exists, then it cannot have any surroundings. In general, we 
can see that any possible universe constitutes a perfectly 1 sot ated system. 10 
The Paradox Of Entropy Increase Along A Closed Time-Like Curve 
We now have the conceptual tools necessary to understand why Einstein refers to the 
sending of a signal as an irreversible process. II In order to send a signal, a degree of 
order will need to be imposed in the spatial region designated as point B, where B is 
some arbitrary point on a time-like curve. In order to impose the ordering necessary to 
send the signal, energy or matter will have to be transferred to or from the surroundings 
8 An isolated system is defined thermodynamically as one which has no contact with its surroundings. Thus 
no matter or energy can enter or leave an isolated system. A closed system is defined as one which can 
exchange energy with its surroundings, but cannot exchange matter. An open system is defined as one 
which can exchange both energy and matter with its surroundings. 
9 As Coveney and Highfield 1990 indicate, in a section entitled "Order Out Of Chaos" (pp. 159-162), 
closed and open systems can change over time from less ordered states into more ordered states. The 
second law of thermodynamics should not therefore be interpreted as implying a straightforward descent of 
all systems in the universe from order into chaos. 
10 In 1865, Rudolf Clausius formulated the first two laws of thermodynamics in cosmological terms, after 
recognizing that the universe is a perfectly isolated system. In cosmological terms, the first law states that 
the total energy of the universe is constant, and the second law states that the total entropy of the universe 
is increasing. Confer Clausius 1867, Coveney and Highfield 1990, p. 153. 
11 Unfortunately, Einstein's reply to Godel is very brief and he does not elaborate on what he means here. 
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of point B. 12 The net effect of the transfer of energy or matter will be to raise the 
entropy of the surroundings of point B by a greater amount than the entropy is lowered 
at point B itself Sending a signal from point B will therefore have the effect of raising 
the entropy of the universe as a whole, since, as we have seen, the universe can be 
considered as a perfectly isolated system. 
According to the second law of thermodynamics, the entropy of an isolated 
system can only stay the same or increase over time. Since the process of sending a 
signal increases the entropy of the universe, which constitutes an isolated system, 
signals can only be sent forwards through time. A signal could only be sent backwards 
through time if the process of sending a signal decreased entropy in the universe as a 
whole, and it is difficult to see how this could occur since the process of sending a 
signal requires that we decrease entropy in a localized region of the universe, and such a 
decrease appears invariably to require that we increase entropy elsewhere in the 
universe by a larger amount. Thus the arbitrary point A on a time-like curve, at which a 
signal sent from the arbitrary point B on the same time-like curve is received, must lie 
after B, since the receiving of a signal can only lie in the future of the sending of a 
signal. This is why the sending and receiving of a signal can be used to establish the 
temporal orientation of a time-like curve. 
As we have noted, it had already occurred to Einstein when he was formulating 
the general theory of relativity that the space-times modelled by the theory might lack a 
temporal orientation, However, it is specifically in response to G6del's paper on the 
possibility of universes containing closed time-like curves that Einstein proposes a 
method of establishing the temporal orientation of time-like curves per se by means of 
sending and receiving signals. What is it about closed time-like curves which prompts 
Einstein to raise the issue of temporal orientation? In fact, it can be demonstrated that if 
we assume that time-like curves have a temporal orientation, and that entropy always 
increases along a time-like curve as we move from earlier to later points on the curve, 
then a closed time-like curve presents us with a paradox. 
Consider a small closed thermodynamic system13 (a gas in a box, for example) 
located at some arbitrary point P, on a closed time-like curve. I will suppose that this 
closed thermodynamic system has an arbitrary entropy S1. That is, S, is the entropy of 
the system at the moment of time associated with P1. 
12 Note that point B is most likely to constitute an open system, although there is nothing to prohibit it 
constituting a closed system. 
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I am associating a point on the curve with the entropy of a small closed system 
since a point in a space-time diagram indicates the space-time location of a particular 
small object, that is, one that can be represented as a point mass. Although in practice it 
is impossible to construct a perfectly isolated thermodynamic system, for the purpose of 
illustration it is sufficient to consider a closed thermodynamic system located on the 
curve. 
Although local entropy can decrease as well as increase, I will assume that since 
the thermodynamic system is closed, it will obey the second law of thermodynamics 
perfectly and hence its entropy will increase over time. 
Suppose we establish that P2 lies after PI, by means of Einstein's signaling 
technique. Then we can infer that P2 is associated with an entropy S2, where S, is 
defined as follows. 
S2 = Sl +AS 
AS is a positive arbitrary increment in entropy. We can see from this formulation 
that P, is associated with a higher entropy than P1. 
Similarly, suppose we establish that P3 lies after P2, by means of the signaling 
technique. Then we can infer that P3 is associated with an entropy S3, where S3 is 
defined as follows. 
S3 ý S2 + AS = Si + 2AS 
For convenience, I shall define P3 such that the same increase in entropy, AS, 
occurs between P, and P3 as occurs between P, and P2. 
We can continue to associate entropy values with points along the time-like 
curve in this fashion. Because, however, the time-like curve is closed, we will in theory 
eventually reach an arbitrary point P,, associated with an entropy S, located a short 
time before PI, the point from which we started. We should be able to infer that P, is 
associated with an entropy Sý,, I, where S,, j is defined as follows. 
St, 
+j = 
S,, + AS = S, + nAS 
13 The use of a small closed thermodynamic system in this thought experiment was suggested to me by 
Roman Frigg. 
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This inference however clearly conflicts with the original assumption that the 
point P, is associated with the entropy St. Hence we can see that application of 
Einstein's signalling procedure along a closed time-like curve leads to a paradox. The 
situation is illustrated in figure 5.2. 
P2, associated with 
entropy S2 
I PI, associated with entropy S, 
and entropy S,, ) 
0 P, associated with 
entropy S,, 
Fig. 5.2 On the left, a closed time-like curve in a Godelian universe is illustrated. 
The arrows indicate the temporal orientation of the curve as established at different 
points by Einstein's signalling method. On the right, a detail of the curve is 
illustrated. Three arbitrary points, P, P, and P2 are illustrated. The entropy 
associated with each point is indicated. It can be seen that the arbitrary point P, is, 
paradoxically, associated with two different entropies. 
Einstein hints at the paradox when he ponders how we might establish the 
ternporal orientation of a tinle-like curve in a universe modelled on the basis of his field 
equations, although it is not clear whether he has actually noticed the paradox. He 
suggests that whilst we might be able to establish a temporal orientation in a local 
temporal region using the signalling method, this method will inevitably lead to 
incoherent results when applied globally to time-like curves which are closed. 
"If, therefore, B and A are two, sufficiently neighboring, world-points, which can 
be connected by a time-like line, then the assertiow 'T is before A, " makes 
physical sense. But does this assertion still make sense, if the points, which are 
connected by the time-like line, are arbitrarily far separated from each other? 
Certainly not, if there exist point-series connectable by time-like lines in such a 
way that each point precedes temporally the preceding one, and if the series is 
closed in itseýf " (Einstein 1949, p. 688) 
We need to consider, therefore, what the implications are of the paradox, and whether 
the paradox can be resolved. 
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3 Two Responses To The Paradox Of Entropy Increase Around Closed Time-Like 
Curves 
One possible response to the paradox of entropy increase along a closed time-like curve 
is to conclude that universes containing such closed time-like curves, specifically 
Godel's rotating universes, are not physically possible, on the grounds that any universe 
containing a closed time-like curve cannot conform to the second law of 
thermodynamics. This would be a useful result for a proponent of an objectively 
distinguished present account of the temporal metaphysics of our universe, since the 
fact that such an account could not be given of a G6dellan universe would not seem to 
have any implications for our universe if G6dellan universes are not physically possible. 
An alternative response is to argue that for a universe to be physically possible it 
need not conform to all the laws of physics to which our universe conforms. We could 
allow that Godellan universes are physically possible even though they do not conform 
to the second law of thermodynamics. However, this is problematic if we consider that 
the second law of thermodynamics plays some role in relation to the temporal 
metaphysics of our universe. 
I shall consider the merits and demerits of these two possible responses in the 
following two sections. 
(a) Denying The Physical Possibility Of GOdelian Universes 
How might we motivate the claim that G6delian universes are not physically possible 
because they contain closed time-like curves? The universes which G6del modelled are 
modelled on the basis of Einstein's field equations and they are thus possible from the 
point of view of general relativity. However, we may consider that the existence of 
closed time-like curves in G6delian universes renders such universes incompatible with 
the second law of thermodynamics, and that this becomes evident when we attempt to 
establish the temporal orientation along a closed time-like curve as a whole. 
If we assume that a universe is physically possible only if it conforms to all 
physical laws, then we can conclude that the non-conformity of universes containing 
closed time-like curves to a particular physical law, the second law of thermodynamics, 
renders such universes physically impossible, even though they are modelled on the 
basis of another physical law, Einstein's field equations. 
Let us consider the two assumptions which have to be made in order to reach the 
conclusion that universes containing closed time-like curves are physically impossible. 
Firstly, we need to assume that the existence of closed time-like curves in a universe 
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does actually render that universe incompatible with the second law of thermodynamics. 
The paradox which arises if we attempt to apply Einstein's signalling technique along 
an entire closed time-like curve certainly seems to suggest that such curves are 
incompatible with the second law. 
The second assumption which we need to make if we are to conclude that 
universes containing closed time-like curves are physically impossible is that a universe 
is physically possible only if it conforms to all physical laws. We need to be clear 
however about what we mean by "all physical laws". The fact that the universe which 
we inhabit conforms to a particular set of physical laws does not necessarily indicate 
that the only universes which are physically possible are those which conform to the 
same set of physical laws. 
Might there not be other possible physical laws than those which obtain in our 
universe? If so, then a universe which conformed to these other physical laws would be 
physically possible. It may be that universes are physically possible which only conform 
to some of the physical laws to which our universe conforms, or it may indeed be that 
universes are physically possible which do not conform to any of the physical laws to 
which our universe conforms. Thus to assume that a universe is physically possible only 
if it conforms to all physical laws, where by "all physical laws" we mean "all the 
physical laws to which our universe conforms", is to make an assumption which cannot 
simply be taken for granted. We can see that this line of thought leads to the alternative 
response to the paradox arising from Einstein's signalling technique. 
(b) Arguing For The Physical Possibility Of Universes R*ich Do Not Conform To 
All The Physical Laws To "ich Our Universe Conforms 
Although Godelian universes do not appear to be compatible with the second law of 
thermodynamics, is there anything to prevent us assuming that a universe is physically 
possible even if it does not conform to all the physical laws to which our universe 
conforms? 
Our universe conforms to a particular set of physical laws, which I shall term Set 
One. We can therefore deduce that universes which conform to Set One are physically 
possible. 11 Let us suppose, for purposes of illustration, that Set One consists of just two 
14 It may be that only some of the universes which conform to Set One are physically possible, those which 
also satisfy a certain set of initial conditions. This is a complication which I will set to one side at this 
stage. 
Thermodynamics And The Direction Of Time 137 
physical laws, Lj and L2. in other words that our universe conforms to Just two physi 
laws. 
Set One = 'I L 1, 
L21 
It is possible to envisage at least three other sets as follows. 
Set Two= tIL 1, M2) 
Set Three = tA/11, L21 
Set Four= f MI, A4'21 
All the sets consist of the same number of physical laws as the number of 
physical laws to which our universe conforms. However, in the cases of Sets Two and 
Three, one of the physical laws of which the set consists is not a physical law to which 
our universe conforms. In the case of Set Four neither of the physical laws of which the 
set consists are physical laws to which our universe conforms. 
We can see therefore that there are a variety of different approaches we can take 
when assessing the physical possibility of a universe. The strictest approach to physical 
possibility is to require that unless a universe conforms to every physical law to which 
our universe conforms, Set One in the example above, it is not physically possible. The 
most lenient approach is to allow that even universes which do not conform to any of 
the physical laws to which our universe conforms, Set Four in the example above, are 
physically possible. 15 
In the light of this analysis, we can see that Godel appears only to require that a 
universe should conform to one physical law from our universe, Einstein's field 
equations, for it to be physically possible. If universes containing closed time-like 
curves are incompatible with the second law of thermodynamics, we might require that 
a universe should conform to this law as well as to Einstein's field equations for it to be 
physically possible. Likewise, when we consider other physical laws to which our 
universe conforms, we will have to consider whether universes containing closed time- 
like curves are compatible with these laws, and if not, whether we wish the to deny 
physical possibility to universes containing closed time-like curves on that basis. 
An important point to note, however, is that whether we require a logically 
15 Additionally, universes may be physically possible which conform to more or less physical laws than the 
physical laws to which our universe conforms. I shall set this consideration to one side. 
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possible universe to conform to all or some or none of the physical laws to which our 
own universe conforms before we allow that such a universe is physically possible, 
there does not appear to be any means of testing our requirement. The most coherent 
claim we can make in this context is that a universe is at least physically possible if it 
conforms to all the physical laws to which our own universe conforms, given that we 
know that one universe which conforms to all the physical laws to which our own 
universe conforms actually exists, namely our own universe. Whether however logically 
possible universes which do not conform to all the physical laws to which our universe 
conforms are nonetheless physically possible appears to be undecideable. 
4 Is It Alwa s Possible To Give An Objectively Distinguished Present Account Of y 
Universes Which Conform To The Second Law Of Thermodynamics? 
Let us consider an arbitrary universe, which I will refer to as U0, which conforms to the 
second law of thermodynamics. Is it always the case that it will be possible to give an 
objectively distinguished present account of UO? 
We have already seen that a universe which contains closed time-like curves 
cannot conform to the second law of thermodynamics. Therefore, if Uo conforms to the 
second law of thermodynamics, it cannot contain problematic space-time structures 
such as closed time-like cw-ves. Indeed, it cannot by implication contain any space-time 
structure which is incompatible with the second law of thermodynamics. 
In order for (10 to conform to the cosmological]6 version of the second law of 
thermodynamics, the following conditions must hold. 
(IT I) A sequence of global time slices can be identified in UO such that the time slice 
with the lowest entropy and the time slice with the highest entropy are at 
opposite ends of the sequence. 
(T2) For any two adjacent global time slices in UO, the time slice which is nearer to 
the time slice with the highest entropy has either the same or a higher entropy 
than the time slice which is further from the time slice with the highest entropy. 
Notice that I am now assigning an entropy to a global time slice as a whole. This 
would involve adding all the entropies of those systems which are contained in the time 
slice at the moment of time defined by the time slice. Since the time slice is global, it 
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constitutes an isolated system, and therefore its entropy constitutes the entropy of the 
universe UO at the moment of time defined by the time slice. If (T I) and (T2) hold for 
UO, therefore, the second law of thermodynamics holds for (Jo. It appears in principle, 
therefore, that if a structurally simple universe like UO is compatible with the second 
law of thermodynamics, at least the cosmological formulation of that law, it must be 






global time slice ti., 
global time slice t, 
to 
Fig. 5.3 A structurally simple universe U0, shown on the left, can be foliated into 
a sequence of global time slices. One arbitrary pair of time slices is shown in detail 
on the fight. If Uo satisfies conditions (TI) and (T2) (see text), and if t, has a 
higher entropy than to, then a temporal orientation can be assigned to the universe 
as indicated by the arrow which points from earlier moments to later moments. 
The representation of the universe is based on the representation of a universe 
given by Penrose 1989, p. 325 (see footnote 19). 
However, the ability to define a sequence of global time slices in a universe is 
precisely what is required if we wish to be able to giVe a physically distinguished 
present account of the temporal metaphysics of that universe. Therefore it appears that 
16 Confer footnote 10. 
17 Assuming that a temporal orientation can be assigned to Uo, it can be represented as having a first 
moment, 10, and a last moment, 1, Following Penrose 1989,1 have represented the spatial extension of the 
universe on the horizontal axis and the temporal duration of the universe on the vertical axis. The universe 
is thus shown expanding from some initial point to for half of its duration before contracting again to some 
final point t, The diagram is a simplification, since the so-called "big crunch", the final stage of the 
universe, may be very different from the "big bang", the initial stage of the universe. Indeed, the final stage 
would appear to be necessarily different to the initial stage if the universe conforms to the second law of 
thermodynamics, since the final stage has a high entropy whilst the initial stage has a low entropy. The 
requirement with which we are concerned, however, is that a sequence of global time slices should be 
definable. I have represented the time slices as lines, but this representation is not intended to preclude the 
possibility that a time slice, a moment of tme, may have a "thickness" or duration. 
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any universe which conforms to the second law of thermodynamics is one of which it is 
possible to give a physically distinguished present account. 
6 Conclusion 
I have suggested in this chapter that a universe can only conform to the second law of 
thermodynamics if it is possible to define at least one sequence of global time slices 
along which entropy increases, where that sequence conforms to conditions (TI) and 
(T2). This sequence is capable of constituting the privileged sequence of global time 
slices which a physically distinguished present account requires. Thus a universe which 
conforms to the second law of thermodynamics is a universe of which a physically 
distinguished present account could be given. 
A presentist can assert that only one global time slice actually exists, all the 
other time slices in the sequence being merely theoretical constructs. A growing block 
universe theorist or growing determinacy theorist can assert that although some or all of 
the time slices in the sequence exist, one of the time slices is objectively distinct from 
the other time slices. 
In the context of demonstrating that a paradox arises when a thermodynamic 
system is placed on a closed time-like curve, I investigated the second law of 
thermodynamics. This law can be viewed as a constraint upon the physical possibility of 
a universe. I considered whether, if a universe did not conform to the second law of 
thermodynamics, we would be entitled to consider it physically impossible. 
This suggests the structure of a more general argument against Godelian 
universes, based on the possibility that such universes might not conform to all the 
physical laws to which our universe conforms. It can be argued, as was examined in the 
current chapter, that unless a universe conforms to all the physical laws to which our 






I begin this chapter by examining the wave-like and particle-like behaviour of quantum 
entities. This acts as a prelude to an examination of various interpretations of quantum 
mechanics. I consider the concept of measurement implied by the different 
interpretations, before addressing whether performing a measurement upon a quantum 
system produces an irreversible evolution in the state of that system. I consider an 
argument due to Penrose (1989) in favour of the conclusion that quantum measurement 
produces irreversible state evolutions. However, I also consider a demonstration by 
Aharanov, Bergmann and Lebowitz (ABL) that it is possible to prepare quantum 
systems in such a way that reversible measurements can be made upon them. ABL 
suggest that it is the irreversibility of time in the universe as a whole which is reflected 
in the irreversibility of measurement at the quantum level. The various results obtained 
in this chapter turn out to have implications for the physical possibility of G6delian 
universes, and this is examined in chapter 7. 
2 The Wave-Like And Particle-Like Behaviour Of Quantum Entities 
One of the factors which led to the formulation of quantum mechanics was the 
observation that very small material entities, of the order of 10-11 m in size, can exhibit 
two types of behaviour. 
On the one hand, very small material entities can behave as if they are point 
particles, localized in space. On the other hand, they can behave as if they are waves, 
spread out in space. An experiment exists which lucidly illustrates this dual nature of 
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matter. The experiment in question, known as the two slit experiment, consists of the 
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Fig. 6.1 The apparatus for the two slit experiment consists of a 
source, a barrier with two slits A and B, and a screen. What is 
emitted from the source depends upon the particular version of 
the experiment which is being carried out. The diagram is 
based on the one given by Coveney and Highfield 1990, p. 122. 
For the first version of the experiment, suppose that the source emits classical 
particles', that is, particles which are much larger than atoms such as, for example, 
tennis balls. If the source emits these particles one at a time in the general direction of 
the barrier, a wall with two slits in it, then these particles either hit the barrier and are 
deflected, or they pass through slit A or through slit B. The particles which pass through 
the barrier accumulate at the screen at point X or point Y, as illustrated in figure 6.2 (a). 
For the second version of the experiment, suppose that the source consists of an 
oscillating lever which is placed in a water tank along with the barrier and the screen. 
The source then emits waves, and each wave emitted by the source passes through both 
slit A and slit B, so that A and B act as secondary sources of waves. The waves emitted 
from A and B interfere so that where the peak of a wave from A meets the trough of a 
wave from B, the waves cancel, and where the peak of a wave from A meets the peak of 
a wave from B, or where the trough of a wave from A meets the trough of a wave from 
B, the waves re-enforce. If the screen detects the height of a wave, then an interference 
pattern is produced on it, as illustrated in figure 6.2(b). 
I In reality, there are no such entities as classical particles, since the description of an entity's behaviour 
provided by quantum mechanics is theoretically applicable at any scale. At macroscopic scales, however, 
effects arising from the quantum behaviour of an entity are usually undetectable, so that it is legitimate to 
treat such entities as classical. That is, their behaviour is describable in terms of classical Newtonian laws 
of physics. 
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Fig. 6.2 (a) The two slit experiment conducted with a source emitting classical particles. 
Particles accumulate at points X or Y on the screen. (b) The two slit experiment conducted 
with a source emitting waves, or quantum entities exhibiting both wave-like and particle-like 
behaviour. An interference pattern builds up on the screen. Dark regions correspond to high 
wave intensity, light regions to low wave intensity. Slits A and B act as secondary wave 
sources. The diagram is based on the one given by Coveney and Highfield 1990, p. 122. 
For the third version of the experiment, suppose that the source emits quantum 
entities, that is, entities which are the size of atoms or smaller such as, for example, 
electrons or photons. The screen used in this version of the experiment detects the 
arrival of a quantum entity by, for example, changing from a light colour to a dark 
colour. 2 If we design the source so that it only emits one entity at a time, we might 
expect the pattern illustrated in figure 6.2 (a) to gradually build up over time on the 
screen as the number of entities emitted increases. What we find, however, is that the 
pattern illustrated in figure 6.2 (b) builds up over time. This indicates that, although the 
source is only emitting one quantum entity at a time, the wave-like aspect of the entity 
leads to an interference effect. The entity behaves like a wave after it is emitted, passing 
through both slits in the barrier, the two resultant waves interfering. However, if we 
were to observe the screen, we would find that the entity is only detected at one point on 
the screen when the entity arrives there. The screen, which in effect measures the 
position of the entity, causes the entity to cease to behave like a wave and instead to 
behave like a particle. 
If we consider the first version of the two slit experiment, it is evident that if we 
have a complete description of the velocity of a classical particle, that is, its speed and 
the direction in which it is travelling, then we can predict whether it will hit the barrier 
or pass through one of the slits to hit the screen. We can also predict which, if either, of 
the slits it will pass through, and therefore which, if either, of the points X and Y on the 
screen it will hit. 
2 Where the quantum entities being emitted are photons, for example, an undeveloped photographic film 
can be used which permanently changes colour at the point where it is exposed to a photon. 
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In the third version of the two slit experiment, however, the quantum mechanical 
description of the quantum entity just after it is emitted by the source does not predict 
either through which slit the entity will pasS3, or at which point on the screen the entity 
will be detected. The quantum mechanical description merely assigns a probability that 
the entity will be detected in a particular spatial interval on the screen. There is thus a 
high probability that the entity will be detected in one of the intervals where the waves 
from A and B re-enforce at the screen, and a low probability that the entity will be 
detected in one of the intervals where the waves from A and B cancel at the screen. 
In general, the quantum mechanical description of the position of a quantum 
entity indicates the probability of finding that entity in a particular interval of space. 
Similarly, the quantum mechanical description of the momentum of a quantum entity 
indicates the probability of finding that entity with a particular momentum. 4 Therefore, 
in the two slit experiment, we can be sure that if a thousand quantum entities are 
emitted one by one, an interference pattern will build up on the screen composed of a 
thousand entity detections by the screen. However, for any particular quantum entity, we 
can only give a probability of where it will be detected on the screen. 
The quantum mechanical description of a quantum entity such as a photon 
emitted by the source in the two slit experiment is given in terms of the wave function 
of that entity. 5 The behaviour of a quantum entity as described by the wave function of 
that entity is reversible in time. 6 Suppose that the wave function implies that the 
probability of finding a particular quantum entity in the spatial interval P is 0.1 at 
moment ti and 0.2 at moment tj. 7 From the point of view of the wave function 
description, ti could be either before or after tj. If we think of the wave function as 
implying the set of possible trajectories of a quantum entity over a period of time, then 
the temporal reversibility of the wave function implies that a quantum entity could 
3 Indeed, if we attempt to detect through which slit the entity passes, which amounts to measuring its 
position at the barrier, the entity ceases to behave like a wave, and behaves instead like a particle. In this 
case a classical pattern like that illustrated in figure 6.2 (a) builds up on the screen. 
4 The momentum of a particle is its mass multiplied by its velocity. Position and momentum in quantum 
mechanics are related by Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, which indicates that the more precisely we 
measure the position of a quantum entity, the less precisely we can measure its momentum, and vice versa. 
A similar relationship pertains between energy and time. The more precisely we measure the energy which 
a quantum entity has, the less precisely we can determine the particular moment of time at which the entity 
has that energy. 
5 An account of the mathematical representation of wave functions, and the methods of obtaining 
information from them by performing mathematical operations upon them, can be found in Beiser 1987, 
chapter 5. See also Hughes 1989, chapter 2. 
6 To be precise, the Schr6dinger equation which represents the wave function of a quantum entity is 
invariant under Wigner transformations, but is not invariant under I --> -1. 
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travel in either direction along a particular trajectory over a period of time. 
In the two slit experiment, the wave function describes, in probabilistic terms, 
the behaviour of a quantum entity from the moment it is emitted from the source to the 
moment it is detected at the screen. However, once the entity is detected at the screen, 
the wave function which described its behaviour until the moment of detection no 
longer provides a valid description. This is evident if we consider what the wave 
function implies about the position of the entity. On the basis of the wave function, we 
can only calculate a probability between I and 0 that the entity is located in a particular 
interval on the screen. So, for example, the wave function might imply that there is a 
probability of 0.2 that the entity is located in some interval P on the screen. However, 
since the screen detects the entity, we can say precisely where the entity is when it hits 
the screen. If the entity is in fact detected in the interval P, we can say there is a 
probability of I that the entity is located in the interval P. 
The detection of the location of a quantum entity by the screen in the two slit 
experiment implies that the wave function which described the behaviour of the entity 
previously is no longer suitable as a description of the behaviour of that entity. 
Detection of the position of a quantum entity, which constitutes a position 
measurement, produces an irreversible change in the behaviour of that entity, which is 
popularly termed the "collapse of the wave function". 8 After detection, the behaviour of 
the quantum entity has to be given in terms of a new wave function, and the behaviour 
of the quantum entity before it was detected cannot be retrodicted from this new wave 
function. Measurement therefore appears to introduce irreversibility into the description 
of the behaviour of a quantum entity. 9 In section 4 of the current chapter I will consider 
evidence for and against the claim that measurement does indeed introduce 
irreversibility in the way that it appears to do. I will examine an argument from 
Penrose'O which supports the claim that measurement introduces irreversibility into the 
7 Note that a wave function only tells us the probability of finding a quantum entity in a particular spatial 
interval. The wave function actually gives a probability of zero of finding a quantum entity at a specific 
point in space. 
8 The expression "collapse of the wave function" is potentially misleading, suggesting as it does that some 
kind of physical collapse occurs at the moment that a measurement is made upon a quantum system. The 
mathematical representation of quantum mechanics reveals only that a measurement provides us with a 
determinate value for some physical variable such as position. The mathematical representation does not 
express how this value derives from the state of the quantum system just prior to the measurement. 
9 It is interesting to note in this context that Einstein comments, in his short reply to G6del, that 
11 according to ourpresent knoit, ledge, all elementary processes are reversible" (Einstein 1949, p. 688, italics 
in original). He is contrasting elementary processes with the growth of entropy, which the second law of 
thermodynamics implies is irreversible. Whilst it is not entirely clear what would count as an elementary 
process for Einstein in this context, he is apparently ignoring the fact that measurement appears to 
introduce irreversibility into a system's evolution through time. 
10 Confer Penrose 1989. 
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description of the behaviour of quantum entities, and an argument from Aharanov, 
Bergmann and Lebowitz' I which may cast some doubt on this claim. 
Given that the wave function of a quantum entity only tells us the probability of 
finding that entity at a particular spatial location at a particular moment in time, it might 
appear tempting to interpret the wave function as a description of how much we know 
about the entity. This interpretation would imply that the entity is really at a definite 
location, even when a measurement is not being performed upon it, but that we can only 
assign a probability to where it is likely to be when we are not performing a 
measurement. The physicist David Bohm interpreted quantum mechanics in this way. 
On the other hand, the fact that a single quantum entity in the two slit 
experiment lands at a point on the screen which constitutes part of an interference 
pattern, rather than part of a classical distribution, may indicate that whilst the quantum 
entity is passing through the two slits, it is not localized in space, but is rather behaving 
like a wave which passes through both of the slits. It is therefore possible to interpret the 
wave function as representing not the state of our knowledge, but the wave-like nature 
of the quantum entity when it is not being measured. 
Just as there is more than one way to interpret the wave function of a quantum 
entity, so there is more than one way to interpret the theory of quantum mechanics as a 
whole. Indeed, the interpretation placed upon the wave function often forms the basis 
for the overall interpretation of quantum mechanics. In the next section, therefore, I am 
going to consider a variety of interpretations of quantum mechanics which have been 
proposed since the theory was first formulated. As will become apparent, the 
implications of quantum mechanics for temporal metaphysics depend to some extent on 
the interpretation placed upon quantum mechanics. 
3 Theories Of Quantum Mechanics 
Whilst I have yet to examine whether performing a measurement on a quantum system 12 
brings about an irreversible change in the evolution of that system, a useful preliminary 
to such an examination is an assessment of what constitutes a measurement and what 
constitutes a quantum system. There are a number of different theories of quantum 
mechanics, and the various theories imply different concepts of measurement and 
different concepts of quantum system. There is no general agreement as to which, if any, 
of these theories is correct. 
II Confer Aharanov, Bergmann and Lebowitz 1964. 
12 1 will sometimes refer to "a measurement on a quantum system" as a quat7fllM measurement. 
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I am therefore going to consider the various theories of quantum mechanics 
which are available, and the concepts of measurement and quantum system implied by 
them, before attempting to assess what implications the various theories have for the 
debate between the advocates of static block universe accounts and objectively 
distinguished present accounts of temporal metaphysics. 
(a) The Copenhagen Interpretation 
Niels Bohi-13, whose theoretical work contributed significantly towards the development 
of quantum mechanics, adopted an approach towards the interpretation of a 
measurement on a quantum system which has remained popular, particularly amongst 
those physicists who do not consider investigating the philosophical implications of 
quantum mechanics to be part of their role. Bohr's approach, which is usually referred 
to as the Copenhagen14 interpretation, is based upon the premise that our natural 
languages15 can only satisfactorily describe the contents of our experience. We 
experience the physical world as "classical", as composed of physical objects which are 
much larger than atoms and which broadly obey Newtonian mechanics. Our natural 
languages therefore have developed in order to describe the behaviour of such objects. 
Quantum mechanics however applies to entities which are much smaller than any 
objects of which we can have a direct experience. Therefore, any attempt to explain in a 
natural language what the mathematical procedures of quantum mechanics represent 
must inevitably fail. 
In order to perform a measurement, we employ large objects such as lamps, 
screens and photo-cells which our natural languages are well-suited to describing. 
However, when we are making a measurement upon a quantum entity, our languages 
are not equipped to describe the behaviour of the entity itself 
This line of thought led Bohr and other physicists who played an important part 
in formulating quantum mechanics such as Max BOM16 and Werrier Heisenberg17 to 
conclude that we are incapable of translating the mathematical procedures of quantum 
mechanics into a natural language description of what is happening at the quantum 
13 Confer Bohr 1935,1935a. 
14 Copenhagen was the city where Bohr lived and worked. 
15 A natural language is a language which has developed amongst a language community over many 
generations in a largely uncoordinated fashion to serve many different purposes. It can be distinguished 
from a formal language devised to serve a specific purpose. 
16 Confer Born 1926. 
17 Confer Heisenberg 1927. 
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level. 18 We have to be content with the fact that the mathematical procedures appear to 
give us the correct results at the macroscopic level. 
This approach, which is essentially instrumentalist (a description more 
appropriately applied to Heisenberg than to Bohr, in fact) implies that the mathematical 
procedures of quantum mechanics are useful tools, but tools whose intrinsic meaning 
cannot be understood. Indeed, Bohr and some of his successors make the stronger claim, 
which is reminiscent of logical positivism in its import, that it is not simply that we 
cannot describe what is happening at the quantum level, but that there is nothing to be 
described. Bohr expresses this thought as follows. 
"There is no quantum world. There is only an abstract quantum description. " 
(Bohr, quoted by Herbert 1985, p. 17) 
For Bohr, quantum entities are only real when they are measured. This is in fact 
a metaphysical claim, since there is no more evidence that quantum entities are not real 
when they are not being measured than that they are real. What we might term the 
strong version of the Copenhagen interpretation is therefore as problematic as any 
theory which asserts the reality of quantum entities when they are not being measured. 
The weak version of the Copenhagen interpretation, the version which asserts 
that we are not entitled to deduce anything about the nature of reality at the quantum 
level from the mathematical procedures of quantum mechanics, limits us to describing 
the mechanics and results of measurement without any possibility of understanding 
what is happening at the level of quantum entities. As such, it implies that we adopt 
Wittgenstem's advice, in this case in relation to quantum entities. 
"Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent. " (Wittgenstem 1922, 
P. 189) 
This approach, whilst coherent, is philosophically dissatisfying and has not 
prevented numerous other interpretations being offered as to what happens when a 
measurement is made upon a quantum system. 
18 The term "quantum level" is used here to denote scales of the order of 10-11 m and smaller, the atomic 
scale. As pointed out previously, however, the distinction between the quantum and classical levels is an 
artificial one since quantum mechanics applies at all scales, though its effects are only evident on the 
atomic scale. Confer footnote 1. 
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(b) The Conscious Observer Account 
In order to demonstrate the implications of the wave function account of the evolution 
of a quantum system which he had formulated, Erwin Schrodinger devised a thought 
experiment which has come to be known as Schreidinger's cal. Schr6dinger describes 
the experiment as follows. 
"A cat is penned up in a steel chamber, along with the following diabolical 
device (which must be secured against direct interference by the cat): in a Geiger 
counter there is a tiny bit of radioactive substance, so small, that perhaps in the 
course of one hour one of the atoms decays, but also, with equal probability, 
perhaps none, if it happens, the counter tube discharges and through a relay 
releases a hammer which shatters a small flask of hydrocyanic acid. If one has 
left this entire system to itself for an hour, one would say that the cat still lives if 
meanwhile no atom has decayed. The first atomic decay would have poisoned it. 
The V-function of the entire system would express this by having in it the living 
and the dead cat (pardon the expression) mixed or smeared out in equal parts. " 
(Schrodinger 1935, p. 157) 
This thought experiment has the effect of magnifying up to the macroscopic 
level the indeterminacy which is implied by the wave function description of a system at 
the quantum level. The wave function of the sample of radioactive substance evolves 
into a superposition of states, one part of the wave function relating to the situation in 
which an atom in the sample has not decayed, the other part of the wave function 
relating to the situation in which an atom in the sample has decayed. As the experiment 
is devised, each part of the wave function has an amplitude of IN2, indicating that there 
is a probability of one half that an atom in the sample will be found to have decayed 
when the chamber is opened at the end of an hour. However, if an atom does decay, this 
will have the effect of releasing the poison into the chamber and killing the cat. 
Therefore, there is also a probability of one half that the cat will be found dead when the 
chamber is opened at the end of an hour. 
As the experiment is presented, it is the opening of the chamber at the end of an 
hour which constitutes a measurement upon the quantum system. Therefore, until the 
measurement is made, the entire system inside the chamber, including the cat, is in a 
superposition of states. The notion of a macroscopic object such as a cat evolving into a 
superposition of states, one state in which the cat is alive and another state in which the 
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cat is dead, is one which clearly does not conform with our experience of the physical 
world. Schr6dinger's thought experiment, therefore, serves to Illustrate just how unlike 
the physical world as we experience it is the physical world implied by the wave 
function representation, if, contrary to the Copenhagen interpretation, we allow that the 
wave function representation has any implications at all. 
One use of Schr6dinger's thought experiment, aside from providing a graphic 
illustration of the nature of the physical world when that world is described in quantum 
mechanical terms, is to provide a context in which answers to the question of what 
constitutes a measurement upon a quantum system can be formulated. If, for example, 
we accept that the system in the chamber in Schrodinger's thought experiment evolves 
into a superposition of states'9 and remains in a superposition until someone opens the 
chamber, then this raises the question of what distinguishes the chamber when it is 
closed ftorn the chamber when it is opened. The answer seems to be that when the 
chamber is opened the system within it is observed. 
Various theorists, including John von Neumann and Eugene Wigner, both of 
whom contributed to the formulation and development of quantum mechaniCS20, broadly 
accepted the description of Schrodinger's thought experiment as it stands. According to 
the account which such theorists propose, the quantum system inside the chamber, 
which includes the cat, does indeed evolve into a superposition. Furthermore, the system 
only "collapses" from a superposition into a determinate state when an observer opens 
the chamber. The assertion in this account which distinguishes it from other accounts 
which we will consider is that it is the fact that the observer is conscious which leads to 
the instantaneous transition of the quantum system from an indeterminate superposition 
into a determinate state. I shall therefore term this the conscious observer account. In 
general, the conscious observer account states that a quantum system which evolves into 
a superposition remains in a superposition until a conscious observer intervenes in the 
system. This claim has two significant implications. 
Schrodinger's thought experiment implies that if a macroscopic physical object 
such as a Geiger counter interacts with a quantum entity in a superposition, then the 
macroscopic physical object enters into a superposition along with the quantum entity, 
provided that no conscious observer is observing the macroscopic object. If, therefore, a 
piece of measuring apparatus is used to detect whether a radioactive sample has decayed 
19 Strictly, it is the wave function representing the system which evolves into a superposition of states. For 
convenience, however, I shall sometimes speak about a system evolving into a superposition, rather than 
the wave function which represents the system. 
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or not, the wave function of the system consisting of the measuring apparatus plus the 
radioactive sample evolves into a superposition. One part of the wave function relates to 
the apparatus having recorded a decay and the other part of the wave function relates to 
the apparatus having recorded no decay. The wave function describing the apparatus 
and sample remains in a superposition for as long as no conscious observer observes the 
measuring apparatus. 
Suppose that someone looks at the measuring apparatus. Given that a human eye 
is a macroscopic physical object like a piece of measuring apparatus, it would be 
consistent to expect that the wave function describing the eye, apparatus and sample 
would evolve into a superposition. Similarly, since the human brain is a macroscopic 
physical object, it would be consistent to expect that the wave function describing the 
brain, eye, apparatus and sample would evolve into a superposition. 
According to the conscious observer account, however, when the observer 
observing a quantum system is conscious, the consciousness of the observer causes the 
transition of the wave function of the system out of a superposition and into a 
determinate state. The conscious observer account therefore implies that consciousness 
is distinct from the physical brain, since consciousness does not enter into a 
superposition along with the physical brain, but rather collapses any superposition into a 
determinate state. 21 
A second implication is evident when we consider Schr6dinger's original 
thought experiment. If we accept that the wave function describing the system inside the 
chamber, including the cat, is in a superposition until a conscious observer opens the 
chamber, this implies that the cat does not count as a conscious observer, and therefore 
effectively restricts consciousness, at least of the kind required to collapse wave 
functions, to human beings. On some versions of the conscious observer account, 
however, the cat never enters into a superposition because the cat is considered to 
possess a sufficient level of consciousness to collapse the wave function. This then 
raises the question of what level of consciousness is required to cause wave function 
collapse. Would an amoeba, for example, possess sufficient consciousness to collapse a 
wave function? 
20 Confer von Neumann 1932, Wigner 1961,1963. Von Neumann 1932 was completed before 
Schr6dinger formulated his thought experiment. 
21 It could be argued that it is the physical structure of the brain which collapses a wave function out of a 
superposition, so that a brain never in fact enters into a superposition. In this case, it would not be 
necessary to conceive of consciousness as something distinct from the physical brain. However, an account 
would still be required of what it is about the physical structure of the brain which enables the brain to 
collapse a wave function out of a superposition. Confer Penrose 1989, chapter 9. 
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The conscious observer account is problematic because it is couched in terms of 
consciousness, a concept which is problematic in itself The account implies that 
consciousness is not physical and, partly as a consequence of the implied non- 
physicality of consciousness, the actual mechanism by which consciousness causes a 
wave function in a superposition to collapse into a determinate state remains 
mysterious. Nonetheless, the account does at least provide us with a precise definition 
of what constitutes a measurement upon a quantum system, and it implies a definition 
of what constitutes a quantum system. A measurement occurs when a conscious 
observer observes a quantum system. A quantum system is a system which can be 
described by a wave function and which therefore can evolve into a superposition of 
states. 
Dissatisfaction with the conscious observer account has suggested two opposing 
strategies to theorists. On the one hand, some theorists have attempted to extend 
classical determinacy down to the quantum level. This approach is employed in hidden 
variable accounts of measurement and also in a theory developed by David Bohm. 22 On 
the other hand, some theorists have proposed that quantum indeterminacy extends all 
the way up to the level of the observer and beyond. This is the approach adopted by 
advocates of the many worlds and many minds theories. I will consider these two types 
of approach over the next four sections. 
(c) Hidden Variable Theories 
Schrodinger's wave function representation of quantum entities implies that such 
entities are fundamentally indeterminate when no measurement is being performed 
upon them, apparently capable of existing in more than one state at the same time . 
23 
Some theorists, confronted with the kind of implications of the wave function 
representation which are made evident by Schrodinger's cat, have argued that the 
indeterminacy implied by the representation indicates that the representation cannot be 
complete. One response has been to propose that there are various properties of a 
quantum system which are not measurable, the so-called hidden variables of the 
quantum system, and that it is these variables which determine the outcome of a 
22 It can be argued that Bohm's theory is itself a hidden variable account. I have refrained from describing 
Bohm's theory as a hidden variable account, however, since Basil Hiley, a long standing collaborator with 
Bohm, and my tutor whilst I was studying physics at B. Sc. level, informed me that Bohm himself used to 
insist that his theory was not a hidden variable account, on the grounds that none of the variables in his 
theory were, in fact, hidden. 
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particular measurement upon such a SyStern. 24 
If hidden variables exist, it may be that advances in experimental technique will 
eventually allow us to measure them, or it may be that they are by their very nature 
inaccessible to measurement. The advantage of postulating such variables however is 
that they permit us to interpret a quantum system as determinate even when no 
measurement is being performed upon the system. The hidden variable approach 
implies that the wave function description of a quantum system is only a partial 
representation of such a system, and that the apparent indeterminacy of an unmeasured 
quantum system is a consequence of the failure to represent the hidden variables in the 
wave function. 
A simple analogy can be used to illustrate the concept underlying the hidden 
variable approach. Suppose that a six-sided die is thrown one hundred times. It is found 
that the die lands forty-six times displaying a one on its uppermost face, and fifty-four 
times displaying a six on its uppermost face. We can describe the behaviour of this die 
by stating that the probability of the die displaying a one or a six is approximately a half 
in each case. Our description contains no explanation of why the die lands as it does, 
however. 
We now cut the die in half and discover that there is a hollow tube between the 
face with a one on it and the face with a six on it. A lead weight is located in the tube 
and can move freely along it. The tube is designed in such a way that the face of the die 
which is uppermost when the die lands is determined by the way in which the die is 
thrown. 
The hidden variable approach to quantum mechanics suggests that describing a 
quantum system in terms of a wave function is akin to describing the die in the example 
above in terms of the probability of the die landing with a particular face up. The 
description of the behaviour of the die in probabilistic terms suggests that whether the 
die lands on any particular occasion with a six or a one showing is not determined. 
However, there are factors in this situation, the hollow tube and the disposition of the 
lead weight within it, which, if they were included in the description of the die, would 
allow us to give a completely deterministic account of the behaviour of the die. The 
suggestion made by those who favour the hidden variable approach is that there are 
23 Heisenberg's matrix representation of quantum entities similarly implies the indeterminacy of such 
entities. Therefore, the hidden variable theories are as much a response to Heisenberg's representation as 
they are to Schr6dinger's representation. 
24 Confer Bell 1966. 
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factors in a quantum system which are hidden, and that these factors are not represented 
by the wave function description of such a system. Were these factors evident, however, 
it would be clear that the behaviour of a quantum system is in fact deterministic. 
Whilst it is evident that this approach will appeal to any theorist who is 
uncomfortable with the claim that quantum systems are indeterminate, it can be 
demonstrated mathematically that the statistical results predicted by the mathematical 
representation of quantum systems, as that representation is formulated in standard 
quantum mechanics, place certain constraints upon the properties of any hidden variable 
theories which can be postulated for such systems. In order for a hidden variable theory 
to predict a set of results which match the statistical predictions of standard quantum 
theory, that is, quantum theory which does not employ hidden variables, a hidden 
variable theory must conform to these mathematical constraints. 25 
In particular, it appears that if we wish to make determinate predictions using a 
hidden variable theory in such a way that a sufficiently large number of such predictions 
reproduce the statistical patterns predicted by standard quantum mechanics, then our 
hidden variable theory will need to be both contextual and non-local. 
A contextual hidden variable theory is one in which a Hermitian operator, the 
mathematical object which represents a physical quantity in quantum mechanics, can 
represent different physical quantities if that operator belongs to more than one set of 
mutually compatible operators. Which physical quantity the operator is taken to 
represent would depend upon the context of the set of operators in which we are 
considering the operator. 
A non-local hidden variable theory is one in which the hidden variables 
describing quantum systems which are spatially separated are not independent of one 
another. 
The import of these two constraints upon hidden variable theories may not be 
immediately obvious, but it will suffice to note that the constraints exist. 
The main point to note in the present context is that hidden variable theories, if 
they can be constructed at all, may imply that quantum systems have features which are 
as problematic as the indeterminacy which the hidden variable theories are designed to 
alleviate. 
If a hidden variable version of quantum mechanics could be formulated, the 
implication would be that a quantum entity has a determinate existence even when it is 
not being measured. Therefore the perceived role of measurement in relation to a 
25 Confer Hughes 1989, chapter 6, especially section 8. 
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quantum entity would change. In standard quantum mechanics, as we have seen, 
measurement appears to cause the transition of a quantum entity from an indeterminate 
superposition into a determinate state. If, however, a quantum entity is in a determinate 
state even before it is measured, then the measurement is simply establishing what that 
determinate state is, rather than actually bringing it about. Under the auspices of hidden 
variable theories, therefore, a measurement is just that, an intervention in a system 
which establishes the state of that system, but which does not bring about a fundamental 
transition in the state of determinacy of that system. A quantum system, in this context, 
is any system of which a hidden variable account is required. 
If a quantum entity is determinate at all times, as a hidden variable theory would 
imply, this ral III ajectory through space-time is time-reversal ises the possibility that its tr 
invariant. Since full knowledge of the bidden variables in a system would permit us to 
predict with certainty the outcome of a measurement on that system, Penrose's 
probabilistic demonstration of irreversibility which I will consider in section 4(a) of the 
current chapter would no longer be relevant. This would not necessarily prove that the 
processes describable in terms of a hidden variable theory were reversible, however. 
It should be noted that not all hidden variable theories imply that we can 
describe and predict the behaviour of quantum entities with absolute certainty. 
Stochastic hidden variable theories only provide us with the probability that a quantum 
entity will have a particular value for a particular observable. The implication is that the 
values of the observables of quantum entities develop stochastically over time. Redhead 
describes stochastic hidden variable theories in the context of the Bell inequality26 as 
follows. 
"The idea of [stochastic hidden-variable] theories is that the 'complete' hidden- 
variable description of the source does not determine the values of local 
observables possessed by the two particles in the Bell type of experiment, but 
only the probabilities for possible values to occur. We can think picturesquely 
that the values of the spin-components in any given direction are developing in 
time stochastically, the state of the source controlling only the probabilities that 
26 The Bell inequality is an inequality between measurable correlation coefficients in a version of the EPR 
experiment in which spin-components of quantum entities are measured. The inequality arises as a 
consequence of assuming that a hidden variable account of quantum mechanics is compatible with a 
particular concept of "locality", to the effect that "A sharp value for an observable cannot be changed into 
another sharp value by altering the setting of a remote piece of apparatus. " (Redhead 1999, p. 82). Confer 
Bell 1964, Redhead 1989. 
Interpretations Of Quantum Mechanics 156 
particular values will be revealed when subsequent measurements are 
performed. " (Redhead 1989, pp. 98-9) 
Whilst it appears that a hidden variable theory is possible in principle, it is 
important to note that no such theory has as yet been successfully formulated. We have 
however observed some possible implications of the successful formulation of such a 
theory. 
(d) Bohm's Theoty 
Closely related to hidden variable theories in intent, although not in methodology, is a 
theory proposed by David Bohm in 1952.27 Bohm's theory implies that quantum entities 
are determinate even when they are not being measured, the same implication that a 
consistent hidden variable theory would have. 
According to Bohm, quantum entities such as electrons and photons are 
particles, and as such they always have a determinate position in space at a particular 
moment in time. What is required of Bohm's theory, therefore, is an explanation of the 
type of behaviour which occurs in experiments such as the two slit experiment 
considered in section 2 of the current chapter and the half-silvered mirror experiment 
which I will consider in section 4 of the current chapter, behaviour which suggests that 
quantum entities are behaving as if they were waves rather than particles. 
Whilst maintaining that a quantum entity such as an electron or a photon is a 
particle, Bohm argues that there is another type of quantum entity, the wave function 
itself According to Bohm, the wave function of a quantum entity is also a quantum 
entity, a component of the physical world just as an electron or a photon is a component 
of the physical world, but a different kind of quantum entity to the particulate quantum 
entities. Wave functions are spread out through space, and their evolution through time 
is described by exactly the same mathematical equations as those which describe the 
evolution through time of Schrodinger's wave functions. The only difference between 
Bohm's wave functions and Schrodinger's wave functions is one of interpretation. 
Whilst Schrodinger conceives of a wave function as representing a possible state of a 
quantum entity, when that entity is behaving like a wave rather than like a particle, 
Bohm conceives of a wave function as an entity in its own right, distinct from though 
27 The approach to quantum mechanics adopted by Bohm was first hinted at by Louis de Broglie in 1930. 
A refined version of Bohm's theory was proposed by John Bell in 1992. Confer De Broglie 1930, Bohm 
1951, Bohm 1952, Bell 1987. 
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associated with a particulate quantum entity. 
According to Bohm, a wave function has the effect of directing the trajectory Of 
a quantum particle through space, in such a way that the measured behaviour of the 
particle gives rise to the results predicted by standard quantum theory. We can note 
therefore that Bohm is not taking issue with the results predicted by standard quantum 
theory. One way of testing a theory is to compare the results which it predicts with the 
results obtained experimentally, and experimental results have consistently been in 
accord with the results predicted by standard quantum theory. What Bohm is rejecting is 
the interpretation of standard quantum theory which implies that quantum entities can 
exist in indeterminate states when no measurement is being performed upon them. The 
postulation of wave functions as actual physical existents alongside particulate quantum 
entities allows Bohm to reproduce the same predictions as standard quantum mechanics, 
but without thereby implying that particulate quantum entities can exist in indeten-ninate 
states. 
Since a particulate quantum entity remains a particle throughout its existence, 
there is no question of either it or the wave function which guides it "collapsing" when 
a measurement is made upon the particle. As in the hidden variable theories, a 
measurement according to Bohm's theory simply serves to establish where exactly a 
particle is at a particular moment of time. A measurement therefore does not bring 
about a transition from an indeterminate to a determinate state. Bohm's theory implies 
that even when we have discovered the location of a particle, the wave function which 
was guiding that particle remains. Bohm's theory also implies that we cannot perform 
measurements directly upon wave functions, but can only infer their existence and their 
behaviour by measuring the behaviour of the particles which they are guiding. A 
quantum system, in Bohm's account, is therefore any system of which a description in 
terms of wave functions can be given. 
Given that Bohm's theory implies that the state of quantum entities, both 
particles and wave functions, is always determinate, and given that it implies therefore 
that measurement does not induce a transition from indeterminacy to determinacy, we 
will see that as with hidden variable theories, Penrose's argument for the irreversibility 
of measurement of a quantum system, which I will consider in section 4(a) of the 
current chapter, is not applicable where that quantum system is conceived of from a 
Bohmian point of view. We can also note that as with hidden variable theories, this does 
not necessarily imply that processes which are describable in Bohmian terms are 
reversible. 
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Although Bohm's theory allows us to re-establish determinacy at the quantum 
level, the fact that it predicts, and is indeed designed to predict, exactly the same 
experimental results as the results predicted by quantum mechanics indicates that there 
is no way of distinguishing Bohm's theory from standard quantum mechanics in 
experimental terms. Unless we are able to find some testable implications of Bohm's 
theory which are different from the testable implications of standard quantum 
mechanics, the choice between the theories will have to be made on metaphysical 
grounds. The essence of the metaphysical debate is whether indeterminate quantum 
states on the one hand or wave functions existing in space on the other hand are felt to 
be more coherent as components of an interpretation of the physical world. 
The Many Worlds Theory 
As we have seen, both hidden variable theories and Bohm's theory seek to re-establish 
the determinacy at the quantum level which is absent ftom standard quantum 
mechanics. An alternative reaction to the indeterminacy implied by standard quantum 
theory is to embrace that indeterminacy, and to incorporate it as an integral component 
of one's metaphysics. This is the approach adopted by those who favour many worlds 
and many minds theories of quantum mechanics. 
The many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics was first proposed by 
Hugh Everett III in 1957.28 The interpretation arose out of his doctoral work which was 
supervised by the physicist John Wheeler. 29 The import of the interpretation can be 
illustrated by reference to the thought experiment in which Schrodinger's cat plays its 
part. According to Schrodinger's original presentation of the thought experiment, the 
superposition into which the quantum system inside the closed chamber has evolved 
collapses into a determinate state when the chamber is opened. 
Let us suppose that someone called Hugh has carried out Schrodinger's thought 
experiment, and that when Hugh opens the chamber, he finds that the cat is dead. Let us 
suppose, however, that the superposition into which the quantum system inside the 
closed chamber has evolved has not collapsed, even though the chamber has been 
opened. Can we reconcile Hugh's observation that the cat is dead with the supposition 
that the quantum system is still in a superposition? 
Everett proposes the following. Suppose that when Hugh opens the chamber, 
29 Confer Everett 1957. 
29 Confer Wheeler 199 1. 
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rather than the quantum system collapsing into a determinate state, Hugh himself enters 
into a superposition along with the quantum system he is observing. On this account, 
Hugh's consciousness does not collapse the superposition, as it does in the conscious 
observer account. Nonetheless, he only experiences a determinate state. This implies 
that he only experiences one branch or the other of the superposition, the branch in 
which the cat is alive or the branch in which the cat is dead. 
There are various ways of expressing what happens when Hugh opens the 
chamber. Everett can be interpreted as saying that when we make a measurement upon a 
quantum system which is in a superposition, the universe splits. If the quantum system 
is in a superposition with two branches, then the universe splits into two. Therefore, if 
the system in the chamber is in a superposition, in one branch of which the cat is dead 
and in the other branch of which the cat is alive, then when Hugh opens the chamber the 
universe splits into two universes. Since Hugh is part of the universe, Hugh splits when 
the universe splits. In one universe, there is a person called Hugh who sees a dead cat in 
the chamber, in the other universe, there is a person called Hugh who is greeted by a 
living cat. The problem with this way of expressing what happens when Hugh opens the 
chamber is that it appears to equate making a measurement with observation by a 
conscious observer, as in the conscious observer account. The implication of the 
account just given is that the universe only splits when a conscious observer observes a 
quantum system. Since however consciousness plays no integral part in the account, that 
is, it no longer performs the role of collapsing the superposition, it is not clear why the 
universe should be deemed to split only when a conscious observer makes an 
observation. 
A more consistent way of expressing what happens when Hugh opens the 
chamber is as follows. At the moment that an atom in the radioactive sample in 
Schr6dinger's thought experiment enters a state describable in terms of a wave function 
in a superposition, it is not simply the atom which enters that superposition but the 
entire universe containing that atom. From that moment onwards, there is one branch of 
the superposition containing an atom which has decayed and another branch of the 
superposition containing an atom which has not decayed. Each branch constitutes what 
we, aware only of the branch we are in, refer to as "the" universe. Since the decay of an 
atom has determinate consequences in Schr6dinger's thought experiment, the death of 
the cat amongst those consequence, what happens when Hugh opens the chamber and 
discovers an alive or dead cat is that he discovers which branch of the superposition he 
is in. His opening of the chamber does not in itself either effect or affect the branching 
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of the superposition. 
We can understand Everett's account of quantum mechanics as implying that the 
universe itself has a wave function, and that this wave function is constantly evolving 
into a superposition, each branch of the superposition in turn branching. The inhabitants 
of this type of universe only ever experience one particular branch of the superposition, 
and since events along a single branch are completely determinate, inhabitants of this 
type of universe experience the physical world as detenninate. It is because, however, 
there are a multitude of branches of the universal wave function, each branch 
constituting what the inhabitants of that branch would term "the" universe or world, that 
this theory is known as the many worlds theory of quantum mechanics. 
If we interpret a measurement as an observation by a conscious observer, then 
depending upon the version of the many worlds theory we are adopting, a measurement 
can be conceived of either as that act which causes the universe to split or, more 
coherently, as that act which enables observers to discover on which branch of the 
superposition into which the universe has evolved they are located. 
If a measurement is conceived of as that act which causes the universe to split, 
then a quantum system can be defined as the type of system which leads to the splitting 
of the universe when a measurement is performed upon it. This however seems to 
preclude our describing the universe itself as a quantum system. 
If a measurement is conceived of as that act which enables observers to discover 
on which branch of the superposition into which the universe has evolved they are 
located, then it appears legitimate to describe the universe itself as a quantum system. 
Although it might be possible to identify smaller systems within a universe as quantum 
systems, it is not exactly clear how a boundary around such systems could be defined in 
a non-arbitrary way, since they are components of a system, the universe, which is itself 
quantum. 
There are problems, given the many worlds account, as to how to understand 
interference effects such as those observed in the two slit experiment. According to 
what I have termed the more coherent version of the many worlds account, if one 
branch of the superposition into which the universe has evolved contains a quantum 
entity which has gone through slit A, then the other branch of this superposition contains 
a quantum entity which has gone through slit B. However, it can be shown 
experimentally that if a quantum entity only passes through one slit in the two slit 
experiment, no interference pattern is produced. This seems to imply, if we accept the 
coherent version of the many worlds account, that when an interference pattern is 
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produced, it results from two separate branches of the superposition into which the 
universe has evolved interfering with each other. 30 The only way to avoid this 
conclusion is by reverting to the version of the many worlds theory according to which 
the universe only splits when a conscious observer makes a measurement on a quantum 
system. This allows the quantum entity to pass through both slits in the two slit 
experiment in a superposition localized to the quantum entity itself, before the universe 
as a whole splits when an observer looks at the screen to observe where the quantum 
entity has been detected. 
Partly in response to these types of problem, a modified version of the many 
worlds theory was proposed, termed the many minds theory, and I will consider this 
theory in the following section. 
(/) The Many Minds Theory 
The many minds theory, which was first proposed by David Albert and Barry Loewei-31 
in 1988, resembles the many worlds theory in some respects. The essential difference is 
that whereas in the many worlds theory the universe evolves into a superposition, in the 
many minds theory it is the mind of a conscious observer which evolves into a 
superposition. This difference can be illustrated with reference to the thought 
experiment involving Schr6dinger's cat. 
Let us again consider the moment at which our conscious observer Hugh opens 
the chamber in which Schr6dinger's cat is contained. The quantum system contained 
within the chamber has evolved into a superposition, in one branch of which the cat is 
alive and in the other branch of which the cat is dead. Nonetheless, when Hugh opens 
the chamber, he observes a cat in a determinate state, either alive or dead. 
According to the many worlds theory, the universe itself has evolved, or evolves 
at the moment that Hugh opens the chamber, into a superposition with two branches. In 
one branch, Hugh is confronted by an alive cat, in the other branch, Hugh is confronted 
by a dead cat. 
Advocates of the many minds theory discount the idea that the universe evolves 
into a superposition and argue instead that when a conscious observer like Hugh is 
confronted by a quantum system in a two-branch superposition, a proportion of the 
30 There is nothing in the many worlds theory as it stands which forbids two separate branches of the 
superposition into which the universe has evolved from interfering with each other. It is usually assumed, 
however, that once the universe has evolved into a superposition, the separate branches of the 
superposition have no further effect upon one another. 
31 Confer Albert and Loewer 1988. 
Interpretations Of Quantum Mechanics 162 
minds of the conscious observer perceive one branch of the superposition, the remainder 
of the minds of the conscious observer perceive the other branch of the superposition. 
How many minds does a conscious observer have, in that case? A clue to the answer Is 
contained in the name of this theory, the many minds theory, and the actual answer is 
that, according to this theory, a conscious observer has an infinity of minds. 
The proportion of the observer's minds which perceive a particular branch of a 
superposition corresponds to what we would describe in standard quantum mechanics as 
the probability of finding a quantum entity in the state represented by that branch of the 
superposition. In the case of Schr6dinger's cat, standard quantum mechanics informs us 
that there is a probability of a half that Hugh will find the cat alive when he opens the 
chamber. According to the many minds theory, what this actually implies is that half of 
Hugh's minds perceive the branch of the superposition in which the cat is alive. The 
other half of Hugh's minds perceive the branch of the superposition in which the cat is 
dead. Had standard quantum mechanics assigned a probability of a third to finding the 
cat alive, only one third of Hugh's minds would have perceived the branch of the 
superposition in which the cat Is alive. The other two thirds of Hugh's minds would 
have perceived the branch of the superposition in which the cat is dead. Nonetheless, 
each of Hugh's minds, from its own point of view, observes a cat In a determinate state. 
The many minds theory implies that when a quantum system evolves into a 
superposition, it remains in that superposition and never collapses back into a 
determinate state. However, if a conscious observer encounters a system in a 
superposition, any particular mind of the infinity of minds possessed by the observer 
only perceives one branch of the superposition, and therefore perceives the quantum 
system in a determinate state. On this account, we can describe the act by a conscious 
observer of observing a quantum system as a measurement of that system. However, an 
exact definition of a measurement is not vital in the many minds theory, since a 
quantum system remains in a superposition, even after it has been measured, whatever 
form that measurement takes. A quantum system, in this account, is therefore any 
system which can evolve into a superposition. 
(g) The Spontaneous Localization Themy (GR ff) 
The final theory of quantum mechanics which I will consider appears comparatively 
mundane by comparison with some of the theories at which I have looked in the 
previous sections. The spontaneous localization theory, often referred to as GRW after 
the three physicists who first proposed it in 1985, G. C. Ghirardi, A. Rimini, and T. 
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Weber32, postulates that although individual quantum entities around 10- 11 in in size can 
and do exist in superpositions, the chances of objects composed of even a relatively 
small number of such entities existing in superpositions is so small as to be negligible. 
Consider a single quantum entity. According to GRW, such an entity evolves 
accordina to Schr6dinger's wave function for most of its existence. However, GRW 
stipulates that there is a very small probability at each moment at which a quantum 
entity exists that the wave function describing that entity will collapse in such a way that 
the entity will, at the moment that the collapse occurs, have a determinate position. 
After such a collapse, the entity will again continue to evolve according to 
Schr6dinger's wave function. As so described, there is only a very small probability of 
finding a single quantum entity in a state of determinate position. 
However, macroscopic objects, including the devices which we use to make 
measurements in experiments, are composed not of single quantum entities but of vast 
ensembles of such entities. If we consider for example a pointer on a measuring device, 
a pointer composed of, say, 1025 quantum entities, we can see that even if there is only a 
probability of I in 1025 that a particular quantum entity will undergo a wave function 
collapse at a particular moment of time, then the likelihood is that at least one quantum 
entity in the ensemble of quantum entities which compose the pointer will undergo a 
wave function collapse at that particular moment of time. 
According to GRW, the effect of a single quantum entity in an ensemble of 
quantum entities undergoing a wave function collapse is, in effect, to collapse the wave 
function of the ensemble as a whole. In the case of the pointer on the measuring device, 
therefore, provided that the wave function of at least one quantum entity in the 
ensemble of quantum entities composing the pointer collapses at a particular moment of 
time in such a way that the entity in question has a determinate position, then the wave 
function of the entire pointer will collapse in such a way that the pointer has a 
determinate position. Given that at any particular moment of time, at least one of the 
quantum entities composing a macroscopic object like a pointer is likely to have a 
determinate position, we will almost always experience macroscopic objects like 
pointers as having determinate positions. 
Interestingly Albert, who was originally doubtful about the viability of the GRW 
theory'33 has more recently expressed support for the theory. 34 He gives a succinct 
description of GRW as follows. 
32 Confer Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber 1985,1986. 
33 Confer Aibert 1992. 
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"Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber's idea (the GRW theory) goes (roughly) like this: 
the wave function of any single-particle system almost always evolves in 
accordance with the linear deterministic equations of motion; but every now and 
then (once in something like 10 9 years), at random, but with fixed probability per 
unit time, the wave-function is suddenly multiplied by a narrow bell-shaped 
curve -a curve (more particularly) whose width is something on the order of the 
diameter of a single atom of one of the lighter elements - which has the effect of 
localizing it, of setting its value at zero everywhere in space except within a 
certain small region. The probability of this bell curve's being centered at any 
particular point x depends (in accordance with a precise mathematical rule) on 
the wave- IIn , 
function of the particle at the moment just prior to that mu tip icatio . 
Then, until the next such "jump, " everything proceeds as before, in accordance 
with the deterministic differential equations. " (Albert 200 1, p. 148) 
If we apply GRW to the Schrodinger's cat thought experiment, we can see that 
an atom in the radioactive sample will certainly evolve into a superposition, but almost 
as certainly this superposition will have no measurable effect at the level of the 
macroscopic Geiger counter which is composed of a vast number of atoms. The chance 
therefore of the Geiger counter entering into an overall superposition of states, let alone 
of the cat doing so, is virtually zero. 
Measurement in the GRW theory of quantum mechanics, since it is carried out 
using large macroscopic objects, is invariably of determinate quantities. Although 
entities do indeed exist in superpositions, the indeterminate states implied by these 
superpositions are not detectable at the macroscopic scale, owing to the collapse 
mechanism postulated by GRW, namely the very small probability that any particular 
quantum entity in a superposition will undergo spontaneous localization and hence the 
very large probability that a macroscopic object composed of many quantum entities 
will undergo spontaneous localization. In GRW, therefore, measurement plays no part in 
causing a wave function to collapse, and hence measurement is no more than an 
intervention in a system to establish a determinate property of that system. In some 
sense, a system is quanturn at any scale in GRW, since all systems are composed of 
quantum entities. However, any system composed of more than a few quantum entities 
will not exhibit the wave function behaviour which we might take to be characteristic of 
quantum systems. 
34 Confer Albert 2001, p. 149. 
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4 Reversible And Irreversible Evolution Of Quantum Entities 
In the previous section, I have considered a number of different interpretations of 
quantum mechanics. 35 1 Will refer to these interpretations in assessing the implications 
of quantum mechanics for temporal metaphysics in chapter 7. Before turning my 
attention to these implications, however, I am going to examine another aspect of 
quantum mechanics which may also have implications for temporal metaphysics, 
namely whether a SySteM-36 described in quantum mechanical terms exhibits reversible 
behaviour. 
We saw in section 2 of the current chapter that quantum mechanics provides us 
with two ways of describing the behaviour of a system. It is possible to describe the 
evolution37 of a system in terms of its quantum mechanical wave function, In this 
context, the Schrodinger equation is the equation used to represent the dynamical 
evolution of a quantum SyStem. 38 It is also possible to describe the behaviour of a 
system when a measureMent39 is made upon it. Whilst the wave functions which 
describe quantum systems display evolution into superpositions, 40 when we come to 
make a measurement upon a quantum system we only ever measure determinate 
properties of that system. The wave function of a radioactive atom, for example, can 
33 1 have referred to many of the interpretations as theories "to allow for the possibility of not reproducing 
all the empirical predictions of QW' (Redhead 1989, p. 98). 
36 In general terms, a system is some region of a universe around which a theoretical boundary is drawn. 
Analysis is then largely confined to the region within this boundary, though some consideration may be 
given to flows (of matter, energy, information, and so on) across this boundary. Quantum mechanics 
usually, but not exclusively, focuses upon systems of the order of 10-" m in size, such as atoms and the 
components of atoms. 
37 The evolution of a system is the way in which it changes over time. From the static block universe, the 
growing block universe or the growing determinacy points of view, a description of the evolution of a 
system over two moments would be a description of how the properties of one of the temporal parts 
constituting the system differ from the properties of an adjacent temporal part. From a presentist point of 
view, a description of the evolution of a system over two moments would be a description of how the 
proper-ties of the system existing at one moment differ from the properties of the same system existing at 
the next moment. Note that only in a presentist account is the system undergoing non-incremental 
existential change. 
38 As noted in footnote 6, the Schr6dinger equation is time symmetric under Wigner transformations but is 
not time reversible under / --- > -/. It should also be noted that the solutions to the equation need not be time 
symmetric, and generally are not. 
39 As became apparent in section 3 of the current chapter, what precisely constitutes a measurement is not 
straightforward in quantum mechanics, In simple terms, it is an intervention in a system performed from 
outside the system, and I will assume that no more than this is meant by the term in the current section. 
40 There is an underlying question here as to whether every element of a physical theory has a counterpart 
in physical reality. I formulate the question using Redhead's terminology (Redhead 1989, p. 71). He himself 
draws the terminology from Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen 1935. In relation to quantum mechanics, we can 
ask whether the evolution of superpositions in the representation of quantum systems indicates a 
superposition of those quantum systems themselves. Since superpositions are held to arise precisely when a 
quantum system is not being measured, there is no way of ascertaining whether the system itself is in a 
superposition when not being measured, unless a physically realized superposition has detectable 
consequences beyond the superposition state. This is one of the issues which Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen 
are addressing, 
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evolve into a superposition representing decayed and undecayed states. We only ever 
measure the atom, however, as either decayed or undecayed at a particular moment of 
time. This might suggest that the act of measurement irreversibly changes the state of a 
quantum system, shifting it out of what I will term a superposition state, that is, a state 
which is associated with no determinate observable properties, and into what I will term 
an observable state, that is, a state which is associated with determinate observable 
propertieS. 41 
I will examine in chapter 7 what possible implications we might derive ftom the 
conclusion that the transition of a quantum system from a superposition to an 
observable state, as a consequence of making a measurement on the quantum system, is 
irreversible. However, the claim that the transition of a quantum system from a 
superposition into an observable state is irreversible is a controversial one. I will 
therefore begin by examining why the shift from a superposition to an observable state 
might appear irreversible. 
(a) An Argument For The Claim That Measurement OfA Quantum System Induces 
An Irreversible Change In That System 
I will first consider an argument in favour of assuming irreversibility given by Roger 
Penrose. 42 In the following passage, Penrose uses the bold letter R to denote state-vector 
reduction, the mathematical correlate of performing a measurement on a quantum 
entity. R is therefore the mathematical representation of the act of performing a 
measurement. U denotes the evolution of the Schrodinger equation, the mathematical 
correlate of the evolution of the wave function of a quantum entity. 43 
"There seems to be a prevailing view that R ... should 
be time-symmetric. 
Perhaps this view arises partly because of a reluctance to take R to be an actual 
'process' independent of U, so the time-symmetry of U ought to imply time- 
symmetry also for R, " (Penrose 1989, p. 354) 
Penrose is acknowledging that some theorists regard the act of performing a 
41 If we are measuring one of a pair of non-commuting properties, Heisenberg's uncertainty principle 
indicates that a determinate measurement of one of the properties, position for example, will render 
indeterminate the other of the pair of non-commuting properties, momentum in the case of position, if we 
were to try to measure it at the same time. 
42 Penrose 1989, pp. 354-359. 
43 See Beiser 1987, chapter 5, for a detailed explanation of the mathematical representation of the 
evolution and measurement of quantum entities. 
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measurement on a quantum entity as time-symmetric, and he is suggesting that their 
view may derive from an unwillingness to distinguish a measurement per se from the 
time-symmetric evolution of a quantum entity as embodied in its wave function. 
However, Penrose himself considers that we can distinguish, on the one hand, 
the act of performing a measurement on a quantum entity from, on the other hand, the 
evolution of a quantum entity when that entity is not being measured. His argument is, 
in effect, that the act of performing a measurement is represented as a mathematical 
procedure carried out upon the mathematical representation of a wave function, and that 
these different mathematical representations embody a genuine difference in the 
physical reality which they are designed to represent. 
Furthermore, Penrose considers that, whilst on the one hand the mathematical 
representation of the evolution of a wave function is symmetric with respect to the 
mathematical representation of the time co-ordinate in the wave function, on the other 
hand the mathematical procedure which represents the act of performing a measurement 
on a quantum entity is not symmetric with respect to mathematical representation of the 
time co-ordinate in the wave function of the entity. Once again, the implication is that 
the temporal symmetry of the mathematical representation of the evolution of a wave 
function, and the temporal asymmetry of the mathematical representation of a 
measurement on a quantum entity, reflect a genuine difference in the physical reality 
which the two mathematical representations are intended to represent. 
Penrose sets out to illustrate that the mathematical representation of a 
measurement on a quantum entity is time-asymmetric by means of an experiment which 
I shall term the half-silvered mirror experiment. The experiment requires a source of 
quantum entities, a half-silvered mirror, and a detector of quantum entities. In the 
version of the experiment which Penrose describes, the quantum entities are photons, 
and hence a lamp is used as the source, whilst the photons are detected by a photo-cell. 
The apparatus is illustrated in figure 6.3 below. 
The half-silvered mirror is tilted at an angle of 45' to the line between the lamp 
and the photo-cell, as illustrated. The experiment consists in allowing the lamp to emit a 
quantum entity, a photon, at random moments directly towards the photo-cell. The 
emission of the photon is registered at L and the detection of the photon is registered at 
P. The half-silvered mirror is designed to reflect exactly half of all the photons which 
reach it towards the point A on the laboratory wall and to transmit the other half towards 
the point P on the photo-cell. 
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Fig. 6.3 The apparatus for the half-silvered mirror experiment consists of a lamp, a half- 
silvered mirror, and a photo-cell. The laboratory walls are shown shaded at the top and 
bottom of the diagram. The diagram is based on the one given by Penrose 1989, p. 357. 
Let us consider the situation from the point of view of a single photon. Before44 
the photon reaches the mirror, its evolution is describable in terms of a wave function 
which relates to a single trajectory, that between L and M. After the photon reaches the 
mirror, however, its evolution must be described in terms of a wave function which 
relates to two different trajectories, the two possible paths which the photon can take, 
the path between M and P, and the path between M and A. The part of the wave function 
which relates to the path of a transmitted photon between M and P has an amplitude45 of 
IN2, and the part of the wave function which relates to the path of a reflected photon 
between M and A has an amplitude of 1 N2. 
We say that the wave function used to describe the photon after the photon 
reaches the mirror is a superposition. This is because the wave function required to 
describe the evolution of the photon as a whole is composed of more than one part, the 
part which describes the evolution of a reflected photon and the part which describes the 
evolution of a transmitted photon. 
The amplitudes of the two parts of the photon's wave function after the photon 
has reached the mirror imply that, once a photon has been emitted from A, the 
probability of subsequently detecting a photon at P Is 1/2 and the probability of 
subsequently not detecting a photon at P is also 1/2. This is because the probability of 
detecting a quantum entity along a particular trajectory is given by the square of the 
44 1 will assume, initially, a temporal orientation according to which the emission of the photon from the 
lamp precedes its transmission or reflection by the half-silvered mirror. 
45 An amplitude is associated with each part of a wave function, In simple terms, when the modulus of an 
amplitude ýP associated with a particular part of a wave function is squared, the resultant value P is the 
probability of finding the entity described by the wave function in the state described by that part of the 
wave function with which the amplitude ýP is associated. 
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modulus of the amplitude of that part of the wave function which defines the trajectory. 
In the case we are considering, the square of the modulus of the amplitude is 1 (IN2) J2 
= 112. As Penrose puts it, the quantum mechanical answer to the question "Given that L 
registers, what is the probability that P registers? " is "one half' (Ibid., p. 358). 
Penrose next invites us to consider the same experiment with the orientation of 
time reversed. Suppose that the presence of a photon is registered at P. Since the 
orientation of time is reversed, the evolution of the photon is describable in terms of a 
wave function which relates to the single trajectory between P and M. Tracing back 
through time, the evolution of the photon beyond the trajectory between P and M, that 
is, beyond the point at which the photon reaches the mirror, must be described in terms 
of a wave function which relates to two different trajectories, the two possible paths 
which the photon can take, the path between M and L, and the path between M and B, 
where B is a point on the laboratory wall opposite to the laboratory wall on which the 
point A is located. The part of the wave function which relates to the path of a 
transmitted photon between M and L has an amplitude of IN2, and the part of the wave 
function which relates to the path of a reflected photon between A4 and B has an 
amplitude of IN2, Squaring as before, we obtain two probabilities, each with the value 
1/2. However, Penrose advises caution. 
"[W]e must be careful to note what questions these probabilities are the answers 
to. They are the two questions, 'Given that L registers, what is the probability 
that P registers? ', just as before, and the more eccentric question, 'Given that the 
photon is ejected from the wall at B, what is the probability that P registers? "' 
(fbid., p. 358) 
Whilst the probabilities offered as answers to these two questions are what we 
might expect, Penrose points out that "neither of these questions is the time-reverse of 
the one we asked before" (Ibid., p. 358). The time reverse of the original question, 
"Given that L registers, what is the probability that P registers? ", is the question "Given 
that P registers, what Is the probability that L registers? " (Ibid., p. 358). The correct 
answer to this question, Penrose suggests, is "one". 
"If the photo-cell indeed registers, then it is virtually certain that the photon 
came from the lamp and not from the laboratory wall' In the case of our time- 
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reversed question, the quantum -mechanical calculation has given us completely 
the wrong answer! " (Ibid., p. 358) 
Penrose interprets this result as implying that the mathematical procedure which 
represents the act of performing a measurement on a quantum entity is not invariant 
under reversal of the orientation of time. 
"The implication of this is that the rules for the R part of quantum mechanics 
simply cannot be used for such reversed-time questions. If we wish to calculate 
the probability of a past state on the basis of a known future state, we get quite 
the wrong answers if we try to adopt the standard R procedure of simply taking 
the quantum-mechanical amplitude and squaring its modulus. It is only for 
calculating the probabilities of future states on the basis of past states that this 
procedure works - and there it works superbly well! It seems to me to be clear 
that, on this basis, the procedure R cannot be time-symmetric (and, incidentally, 
therefore cannot be a deduction from the time-symmetric procedure U). (Ibid., 
p. 359) 
The half-silvered mirror experiment appears to demonstrate that the 
mathematical procedure which represents the act of performing a measurement on a 
quantum entity would give us the wrong probabilities if applied in a time-reversed 
situation. If we accept that the mathematical procedure in question, state vector 
reduction, reflects the physical reality which it is designed to represent, we can conclude 
that the act of performing a measurement on a quantum entity brings about an 
irreversible change in that quantum system. 46 Are we justified in concluding, therefore, 
on the basis of the half-silvered mirror experiment, that whenever a measurement is 
made on a quantum entity, an irreversible evolution in the behaviour of the quantum 
entity ensues? The research to which I turn now suggests not. 
46 It is worth noting that whilst the mathematical representation of the act of measurement on a quantum 
entity gives the wrong results when applied in a time-reversed situation, this does not prove that 
measurement itself is irreversible. It could be that the mathematical representation currently in use in 
quantum mechanics fails to embody the reversibility of measurement. However, it is also worth noting that 
a similar problem arises in relation to all mathematical representations of physical conditions. Those 
conditions which appear to be time-reversal invariant in one mathematical representation, for example in 
relativity theory, might be considered irreversible in an alternative representation. I will leave this 
consideration to one side. 
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(d) An Argument Against The Claim That Measurement Of A Quantum System 
Induces An Irreversible Change In That System 
In a paper published in 1964 the physicists Aharanov, Bergmann and Lebowitz argue 
that the irreversibility brought about by measurement of a quantum system is only 
apparent. 
"We argue that this time asymmetry is actually related to the manner In which 
statistical ensembles are constructed. " (Aharanov, Bergmann and Lebowitz 
1964, p. 14 10) 
They go on to demonstrate that it is possible to construct ensembles in which the 
process of measurement introduces no time asymmetric element. This is done by 
selecting both the initial and final states of the system so as to delimit the sample. It is 
the selection of the required final states of the system, as well as the more usual 
selection of its initial states, which produces a time symmetric expression for the 
probability of obtaining a particular value in the course of measurement. In other words, 
the probability function produces the correct value of either the following or the 
preceding state, depending on whether we run the sequence of measurements from 
earlier to later or from later to earlier. Therefore, we cannot deduce whether one 
measurement comes before or after another from its outcome. 
Although Aharanov, Bergmann and Lebowitz go on to demonstrate that time 
symmetric measurements can be extended to ensembles where we are restricted to 
either pre-selection or post-selection by means of "coherence destroying" 
manipulations, they go on to propose a postulate "which asserts that ensembles with 
unambiguous probability distributions may be constructed on the basis of pre-selection 
only" (Aharanov, Bergmann and Lebowitz 1964, p. 1410). They conclude that this 
postulate derives from the time irreversibility of the universe as a whole, rather than 
from the laws of quantum mechanics, and therefore assert that the laws of quantum 
mechanics are in fact time symmetric. 
The results of Aharanov, Bergmann and Lebowitz should not necessarily be 
viewed as flatly contradicting Penrose's argument. Aharanov, Bergmann and Lebowitz 
allow that measurements on quantum systems will exhibit Irreversibility where the 
sample from which the behaviour of a quantum system is deduced is not selected "on 
the basis of required outcomes of specified initial and final observations" (Aharanov, 
Bergmann and Lebowitz 1964, p. 1410). However, whereas it might appear from 
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Penrose's argument that it is the formal representation of quantum mechanics itself 
which embodies temporal irreversibility, the thesis of Aharanov, Bergmann and 
Lebowitz implies that the irreversibility which is apparently disclosed in the 
measurement of quantum systems is a reflection of the temporal asymmetry of our 
universe per se, rather than specifically of quantum mechanics. 
"We are thus confronted with an indubitable asymmetry in time direction. It 
remains to discuss whether this asymmetry is a property of microphysics proper 
or whether it represents the intrusion of the macroscopic universe on the 
microscopic scene. Granting that this question does not lend itself to 
straightforward logical analysis, it appears to us that the construction of 
ensembles in the real physical universe is a macroscopic operation and that it 
depends on the realities of the universe as a whole. " (Aharanov, Bergmann and 
Lebowitz 1964, p. 1416) 
Even allowing for the results demonstrated by Aharanov, Bergmann and Lebowitz, 
measurement performed on a quantum system (provided it has not been specially 
prepared to ensure revers1b, lity) remains a means of revealing an underlying temporal 
asymmetry, leaving aside whether that asymmetry has a macroscopic or microscopic 
origin. In the next section, I will examine how we might make use of measurements on 
quantum systems in establishing the temporal orientation of a universe. 
6 Conclusion 
We have seen in this chapter that the mathematical procedures used to represent the act 
of performing a measurement upon a quantum system can be interpreted as indicating 
an irreversible change in the mathematical representation of a quantum system as a 
wave function. 47 However, we have also seen that the irreversibility reflected in the 
measurement of quantum systems does not appear to be attributable to the formal 
representation of quantum mechanics per se, since it is possible to prepare ensembles of 
quantum mechanical systems in such a way that time-symmetric measurements can be 
47 Heisenberg formulated an alternative mathematical representation of quantum systems to Schr6dinger. 
Heisenberg represents quantum systems by means of matrices rather than by means of wave functions. 
Nonetheless, the mathematical procedures used to represent the act of performing a measurement upon a 
quantum system in Heisenberg's representation can also be interpreted as representing an irreversible 
change, since the application of the procedures in Heisenberg's representation produces the same 
probabilities in the half-silvered mirror experiment as the application of the procedures in Schr6dinger's 
representation. 
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carried out upon them. This may suggest that the irreversibility apparent in the 
measurement of quantum systems is a reflection of an inherent direction of time in the 
universe as a whole. 
The irreversibility made apparent during measurement of a quantum system 
provides us with a means of establishing a temporal orientation in a structurally simple 
universe. If such a universe conforms to the universal measurement law, the law which 
was postulated as the quantum mechanical equivalent of the second law of 
thermodynamics, then we are able to establish a sequence of global time slices in such a 
universe along which the measure count sum of the universe always increases. Such a 
universe can be interpreted in terms of a physically distinguished present metaphysics, 
since at least one sequence of global time slices is defined within it, namely that 
sequence along which the measure count sum of the universe increases. 
It was shown that, if we assume that one consequence of being time-like is that 
the measure count sum associated with points along a time-like curve in a particular 
direction should always increase, then a paradox arises for a closed time-like curve of 
the type which arises in G6del's rotating universes. This paradox is similar to the 
paradox which arises if we assume that the entropy of the universe associated with 
points along a closed time-like curve in a particular direction should always increase. 
I concluded the chapter by considering whether it is possible to give an account 
of the direction of time in terms of causal ordering. 
In the course of this chapter, I have made extensive use of the concept of a 
measurement upon a quantum system, but I have not as yet clarified what constitutes 
such a measurement, nor indeed what constitutes a quantum system. This will be the 
first task in the next chapter, as a prelude to considering whether it is possible to 
formulate a physical theory which is consistent With our current theories of physics, but 
which suggests a candidate for the physical correlate of our experience of the passage of 
time compatible with some version of a physically distinguished present temporal 
metaphysics rather than with a static block universe temporal metaphysics. 
7 
Implications Of Quantum Mechanics 
For Temporal Metaphysics 
I Introduction 
We saw in the previous chapter that Aharanov, Bergmann and Lebowitz (ABL) argue 
that the formal mathematical representation of the measurement of a quantum system is 
not intrinsically irreversible. "[T]he basic laws of quantum physics, including those 
referring to measurements, are as completely time symmetric as the laws of classical 
physics" (ABL 1964, p. 1410). It nonetheless appears that measurement of a quantuni 
system can make explicit an underlying temporal irreversibility, although it remains 
unclear at what level that irreversibility is located, depending upon whether one is 
persuaded by Penrose's argument or by ABL's. 
In the current chapter, therefore, I am going to investigate whether it is possible 
to use measurement of quantum systems as a means of demonstrating that a universe 
containing closed time-like curves is incompatible with the underlying temporal 
irreversibility which measurement of a quantum system makes explicit in our universe, 
even though that universe may be compatible in principle with the formal representation 
of the measurement of a quantum system. 
Given that measurement of a quantum system is a causal interaction, the 
question arises as to whether the direction of time can be explained in terms of the 
direction of causality per se, rather than in terms specifically of quantum interactions. I 
therefore conclude the chapter by considering the causal theory of time order. 
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2 Establishing A Temporal Orientation In A Structurally Simple Universe By 
Performing A Measurement Upon A Quantum System 
I am going to consider the arbitrary universe UO which was defined in chapter 5.1 Uo is a 
structurally simple universe, one which does not contain closed time-like curves. I will 
assume as before that we can define a sequence of global time slices within U () 2 and that 
UO is a block universe only in the sense that entities contained within it are composed of 
temporal parts, a universe which is compatible with a growing block universe 
metaphysics or a growing determinacy metaphysics, as well as with a static block 
universe metaphysics. 
Suppose that we conduct the quantum two slit experiment as described in 
section 2 of chapter 6, the version of the experiment in which we use a source which 
emits quantum entities, during some arbitrary sequence of ten time slices, moments of 
time, which we label ti, j to ti, jo. Suppose that the source emits a quantum entity at the 
moment ti, j and that the quantum entity is detected at the screen at the moment ti, 10. 
During the sequence of moments between ti, j and ti, 10, the behaviour of the quantum 
entity is describable only in terms of its wave function. When the quantum entity is 
detected at the moment ti+10, its behaviour is no longer describable in terms of the same 
wave function that described it previously. 
Assuming that measurement induces an irreversible transition in a quantum 
system from a superposition state to an observable state, we can conclude that the time 
slice ti, 10, which contains the detection of the quantum entity, must occur after the time 
slice ti,,,, which contains the emission of the quantum entity. Assuming that the 
moments ti+2 to tj+9 lie in an ordered3 sequence between tj+j and ti+10, we can deduce that 
the whole sequence of moments are temporally ordered. The two slit experiment 
therefore gives us a means of establishing a temporal orientation along a sequence of 
moments, as illustrated in figure 7.1. 
Given that the two slit experiment can be performed for any sequence of time 
slices in UO, it is theoretically possible to establish a temporal orientation for the entire 
sequence of time slices in the universe. 
I Confer chapter 5, section 4. 
2 It may be that a number of different sequences of global time slices can be defined in 110.1 will assume 
initially that there is only one sequence along which the temporal parts of a quantum two slit experiment 
can be located. I will eventually need to consider whether this is a valid assumption. 
3 The (non-temporal) ordering of the sequence is assumed on the grounds that an ordered sequence of 
global time-slices have been defined within Uo. 

















quantum entity emitted 
Fig. 7.1 A two slit experiment involving the emission and detection of a quantum entity 
is conducted in the structurally simple block universe UO, shown on the left. The 
experiment is conducted during some arbitrary sequence of global time Slices 1141 to IiII0 
shown on the right. The emission and detection of the quantum entity imply a temporal 
orientation of the sequence of time slices. The representation of the universe is based on 
the representation of a universe given by Penrose 1989, p. 325. 
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We need to observe, however, that there is no law extant in quantum mechanics, 
equiValent to the second law of thermodynamics, which implies that the temporal 
orientation of the universe over its entire sequence of global time slices must remain 
constant. Therefore, although the two slit experiment allows us to determine the 
temporal orientation of a short sequence of time slices, this determination in itself does 
not guarantee that the temporal orientation so established applies to the entire sequence 
of time slices contained in 11o. 
Would we be justified in postulating a quantum mechanical law, equivalent to 
the second law of thermodynamics, and if so, what form would that law take? Recall the 
formulation of the second law of thermodynamics employed in chapter 5. 
"The only changes that are possible for an isolated system are those in which the 
entropy of the system either increases or remains the same. Changes in which the 
entropy decreases will not happen. " (Halliday and Resnick 1988, p. 525) 
If we consider the origins of the second law of thermodynamics, we can observe 
that the law is formulated on the basis of a finite number of observations of systems 
which only approximate to isolated systems. In the course of observing such systems, it 
has been found that entropy has always either increased or broadly remained the same. 
The process by which the second law is arrived at therefore appears to be essentially an 
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inductive one, moving from a finite number of observations of particular quasi-lsolated 
systems to a claim about isolated systems in general. 4 
Since it is impossible in practice to totally isolate a system from its 
surroundings, a universe, which by definition has no surroundings, appears to be the 
only genuinely isolated system. Therefore we can rewrite the second law, substituting 
Ic universe" for "isolated system", to give us the following. 
The only changes that are possible for a universe are those in which the entropy 
of the universe either increases or remains the same. Changes in which the 
entropy decreases will not happen. 5 
Can an equivalent law be formulated for quantum mechanics? Provided that we 
accept that experiments such as the two slit experiment and the half-silvered mirror 
experiment are genuinely irreversible, then we are in no worse a position in terms of our 
evidence for a law of irreversibility on the basis of quantum mechanics than we are in 
terms of our evidence for the second law of thermodynamics. 
In an attempt to formulate a law which expresses the direction of time in terms 
of quantum mechanics and which resembles the second law of thermodynamics, I will 
begin by defining a quantity which I will term the measure count. 6 
The measure count of a quantum system' at a particular global time slice is the 
number of times a measurement has been performed upon that quantum system 
4A Popperian, who would be less concerned with the particular process by which the second law was 
arrived at, would probably prefer to describe the law as a bold hypothesis which has yet to be falsified. 
Confer Popper 1959. 
5 This formulation is equivalent to the formulation at which Rudolf Clausius arrived in 1865, when he 
reformulated the first and second laws of thermodynamics in cosmological terms. 
6A potential equivalent in quantum mechanics of the entropy of thermodynamics is the quantity -Tr(AnU 
proposed by von Neumann, where U is a statistical operator. Von Neumann indicates an interesting feature 
of this entropy expression. "Although our entropy expression, as we saw, is completely analogous to the 
classical entropy, it is still surprising that it is invariant in the normal evolution in time of the system 
(process 2), and only increases with measurements (process 1) - in the classical (where the measurements 
in general played no role) it increased as a rule even with the ordinary mechanical evolution of the system. " 
(von Neumann 1955, p. 398-9) Von Neumann defines process I and process 2 as follows. In process 2, H is 
the energy operator, I is time, and H is independent of t, 
Process 1: 
2; r 2 7r 
i- ji i---. tH 
Process 2: U --> Ut =e It Ue h 
7 Note that I define the measure count in terms of a quantum system. What I have referred to as quantum 
entities, entities such as photons or electrons, are definable as quantum systems, and I will therefore 
sometimes refer to such entities as quantum systems. 
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up to8 that particular global time slice. 
it will be necessary to assess whether the postulation of this quantity is justified. 
Let us first, however, consider the postulated law, which is based upon the concept of 
the measure count, and which I will term the measurement law. 
The only changes that are possible for a quantum system are those in which the 
measure count of the system either increases or remains the same. Changes in 
which the measure count decreases will not happen. 
The measure count and the measurement law taken together embody the notion 
that once a measurement has been performed upon a quantum system, an irreversible 
change in the evolution of the system ensues. Therefore, a measurement cannot be 
undone. 
The measure count, which is assigned a numerical value without units, is 
conceived of as follows. Suppose that a quantum system has had no measurements 
made upon it. Its measure count is zero. After a measurement is performed upon it for 
the first time, its measure count becomes one. If it were possible to perform a 
measurement on a quantum system which reversed the effect of the first measurement, 
then it would be legitimate to deduct one from the measure count of the system, so that 
its measure count would return to zero. However, if it is assumed that measurement 
causes an irreversible change in the evolution of a quantum system, the effect of 
performing a second measurement upon the quantum system is to increase its measure 
count to two. 
Let us consider what happens to the measure count of a quantum entity such as a 
photon when we perform a two slit experiment during some arbitrary sequence of global 
time slices tj, j to /j, jo defined in the universe UO. If we assume that no measurement has 
been performed upon the quantum entity prior to its emission at ti,,, then we can assign 
it a measure count of zero at ti,,. When the quantum entity is detected at ti, jo, its 
measure count becomes one. 
There is still a problem, however, if we attempt to equate the increase in the 
measure count of a quantum entity such as a photon with an increase in the measure 
9 The definition of the measure count assumes a temporal orientation to the universe in the phrase "up to". 
We could substitute the phrase "in universal simultaneity hyperplanes before and including7 for the phrase 
"up to". 
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count of the universe as a whole. Whilst I have deliberately left vague what constitutes a 
measurement, I have suggested that in simple terms it is an intervention in a system 
perforined from outside the system. 9 We cannot simply assign a measure count to the 
universe, therefore, since in the case of the universe there is no "outside" from which an 
intervention could be performed. 10 Instead, I will define the measure count sum of the 
universe as follows. 
The measure count sum of a universe at a particular global time slice is the sum 
of the measure counts of all the quantum systems comprising that universe at 
that particular global time slice. 
Even this definition leaves us with a problem, namely what constitutes a 
quantum system. We could, for example, define a quantum system as the entire contents 
of a universe apart ftom one atom. A measurement would then be deemed to be made 
when the atom "intervened" in some way in the rest of the universe. This example 
illustrates that the definition of what constitutes a quantum system is going to depend 
upon how we define a measurement. The definition of a quantum system as the entire 
9 Confer chapter 6, section 3. 
10 The situation here is rather like the situation faced by proponents of an interventionist account of 
irreversibility in the realm of thermodynamics, as was pointed out to me by Michael Redhead. In the 
context of an analysis of spin-echo experiments and the implications of these experiments for the second 
law of thermodynamics, Ridderbos and Redhead (1998) make the following observation. 
"Since an isolated system will retain its coherence, the only way to account for nonequilibrium 
behavior is to focus on the fact that no physical system can be completely isolated from its 
environment. The origin of irreversibility is then seen to lie in the interaction between a system 
and its environment, " (Ridderbos and Redhead 1998, p. 1257) 
This approach generates a potential problem when we consider the universe as a whole. 
"Since the universe itself does not have an environment to interact with, it follows that its entropy 
must be constant in time. Is not this in contradiction with what cosmologists standardly describe 
as the cosmic entropy increase? " (Ridderbos and Redhead 1998, p. 1261) 
Ridderbos and Redhead address this problem by invoking a distinction between coarse-grained 
and fine-grained definitions of entropy, allowing that whilst entropy defined in coarse-grained terms can 
increase, this does not contradict "a fine-grained entropy which remains constant for the universe as a 
whole" (Ridderbos and Redhead 1998, p. 1262). 
If measurement of a quantum system is defined as an intervention in a system performed from 
outside the system, then a problem, parallel to the problem described by Ridderbos and Redhead, arises in 
relation to measurement of the universe as a whole, regarded as a quantum system since, once again, "the 
universe itself does not have an environment to interact with". 
It is interesting to speculate to what extent solutions to this problem with the measurement of 
quantum systems might resemble in their structure the solution offered by Ridderbos and Redhead to the 
problem for an interventionist account of irreversibility in the realm of thermodynamics. However, for the 
purposes of this thesis I will only indicate the existence of the problem without attempting to solve it. 
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contents of a universe apart from one atom, for example, would only be viable if an 
interaction of an atom with some other entity in the universe containing the atom 
counted as a measurement upon the entire system apart from the atom, rather than upon 
the atom. How precisely one defines a measurement and how therefore one defines a 
quantum system is going to depend upon which interpretation of quantum mechanics 
one adopts. Rather than select a particular interpretation, I will employ in what follows 
a concept of measurement which is broadly compatible with most of the interpretations 
of quantum mechanics which I discussed in chapter 6. 
I assume that, in the two slit experiment, detection of a quantum entity such as a 
photon at a screen constitutes a measurement of a quantum system. I therefore assume 
that performing the two slit experiment for a single quantum entity has the effect of 
increasing the measure count of that entity by one. Suppose that in (10 no measurements 
upon quantum systems are made other than by conducting the two slit experiment. At 
ti+,, three separate two slit experiments begin, and at ti+10, three quantum entities are 
detected at three separate screens. According to the definition of the measure count 
sum, the measure count sum of the universe at ti, lo is three more than the measure count 
sum of the universe at ti, g. The measure count of each quantum entity in each of the 
three two slit experiments is one greater at ti, 10 than it was at fi+q. 
I then propose that the temporal orientation established in any of the three two 
slit experiments, in the situation just described, is the temporal orientation not just of 
the sequence of time slices during which the experiments were conducted, but also the 
temporal orientation of the universe (10 as a whole, the temporal orientation, that is, of 
the entire sequence of time slices contained in UO. If this is the case then the quantum 
two slit experiment is capable of fulfilling much the same role as Einstein's signalling 
technique. 
I assumed that the structurally simple universe U(), one which contains no 
problematic space-time structures such as closed time-11ke curves, is one in which we 
are able to define a sequence of global time slices. Suppose now that the following 
conditions hold in Uo. 
A sequence of global time slices can be identified in (10 such that the time slice 
with the lowest measure count sum and the time slice with the highest measure 
count sum are at opposite ends of the sequence. 
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(M2) For any two adjacent global time slices in (fo, the time slice which is nearer to 
the time slice with the highest measure count sum has either the same or a higher 
measure count sum than the time slice which is further from the time slice with 
the highest measure count sum. 
These two conditions, if they obtained in (JO, would constitute an ordering of the 
global time slices in UO in terms of the measure count sum. 
3 The Paradox Of Measure Count Sum Increase Along A Closed Time-Like Curve 
Equipped with the quantum two slit experiment, the concepts of the measure count and 
the measure count sum, and the measurement law, it is possible to demonstrate that a 
paradox arises on a closed time-like curve equivalent to the paradox which arose when 
we considered entropy increase around such a curve. All that is required is that we 
substitute the measure count for the entropy of a closed system, and replace Einstein's 
signalling technique with the two slit experiment. 
Consider some arbitrary point Pi on a closed time-like curve. Let us suppose that 
a quantum entity is emitted at P, and that this quantum entity has the measure count 
n7l I. The measure count sum of the universe as a whole at this moment of time is A/11. 
The point P, is therefore associated with a measure count sum AII. 
Let us assume for convenience that the only measurements on quantum entities 
in the universe containing the closed time-like curve we are considering are made at 
points on that particular closed time-like curve, and that no measurements on quantum 
entities have been made prior to the emission of the quantum entity at P1. We can 
therefore deduce that the measure count sum of the universe, MI, is equivalent to the 
measure count of the quantum entity emitted at PI, and that both of these are equal to 
zero. 
All = mil = 
The quantum entity emitted at P, passes through a barrier containing two slits, 
and at the point P2 on the closed time-fike curve, the quantum entity I's detected. The 
measure count of the quantum entity increases by one to inI2, and the measure count 
sum of the universe likewise increases by one to M2. The point P2 is therefore associated 
with a measure count sum M,, where M, is as follows. 
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M2 =M 12 =1 
Since M2 is greater than Alf,, we can deduce that P2 lies after P1. This deduction 
is based on the assumption that performing an act of measurement on a quantum system 
allows us to establish the temporal orientation of the universe. 
We can repeat the double slit experiment to establish that P3 lies after P2. 
Assuming that a new quantum entity is emitted at P2 and detected at P3, the measure 
count of this quantum entity increases from M21 at P2, equal to zero, to M22 at P3, equal 
to one. The measure count of the quantum entity emitted in the previous experiment 
remains at one, and needs to be taken into account when calculating the measure count 
sum of the universe as a whole. Thus we can infer that P3 is associated with a measure 
count sum A43, where A13 is as follows. 
Aý3 = n2 12 + M22 = 
We can continue to associate measure count sums with points along the time- 
like curve in this fashion. Because, however, the time-like curve is closed, we will in 
theory eventually reach an arbitrary point P, located a short time before PI, the point 
from which we started. We should be able to infer that P, is associated with a measure 
count sum A/I,,,,, where A4,,,, is defined as follows. 
MO 
This inference however conflicts with our original assumption that the point P, 
is associated with the measure count sum MI, which was equal to zero. Hence, just as 
the application of Einstein's signaling procedure along a closed time-like curve led to a 
paradox, so the application of the two slit experiment along a closed time-like curve 
leads to a similar paradox. The situation is illustrated in figure 7.2. 
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P2, associated with 
measure count SUM M2 
PI, associated with measure 
count sums Al, and M, I 
P,,, associated with 
measure count sum M. 
Fig. 7.2 On the left, a closed time-like curve in a G6delian universe is illustrated. 
The arrows indicate the temporal orientation of the curve as established at 
different points by the two slit experiment. On the right, a detail of the curve is 
illustrated. Three arbitrary points, P, P, and P2 are illustrated. The measure 
count sum associated with each point is indicated. It can be seen that the arbitrary 
point P, is, paradoxically, associated with two different measure count sums. 
4 The Causal Theory Of Time Order 
Up until now, I have focussed upon interactions deriving from thermodynamics and 
quantum mechanics in establishing the direction of time around a closed time-like curve 
in order to show that such curves do not appear to be compatible with the behaviour of 
thermodynamical and quantum mechanical systems in our universe, possibly implying 
that universes containing closed time-like curves are not physically possible. 
It is however possible to give an account of the direction of time in terms of 
causality per se, rather than in terms of specific physical interactions. 
If an account of the direction of time were required in causal terins, it would be 
possible to assert that a cause always precedes its effect, and that this fact alone is 
sufficient to establish that time has a direction. However, there are a number of 
problems With this approach. To begin with, the assumption needs to be made that cause 
does always precede effect, and it does not appear that this can simply be taken as a 
given. Furthermore, we need to identify what counts as a cause and what counts as an 
effect, and both of these activities seem to require a prior notion of temporal ordering. 
Therefore, an attempt to reduce temporal order to causal order seems to involve 
installing concepts derived from temporal order into the causal order which is being 
I. nvoked as the basis of temporal order. Sklar expresses reservations about the possibilltv 
of reducing temporal order to causal order on much these grounds. 
"We will discover that ending the restriction of attention to special relativity 
makes the reduction seem quite a bit less plausible. " (Sklar 1974, pp, 322-3) 
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Sklar's comment here is a nod to, amongst others, Reichenbach who couches his 
causal theory of time order in the context of special relativity. II 
My comments here are only intended to indicate the possibility of a causal 
theory of time order, since to do the theory justice would require detailed analysis. My 
overall strategy remains one of seeking to show that we are not compelled by our 
current theories of physics to adopt a particular temporal metaphysics. 
5 Conclusion 
The irreversibility made apparent during measurement of a quantum system provides us 
with a means of establishing a temporal orientation in a structurally simple universe. 
Such a universe can be interpreted in terms of an objectively distinguished present 
metaphysics, since at least one sequence of global time slices is defined within it, 
namely that sequence along which the measure count sum of the universe increases. 
It was shown that, if we assume that one consequence of being time-like is that 
the measure count sum associated with points along a time-like curve in a particular 
direction should always increase, then a paradox arises for a closed time-like curve of 
the type which arises in Godel's rotating universes. This paradox is similar to the 
paradox which arises if we assume that the entropy of a closed system associated with 
points along a closed time-like curve in a particular direction should always increase. 
I concluded the chapter by briefly considering whether it is possible to give an 
account of the direction of time in terms of causal ordering. 
II Confer Reichenbach 1956. 
8 
The Past, Present And Future Of 
TemporalAletaphysics 
I Static Block Universe Theories And Objectively Distinguished Present Theories 
Of Temporal Metaphysics 
Over the preceding chapters I have examined a number of proposed transitions from 
theories of physics, which embody various concepts of time, to theories of temporal 
metaphysics. I began in chapter I by postulating that there are broadly two types of 
temporal metaphysics available, a static block universe metaphysics and an objectively 
distinguished present metaphysics. 
A static block universe metaphysics, as we have seen, is one which states that 
global time slices which are defined as past, present and future moments of time by 
some arbitrary observer are not existentially distinct, that is, they all exIst In exactly the 
same way. The experience by an inhabitant of such a universe of the passage of time is 
therefore not a reflection of any underlying existential difference between time slices in 
that universe, although the experience may be explained in terms of the arrangement of 
time slices in sequence according to a varying physical property or properties. The 
experience of one temporal part of an inhabitant of such a universe is an experience of 
one time slice in a sequence of time slices, and it can be argued that this experience will 
contain an experience of the passage of time as a consequence of its place in such a 
sequence. 
An objectively distinguished present metaphysics is one which states that global 
time slices which are defined as past, present and future moments of time relative to 
some arbitrary observer are objectively distinct. The experience of the passage of time 
by an inhabitant of a universe which is correctly described in terms of an objectively 
distinguished present theory therefore reflects the physical conditions which obtain in 
The Past, Present And Future Of Temporal Metaphysics 186 
that universe, and hence the distinction drawn by such an inhabitant between past, 
present and future moments of time reflects an underlying physical distinction between 
global time slices in the universe. 
As we have seen, objectively distinguished present theories of temporal 
metaphysics can be subdivided according to whether the distinction between moments 
of time is taken to be correlated to a difference in the existential status of global time 
slices, or to a difference in the state of determinacy of global time slices. Those theorists 
who conceive of the distinction between moments of time being correlated to the 
existential status of global time slices are either presentists or growing block universe 
theorists. Those theorists who conceive of the distinction between moments of time 
being correlated to the state of determinacy of global time slices I have termed growing 
determinacy universe theorists. Growing determinacy universe theorists regard the 
existential status of global time slices as invariant, whilst claiming that their physical 
status can vary in terms of their state of determinacy. 
I noted that the distinction between presentist and growing block universe 
theories rests upon the envisaged status of past global time slices. For a presentist, only 
the present global time slice is deemed to exist. Past global time slices, like future 
global time slices, are deemed not to exist. For a growing block universe theorist, the 
present global time slice is the time slice which is coming into existence, but global 
time slices are envisaged as not going out of existence once they have come into 
existence, so that existing time slices other than the present time slice constitute past 
time slices. Global time slices are therefore cumulative in a growing block universe. 
2 Four Theories Of Physics 
In chapters 2 through to 7,1 considered four of the most important branches of modern 
physics, special relativity, general relativity, thermodynamics, and quantum mechanics, 
to ascertain whether the theories associated with each branch of physics appear to imply 
either a static block universe or an objectively distinguished present temporal 
metaphysics as the temporal metaphysics of our universe. 
(a) Special Relativity 
In chapter 2,1 considered Putnam's argument for a static block universe metaphysics on 
the basis of special relativity. According to special relativity, observers moving at 
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different velocities relative to one another define different simultaneity hyperplanes' as 
their respective present moments. Consequently, a state of affairs which lies in my 
future may lie in the present of another observer moving relative to me. If I assume that 
a present state of affairs is a state of affairs which exists, then I can conclude that a state 
of affairs which is in my future exists, since It Is present relative to another observer. On 
this basis, Putnam argues that past and future states of affairs, defined relative to some 
arbitrary observer, exist in exactly the same way as present states of affairs. This 
conclusion implies that there is no difference in the existential status of past, present 
and future states of affairs defined relative to some observer. It further implies that a 
static block universe is a universe in which all moments of time are determinate, since if 
a state of affairs in my future exists, then I cannot bring it about that that state of affairs 
does not exist when I experience that state of affairs in my present.. 
I observed that Putnam's argument is based upon a number of metaphysical 
assumptions. Putnam assumes a reality relation, to the effect that if I-now am 
simultaneous with a thing (or a state of affairs), that thing (or state of affairs) is real. 
This reality relation appears to be a basic premise of presentism. Therefore, a presentist 
who wishes to challenge Putnam's choice of reality relation will have to adopt a 
different reality relation. We saw that other reality relations have been suggested, such 
as the reality relation proposed by Stein, but noted some of the problems which arise for 
anyone adopting a reality relation other than the one adopted by Putnam. 
Putnam accepts the definition of simultaneity employed within special relativity, 
even though this definition is itself a convention which incorporates metaphysical 
assumptions. I therefore considered whether other ways of defining simultaneity might 
be possible, at least in principle, but concluded that no other ways are currently 
available in practice. 
I noted that an argument for a static block universe temporal metaphysics based 
on special relativity was rejected by Godel, some eighteen years before Putnam 
proposed his similar argument, on the grounds that special relativity strictly only applies 
to universes which do not contain matter, and therefore does not strictly apply to the 
universe which we inhabit. 2 
I Simultaneity hyperplanes are a subset of global time slices. They are definable in universes modelled on 
the basis of special relativity, but have no invariant meaning in universes modelled on the basis of general 
relativity. 
2 Special relativity can provide a good approximate description of the behaviour of systems In our 
universe, provided that the distances and masses involved in a system are not too large. Special relativity is 
not therefore suitable for describing the behaviour of our universe as a whole. 
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I concluded therefore that any argument for a static block universe temporal 
metaphysics on the basis of special relativity needs to be seen as embodying 
metaphysical assumptions already implicit in special relativity. Such an argument has 
limited use unless it is considered in the context of an appraisal of the temporal 
metaphysics implied by other theories of physics. 
(b) General Relativity 
In chapter 3,1 considered G6del's argument for a static block universe temporal 
metaphysics on the basis of general relativity. 
I began by considering Godel's concept of existential change, the type of change 
which he assumes must occur in a universe if that universe is to be appropriately 
described in physically distinguished present terms. Godel suggests that the only 
coherent account one can give of a physically distinguished present theory is an account 
in which moments of time are described as passing into and out of existence. He only 
appeared to consider presentism therefore. 
I then proceeded to examine G6del's argument against presentism. As we 
observed, G6del had modelled some universes on the basis of Einstein's field equations, 
the equations which constitute the mathematical foundations of general relativity, such 
that the model universes contain space-time structures called closed time-like curves. 
These curves are distributed in such a way throughout the space-time of Godelian 
universes that it is not possible to foliate a G6delian universe by a sequence of global 
time slices and therefore it is not possible to give an objectively distinguished present 
account of such universes. Consequently, they can only be described in static block 
universe terms. 
Although G6del's argument is specifically aimed against presentism, I noted that 
both a growing block universe theorist and a growing determinacy theorist need to be 
able to define a sequence of global time slices in a universe, so that if it is impossible to 
define such a sequence in a Godellan universe, no objectively distinguished present 
account of such a universe can be given. 
I concluded chapter 3 by noting that an advocate of an objectively distinguished 
present metaphysics is entitled to point out that there may be physical criteria, deducible 
perhaps from other theories of physics, which rule out Godelian universes as physically 
possible. 
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(c) The Modal Step 
In chapter 4,1 examined Savitt's analysis of Godel's argument. Savitt points out that, if 
our universe is not a G6delian universe (G6del nowhere claims that it is), then G6del is 
only entitled to conclude that our universe cannot be described in terms of an 
objectively distinguished present temporal metaphysics, on the basis of his observation 
that a Gddelian universe cannot be described in terms of an objectively distinguished 
present temporal metaphysics, if he can justify taking what Savitt terms a modal step. 
Gbdel needs to motivate the transition from the observation that some universes 
which conform to Einstein's field equations are not describable in objectively 
distinguished present terms, to the claim that all universes which conform to Einstein's 
field equations, including our own, are not describable in objectively distinguished 
present terms. 
I suggested that this modal step may be difficult to motivate. It rests on the 
assumption that the temporal metaphysics of a physically possible universe is 
necessarily the temporal metaphysics of all physically possible universes. I indicated 
that this assumption can at least be called into question. 
Since Godel is not claiming that our universe is a Godelian universe, he can also 
be understood as assuming that it is conformity to Einstein's field equations which 
dictates the temporal metaphysics of a universe, rather than the existence of spacetime 
structures such as closed time-like curves within that universe. For G6del, closed time- 
like curves appear to be evidence that the appropriate temporal metaphysics for 
-universes which conform to Einstein's field equations is a static block universe 
metaphysics, but it is conformity to the field equations themselves which is the reason 
why non-G6delian universes can only be described in static block universe terms. 
Given that Godel himself refers to universes which conform to Einstein's field 
equations but which are not G6delian universes as universes which can be described in 
objectively distinguished present terms, his assumption that all universes which conform 
to Einstein's field equations are in fact static block universes appears to be unjustified, 
but seems to derive from the particular way in which he interprets the field equations as 
laws of nature. 
Savitt's analysis of G6del's argument is of assistance to any theorist who wishes 
to maintain that an objectively distinguished present theory is a possible account of the 
temporal metaphysics of our universe, whether that theorist is proposing a presentist, 
growing block universe or growing determinacy theory. 
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Thermodynamics 
In chapter 5,1 examined Einstein's response to universes modelled by Godel. Einstein 
points out that general relativity does not appear to imply a temporal orientation for 
time-like curves of any kind, whether closed or open, but suggests that it might be 
possible to establish a temporal orientation by recourse to thermodynamical 
considerations. 
Einstein observes that a point from which a signal is sent on a time-like curve 
must be located at an earlier moment of time than the point on the same time-like curve 
at which the signal is received. We can deduce that the point from which the signal is 
sent is at an earlier moment than the point at which the signal is received because the 
sending of a signal increases entropy, and the second law of thermodynamics implies 
that for any two moments of time, the entropy associated with the later moment will 
always be higher than (or the same as) the entropy associated with the earlier moment. 
The entropy associated with the later moment will never be lower than the entropy 
associated with the earlier moment, according to the second law of thermodynamics. 
The sending of a signal therefore allows us to establish the temporal orientation 
of a time-like curve. I indicated that when we apply Einstein's signalling technique to a 
closed time-like curve of the type which occurs in a G6dellan universe, a paradox arises, 
If we assume that the same temporal orientation is maintained all the way around the 
closed time-like curve, then we find that we can demonstrate for any arbitrary point on 
the closed time-like curve that the point is associated with at least two different 
entropies. I considered whether we should therefore deny the physical possibility of 
universes containing closed time-like curves, on the grounds that they cannot conform 
to the second law of thermodynamics. 
By identifying as a privileged sequence of global time slices that sequence of 
time slices along which the entropy of a universe as a whole consistently increases, it is 
possible to establish a privileged sequence of time slices in a universe which conforms 
to the second law of thermodynamics. Such a universe is therefore compatible with an 
objectively distinguished present temporal metaphysics. 
I noted that although the second law of thermodynamics may enable us to 
identify a privileged sequence of global time slices in a universe, it does not suggest that 
one of the hyperplanes in this sequence is physically distinct from any of the other 
hyperplanes in the sequence. It does not therefore imply an objectively distinguished 
present theory in preference to a static block universe theory. I concluded therefore that 
whilst a universe which conforms to the second law of thermodynamics is compatible 
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with an objectively distinguished present metaphysics, thermodynamics does not imply 
that either a static block universe or an objectively distinguished present temporal 
account is the correct account of the temporal metaphysics of such a universe. 
(e) Quantum Mechanics 
In chapter 6,1 considered various interpretations of quantum mechanics, before going 
on to consider whether performing a measurement on a quantum system brings about an 
I. rreversible change in the evolution of that system. I indicated that the observed 
irreversibility of measurement of quantum systems may be interpreted as a reflection of 
the direction of time in the universe as a whole, rather than an irreversibility intrinsic to 
quantum mechanical systems. 
In chapter 7,1 considered a universe in which quantum measurement either 
brings about or serves to indicate irreversible change, and noted that it is possible to 
define a privileged sequence of global time slices in such a universe. The privileged 
sequence of time slices In such a universe is the sequence along which the changes 
brought about by measurements of quantum systems are irreversible. Such a universe is 
therefore compatible in principle with an objectively distinguished present temporal 
metaphysics. 
I went on to observe that if measurement of a quantum system can be used to 
indicate the direction of time in a universe, then we can use such measurement to 
establish a temporal orientation on a t1me-like curve in much the same way as we can 
use Einstein's signalling technique. 
I demonstrated that if we perform measurements on quantum systems around a 
closed time-like curve of the type found in Godelian universes, in order to establish the 
temporal orientation of the closed time-like curve, then a paradox arises similar to the 
paradox which arises when we apply Einstein's signalling technique around such a 
closed time-like curve. The paradox was observed to arise if we assume that the same 
temporal orientation can be defined all the way around the closed time-like curve. 
I concluded the chapter by briefly considering whether it is possible to explain 
the direction of time in terms of a causal theory. 
3 An Overview Of The Analysis 
I began by examining proposed transitions from the special and general theories of 
relativity to temporal metaphysics, proposed transitions which interpret both theories of 
The Past, Present And Future Of Temporal Metaphysics 192 
relativity as implying a static block universe metaphysics. I indicated that the 
proponents of these arguments based on relativity tend to conceive of objectively 
distinguished present theories as implying that the physical difference between global 
time slices, as reflected in the description of moments of time as past, present or future, 
must consist in the existential status of those time slices. The concept of a objectively 
distinguished present is commonly interpreted, both by its supporters and its opponents, 
as implying a presentist metaphysics in which future moments of time do not exist, the 
present moment of time does exist, and past moments of time do not exist. Some 
theorists, termed growing block universe theorists, envisage past moments of time 
existing in addition to the present moment of time. 
Inspired in part by Aristotle's account of temporal metaphysics, I went on to 
consider whether the distinction between global time slices which is reflected in the 
description of moments of time as past, present and future could consist in the state of 
determinacy of those moments, rather than their existential status. Thus I considered 
whether we might equate future moments of time with indeterminate global time slices, 
past moments of time with determinate global time slices, and the present moment of 
time with that global time slice which is becoming determinate. 
Couching an objectively distinguished present theory in terms of determinacy 
allows one to describe a block universe, a universe in which a complete sequence of 
global time slices is defined, in terms of a growing determinacy metaphysics. Although 
all the global time slices in the block universe are posited to exist, the fact that the 
sequence of time slices is in transition from indeterminacy to determinacy implies that 
the experience by an inhabitant of such a universe of the passage of time reflects an 
actual physical difference between time slices in that universe. 
Although the concept of determinacy allows one to describe a potential objective 
correlate of the experience of the passage of time by an inhabitant of a block universe, 
the implied temporal metaphysics is that of a growing determinacy universe rather than 
that of a static block universe, since it relies upon a distinction in the state of 
determinacy of moments of time, and it is precisely such a distinction which static block 
universe theories deny. 
4 Physics, Metaphysics, And Model Universes 
At no point have I claimed in the preceding chapters that an objectively distinguished 
present temporal metaphysics, either expressed in terms of existential status or in terms 
of determinacy, provides us with the correct description of the temporal metaphysics of 
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our universe. The arguments I have considered have rather been designed to show that 
the theories of physics which we currently possess, although they do indeed embody 
concepts of time, do not conclusively imply either that a static block universe temporal. 
metaphysics or that an objectively distinguished present temporal metaphysics is the 
metaphysics of the universe we inhabit. 
The process of modelling a universe on the basis of a theory of physics in order 
to justify a particular metaphysical claim was observed to raise some important issues. 
G6del interpreted the fact that he was able to model universes on the basis of Einstein's 
field equations such that these universes could not be foliated by a sequence of global 
time slices as evidence that any universe which conformed to Einstein's field equations, 
any physically possible universe, should be described in terms of a static block universe 
metaphysics rather than an objectively distinguished present metaphysics. 
I have sought to demonstrate, in response to G6del's interpretation, that possible 
universes, universes which are modelled on the basis of one or more of the laws of 
nature to which our universe conforms, although they may imply a particular 
metaphysics for themselves, do not unambiguously imply that the same metaphysics is 
the appropriate description of our own universe. 
It might be considered that the more closely a possible universe resembles our 
universe in terms of the laws of the nature to which it conforms, the more likely it is that 
a temporal metaphysics which constitutes an appropriate description of that possible 
universe would constitute an appropriate description of our universe. 
5 The Future Of Theory 
We can observe that metaphysical issues tend to arise where there are two or more ways 
of interpreting the available empirical evidence. The development of the theory of 
relativity in the early years of the twentieth century was perceived by some theorists, 
both physicists and philosophers, as allowing them to interpret the physical evidence to 
which the theory of relativity related as evidence for static block universe theories of 
temporal metaphysics in preference to objectively distinguished present theories of 
temporal metaphysics. We have seen that one is only entitled to interpret the theory of 
relativity as supporting static block universe theories if one selectively ignores the 
metaphysical assumptions which are built in to the theory of relativity, and if one does 
not take account of other theories of physics which by no means categorically imply 
static block universe theories. 
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As new theories of physics become available, it will be necessary to assess 
whether they unambiguously imply either static block universe or objectively 
distinguished present theories of temporal metaphysics. It is to be hoped that some of 
the considerations which have been examined in the preceding pages will assist 
philosophers in making these types of assessment. 
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